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THE RAILROADS OF THE UlUTED STATES U:lIDER GOVEFnr.rmNT 
OPERATION DURING THE WORLD WAR 
Chapter I. 
General Condition of the Railroads Prior to the 
Declaration of Vf ar by the United Stat es, April 6, 1917. 
In time of war as it is conducted in modern timea, 
a nation is completely dependent upon its transportation 
syGtem for the success of its army. Durin~ a time of war, 
railroadA have two functions to perform, first the 
military or~ strate~ic function as had the railroads of 
northern and eastern France and second, the econorai c 
function of military operation as had the railroads of the 
United States. The activities of the railroads of 
northern and easter11 France were concerned entireJ..y with 
the military operations of the country but the activities 
of the railroad8 of thi1=3 country were concerned with the 
movement of tr oops and army suppliec; and at the same ti.me 
with m ai ntai ni 11£'.6 the or di nary~ commercial and i nduA trial 
life of the nation. 1. 
The railroads of thic;; cruntry were not totally 
u1riprepared for such work as our entry into the i,yar placed 
upon them becau8e the problem9 relative to that ~ction by 
1. Jfa.rshal Joffre, the French military leader durint; the 
early years of the World War c;aid, "The battle of the Harne 
war:; won by the railvvayrJ of France. ThiB is a railway war." 
Dixon and Parmalee--War Administration of the Railways 
in the United Stat es and Great 1~ri tian.--p. iii. 
\ 
our Government had been thought out bef <?r ehand by railroad 
officials and the preliminary steps toward coordinatint?; 
and unifying the operations of the railraads had already 
been taken before the Un.! t ed States entered the war. 
Former wars in which the United States had been a partici-
pant had shown the weak links in our transportation sys-
tem; so officials knew· what steps must be taken in order to 
secure the results desired. 
The first war in the United Stat es in which rail-
roads were a eignificant factor, was the Civil War. By 
an Act of. Con.gr ess on January 31, 1862, the President of 
the United Sta~es was authorized to take possession of 
the railroads if the public eafety required it. During 
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that war a total of 2105 miles, all of it be int?; in the 
states of Vir~inia, Missiesippi, and ~orth Carolina was 
taken over by the Governmen1t in order to restore connections 
between the North and the Sou th. This was a war measure 
only and the lines were restored as soon as the exiisency 
wae over. 
During the Spanish-American War, the operations of 
the railroads were a valuable lesson as to the results of 
decentralization of authority in transportation matters •. 
The railroads transported nearly on.e-ha.lf million men 
without·trouble but completely broke down when they 
attempted to supply the camps with provisions. Con.ge13tion 
was created in the movement of eupplieA. Frei~ht cars 
were not labeled. No one knew what the cars contained or 
where supplies were to be found. There was no compre-
hensive plan or dentralization of authority. 
'When trouble broke out on the Mexican border in 1915, 
. railroad officials remembered this former experience and 
took steps to prevent its recurrence. In May 1914, 
the War Department a6ked the American Railway Association 
to locate an officer in Washin.gton who could advise with 
the Q,uartermaster CuDps, which or~anization is responsible 
for all army transportation, and in October 1915, the 
ciuatt ermaat er General asked· that the American Railway 
Association establish a commiaaion on military transpor-
tation with which he could co-operate in the movement of 
troop~ and supplies. Thie commission was co~posed of 
four prominent railroad officials, Fairfax Harrischn, 
R. H._Aishton, A. W. Thompson, and W. G. Besler. 
When mobilization took place in June 1916, one 
railroad official was stationed at the 6ffice of the 
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Q,uart ermast er General, one at each Wa:r Department head-
quarters of which there are five, and one at each mobiliza-
tion camp. These officials were to assist and give in-
formation and· advice concer rd.nl$ the moirement of troops 
and GoYernment supplies. Inspectors were also appointed 
for all unloading points to keep iriforme/d as to conditions 
exietin~ at these places. '~Chis action was taken in order 
to avoid con~estion. A committee ~as al$O appointed to 
handle the distribution of passenger equipment, and the 
Pullman Company establis;hed an office in Washington to 
direct the. distribution of sleepinig cars. Movement in 
all cages waa conducted without delay or conigestion. 
The railroad history of the United States may be 
divided into three periods, the formative period from 
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1826 un.til 18?5, the competitive period from 1875 until 
1906, and the reC5Ulative period from 1906 until the present 
time or when the railroads were taken. over and operated 
by the Government .2. Durin/S the first period the build-
i niS of railroads was encouraged in every way possible 
both by the state and the Federal Governments. Durin~ the 
second period or the competitive period there was cut-
throat competition. and rate wars between the different 
railroads of the country and althou~h the Interstate 
Commerce Act was passed durin~ this period, regulation 
did n.ot become very strict or effective until the third 
period. The Hepburn Act of 1906 in.au~rated the third 
period in the history of the railroads and rel$Ulation under 
ite and the Mann-Elkins. Act which was passed in 1910 has 
been much more strict and effective than durin~ either 
of' the other periods. The Hepburn Act was aimed at the 
abuses of secret rebates, the wholesale grantinig of pasee.s, 
I ' , 
the jugglin~ of railroad finances, and the c~rrupt 
political practi~ea of the railroads. It has succeeded 
in abdlishinl$ these and in doinig so has rendered the 
country a very ~r eat e er vice but at the same time this 
2. Dunn, Samuel 0.--Ten_ Year$ of Railroad Regulation, 
·scri bners, October 1916---p .-412. 
reG$Ulation has had some bad effects upon the railroads. 
However, in the f'inal analysis, railroad official$ are 
r esponsi bl e :Bor the enactment of such strict r e.gulation 
because they would no+comply with more lenient laws. 
The con$olidation and combination of several lines 
into one system in attempts to eliminate competition,· 
to maintain rate and other a~reements, and to evade the 
law, have cau6ed the railroads a ~reat deal of ~rief. 
Such practices aroused suspicion in the minds of the people 
and made them all the more ea~er in their demands for 
more strict railway re~u~ation. The most of such consoli-
dations were formed between 1890 and 1906. Two 6~ the 
best examples that we have are the Northern Securities 
Company and the Union Pacific-Southern Pacific Mer~er. 
The Northern Securities Compan,y was a holding com-
pany formed by the Great Northern and the Northenn Pacific 
Railroad Companie~ to hold the stock of these two systems 
thus preventing other interests from securing control of 
them. These two systems which jointly owned the Burlin~.:. 
ton, wished to build up a great transportation system 
in the Northwe6t and wanted a permanent basis upon which 
to build; so the interests of the Northern Pacific and 
the Great Northern Railroad Companie5=3 were united. 
The Union Pacific-Sou ~hern Pacific Mercser which was 
mana€ed by Harriman who was also at the head of the 
Union Pacific Hailroad, i.s.: one of the most remarkable 
t 
chapters in our industrial history. It was probably the 
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largest both as concerns geographical extent and financial 
magnitude of its kind in the world. The Union Pacific 
purehaaed the Sout'hern Pacific outri_ght and owned a 
majority of the stock in $everal small lines, and a 
controlling interest in many of the larger systems of the 
country. That company had a controllin~ interest in.a 
continuous line of railroade from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. The 6$Uidin~ principle in the consolidation was 
the creation of a monopoly in all tranacontinental 
business, and the problem which was to eliminate com-
petition, was being rapidly s ol~ed when the Government 
took a hand in the affair. The ~mall holdings of other 
companies enabled the Union Pacific to exercise a powerful 
influence on the trafffic policy concerned. 
The policy of re@llation after 1906 was an outgrowth 
of the previous period when conditions surroundin~ the· 
railroads were totally different from those existin~ then. 
For a few years previous to 1906, the railroads made larESe 
earnings and great optimism prevailed. Political leaders, 
eager for an issue, thouJ?;ht that the public should share 
in these ,earnings; so agitation ~or lower rates be~an. 
Public opinion was thus turned against the :tailroafts ~ A 
state of mind, hostile to carriers, waa ereated in 
nearly every le~islative body. Railroad officials are 
partly responaible·for the adverse public opinion. becauBe 
of their refusal to recognize the fact that in their 
operation, the public demands first consideration. If the 
public which formerly considered the railroads as sources 
of private profit only, and railroad officials had lont?; · 
ago reco~nized the fact. that the t'ailroads are vested 
with a public interest, many of the difficult problems 
confronting the railroads to-day would have been aolved. 
The reason for such large earnings prior to 1906 was 
because the railroads had been built and paid for ahead 
of the traffic. By 1906 the traffic had caught up with 
the milea~e and has renuvined so 8ince that time. On 
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account of. in.creasing expenses and the increasinq; diff.iculty 
in securinig rate advances and new capital the railroads 
were unable to undertake new conetruction and to add e.s . 
much new equipment as was needed, with the result that 
by the autumn of 1915, they were unable to handle the 
normal increase in business. Ex-President Ta.ft best 
summarizes the reasons for the conditions of the railroads 
in the tallowing: 
"The railroadi:; long aP:;o abused their privileges, E?;ranted 
undue piscriminations, built up rate trusts, encouraged 
rebates, and sought to corruptly control legislatures ·and 
politics .I '1 he people demanded reform. It came slowly 
in interstate commerce regulation. The railroads flouted 
the law until in 1910 the G !!Nernment was given by Congress 
a supervision so drastic that they could no longer defy 
the people. 'l1hen the restrainin.£?; a·r them became too 
severe, the rat es they were-: permitted to charge were too 
low, the wa~e$ they had to pay were inclfeas ed by law and 
by necessity, then other expense~ grew enormously, their 
incomer::; were cu~ or wiped out, and they were driven to the 
wall. When the war came on they were not able to carry 
8 
the load thrown upon them, lar~ely because the law prevented 
such cooperation as would ep_onomize their ener~ies, and 
because the treatment by the Government had taken away 
their er edit to .secure the capital to enlart?;e their· 
f ac ili ti es." 3. 
INCREASED OPERATING EXPENSES 
The adverse condition in which the railroads found 
thernselvea in the autumn of 1915 was due to the lack of 
earnings. 'J.'he policy of the carriers had always been 
to keep equipment and facilities well ahead of the ~rowth 
of traffic, meetin.i$ the costs from income and from the 
sale of securities: '.L'here always wai:; an ample mar.gin of 
aafety for handling the· increasin.g_ volume of freit?;ht and 
pass en.gers. Their ability to continue such a policy de-
pended on the amount of earnings which' acted as e~;d;a,i::;is 
... '~ ~~· f' 
for additional credit and· ae long as they were receiving 
,QT'" 
sufficient earn.in.gs they eJllloount~ed no qifficulty in !'.;ecur-
in.g new capital throu~h the sale of securitie8. 
For a tir.ae, the railroads were able to abs orb in-
er easing coi:;ti:; because of lower unit operatin~ costs 
which crone about throu~h the makin65 of improvernent8 and 
enlaJ?;~ements and the increased traffic, and while this 
3. Taft, Wm .--Mr. Wilson and the Campai~n--Yale Review--
October 1920--p. 20. 
condition existed, investors had confidence in the ae-
curi ti ea of the railroads but a turnin.g :point came a bout 
1906. The gradual rise in operatin~ cost~ which had been 
evident since about 1900 or shortly before, coupled with 
the national and state policy of regulation which tended 
to d,ecrease rates, soon reduced net earnings. At this 
time there was a f6I'eat deal of activity on the part of 
state commsmsions and legi8latures. Lawe, reducing 
reverues and increasin.g expenses, were enacted; taxes 
increased; and labor organizations demanded hi~her wages. 
The railroads tried to convice the Interstate Commerce 
Commi~~ion that hi~her rates were needed but were un-
Buccessful. 'the inevitable result which .:trar sighted men 
had predicted became evident. There wa$ dra$tic re-
trencbment and curtailment of service, the only thing 
possible for the· railroads if they were to remain solvent. 
As it was m~y of them experienced a great deal of 
difficulty to keep out of the hands of the receiver, 
and not all of them did that hecause at tfuii:> time about 
one-sixth of the total railroad mileage of the country 
was in the hands of the receivers, or more than had ever 
been in the receiver's hands at any one time previous to 
this. The point· of tra£fic Baturation had been reached. 4. 
4. Cunningham, Wm. J .--The Railroad Under Government 




The wages were one of the largest items of operatinE?; 
expenses. In 1916, wages YH!r e taking the igr eat er part 
of groas revenue but in September of that year the 
Adamson Eight-Hour Law which increased them still more, 
was enacted. This law provided for a basic eight-hour 
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day with pay for overtime at the rate of time and one-half 
instead of a ten hour day with pay for overtime in pro-
portion to the tota1·tirne put in as wa6 the case under the 
previous agreement. 'l'his law increased the wage bill 
directly $6~000,000 and increased it yet· another $50,000,000 
that had to be paid for o~rertime. 








m. of line 757 
Hours worked(thousands)5,559,324 
Com:pen'3ation 1 $2, 686, 734. 
Per employee, per yr;. $ 1,416 
Per hour (cents) · 48 
Ratio to revenue$ ( %) 54. 06 










The next ~reatest increaBe in operating expenses was the coat of materials needed in the railroad business. IncreaBed cost of' equipment: 6. 
5. Thompson, S. Railway StatiBtica of the U.S.~-1918-p. 65. 6. Increa~ed Gost of Equ~pment--Ry~ Review--Dec. 9,1916-j.790 
Mikado engines 
Mallet S:ngi nes 
Steel 50 ton· frei~ht care 








1, 200 . 2, 500 
11{~ per lb. 28¢ 
26.80 per ton 28.00 
150% increase. 

















. 105, 000, 000 
$ 120,091,534 




Some fiL?;Ures regarding rates will be given at this 
point in order to make a comparison betwe-en the trend of 
expenses and reve rue. 
RAtea. 9. (cents) 
1913 .729 per ton mile 
1914 .733 " ff .. 1915 .732 " II " 1916 • 716 " " " 
Rates were the highest in 1904 that they had been 
since 1896. In 1896 they were .806¢ per ton mile and in 
1904 they were .78¢ per ton mile. Since 1904 they have 
declined and ,in 1916 they were the lowe$t that they had 
ever been. 
These tables show· just what the railroads were con-
fronted with in regard to operating expenses. In eome 
11 
7. Increase8 of 1916 over 1915--Ry. Age. Apr.6,1917. p. 728. 
8. Report of Interstate Commerce Commission--1917--p.36. 
9. Report of Interstate Commer:Be Commission--1917--p.36. · 
instances the coat of equipment and materials had more 
than doubled within two years, taxes were about twelve 
million dollars greater in 1916 than in 1915, while in 
1916 rates were the lowest that they had ever been. 
Op er at in~ costs had been gradually increasing for about 
fifteen years but after 1914 they took a sudden jump 
upward and as the railroad lbusiness is always conducted 
on a very narrow margin, there should be but little or 
no surpri6e then that with the above conditions to combat, 
the railroads failed to perform their proper function 
after 1915. 
THE TRAFFIC INCREASE 
The increase of traffic in the autumn of 1915 caused 
a .gr eat deal of trouble. This was not an increase fol-
lowin~ a period of expansion a$ was the case in 1907 
but was an increase followin~ a period of depression. 
If the increaBe had followed a period of expanaion the 
railroads could have handled it better because they 
would have had more cars, and would have been prepared 
betwer ih every way, but from 1913 until 1915 freight 
traffic declined and there were many idle cars. Mana~ers 
tried to reduce operatin~ expenses and at the same time 
tried to comrinee:.~re~lati 1165 authorities that a rate 
increase was necessary but they· were uneucceBeful in both. 
The increase in traffic in 1915 waB as unheralded and 
unlooked for as it was unprecedented in amount. The 
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in.crease brou~ht a large increaee in tSross earning~ but 
at the sa:me time expenses be~an to ri$e rapidly Bo that it 
wa~ impoa$ible for. the railroads to maintain their net 
return upon a satisfactory basis. 
When the war broke out in Europe, tho$e countries 
ceased manufacturin~ everythin~ except war necessities 
and they could not fill their own demands fCDr those 
products; so they had to come to the United States for 
their ram"materials and a great amount of manufactured 
products. That caused many new manufacturing establish-
ments to be built here. Materials for the construction of 
these had to be transported. Then, after they were com-
pleted, raw material and coal had to be gotten to them. 
to keep them iri operation; and fin.ally the finished 
products had to be tran$ported to the seaports for ship-
ment. In addition to thi !3 the railroads had t'o transport 
foodstuffs for export and for the new war industries. 
There was a demand fDl!m new traffic and from many different 
sources of traffic. There was also an abnormal movement 
in new and unaccustomed directions. These conditions 
placed much heavier burdens upon the railroads than 
. they were prepared to bear. 
CON.F'LIC'l' OF STATE AND FEDERAL UGULATION. 
Much state re~ulation of railroads conflicted with 
and much was a duplication of federal re~ulation. This 
caused a great waste to the railroads both in time and in 
14 
money. Each state desires to protect ite own citizeps 
and industries in their competition with those of other 
states; so laws to that effect were placed upon statute 
books. Much of this regulation inconveniences the rail-
roads. One state require$ screens on the windows but 
another state forbids them; one state orders cuspidors 
in cars but an adjacent one forbids them. The states 
have non-uniform headlight and safety appliance laws; 
the Federal Government also has a safety appliance law. 
Such le.gialation hampers the activities of the railroads 
and makes it impossible for them to give their best 
service, and it also weakens the whole transportation 
system. States .aeek for that which is best fo:r their 
citizens, not for that which ie best for the nation. 
But railroads go from one state to another, are operated 
as a sinigle unit, and not with state lines as division 
points. State regulating bodies.should recognize this 
point. 
OPPOSITION OF THE INTlmSTATE cmnlERCE COMlvfISSIOlT TO 
RATE INCREASES. 
The railroads tried many times in the period int er-
vening between 1906 and 1917 to secure rate increases 
but their de.mande were .generally ref'used. The Knt..erstate 
Commerce Commission is composed of a body of intelli~ent 
men but many of them went on the Commi8sion with little 
knowled~e of railroadin~ or else were prejudiced against 
the railroads. They have dealt. only with the pathology 
of railroad busine$S. In dealing with the ±ailroads, 
they have acted as a sort of a detect! ve agency and thus 
have lost aight of.the fact that they might do construc-
tive work for the riilroada and at the same time protect 
the public. It seems that some of the Commissioners 
have iet their enthusiasm for protecting the public .get 
the better part of their good judgment and common sense. 
This at ti tu de on the par.t of some of the Commissioners is 
another relic of the conditions exi$ting prior to 1906. 
The Commii:;sioners have generally, as far as the welfare 
of the railroad8 was concerned, used a shortsighted 
policy in deciding rate cases, giving but little thought 
to the effect that their decisions might have on·the 
railroad~ in the future. Of course there are mBlty 
difficulties encountered in deciding a rate case. Many 
times it might seem to the average person that a rate 
advance wa8 entirely justifiable, when if he knew the 
real conditions surrounding the case, he might change 
his mind. ,In many cq.ses a carrier is justified in asking 
for increased rat es, but if they were granted great in-
justices would oe worked to· ce±tain interest.s as for 
example, coal and lumber operators who are workin€ under 
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a contract for a period of time. Competition bet'ween 
different railrcmds, between localities, and between in-
duijtrie$ must also be considered. The Commiseion has held 
to the theory that a city is erttitled to natural advan-
ta~ee but not to undue preference by carriers. It will 
not 1?;rant rate!=> to: .. allow one market of supply to compete 
with another, an.d in deciding lon~ and ehort haul cases 
it claims that the.interests of the producer$ and commun-
itie~ are involved as much a~ those of the carriere. 
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In decidin~ the Fifteen Percent Case in June 1917, 
when the railwaya of the whole country asked for· a fifteen 
percent increase in rates because they claimed an 
emerE?;ency which required prompt remedial meai:;urea ~xisted, 
the advance was refused to all but~ lines in Official 
· Clas~ification Territory, and thoae line£3 secured only an 
increase of about eleven cents a ton on bituminous coal, 
coke, and iron ore between Chicago and New York, because 
the Commi$sion claimed that the figures presented did not 
show a country wide emergency, and that these figures 
also showed moet lines to be in a presperous condition 
and that action was not justified becauBe of the needB 
of a few weak lines when most line$ were in good condition. 
The CommisBion was also of the opinion that refueing to 
grant hi$er rate£3 would not retard the prosecution of 
the war and that granting them would not facilitate i te 
prosecution. 
The Commission ciaims that "A reasonable rate is one 
which will provide a return to the form of a constant profit. 11 
10. This is a simple definiition but one encounters many 
difficulties in trying to determine juat rate$ upon such a 
Io. Report of Int er.~t?tt e ,tcornmer·ce Commisei on--1'9 08--p. 83. 
basis. To determine a just rate one should know the size 
of the investment account of a railroad and in the past 
this has been a difficult factor to determine because 
no uniform method of valuation has been worked out until 
recently; so there was no r_eliable baaia upon which to 
work when tYJ"ing to determine rates upon investment ae a 
basis. The Commission had to acqept the accounts of 
1"1 
the railroadB in such cases and these were not always 
reliable or best suited to the purpose. This example 
shows only one of the many difficulties with which the 
Commiesion came face to face in trying to reach a decision 
as to what rate was a just one. 
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS 
IMPAIRED CREDIT 
The small earnings of the railroads had destroyed 
their basis for securing dredit. The credit of a rail-
road depends upon its earnin~ power and that ·in turn 
depends upon the rates which it is permitted to charge. 
In 1914 and 1915 the credit of .the railroads reached its 
mare;in. During those years, one-sixth of the total 
mileage of the country waa in the.hands of recei~ers. 
All railroads that were in the receiver's hands were not 
there becau,se of conditions due primarily to insu:dficient 
earnings. The credit of some of the lineG, notably the 
WabaFJh, had been used for expansion when it should have 
been used in purcha$ing equipment. That line had 
extensive rather than intensive development. Other systems, 
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e:specially the Rock Island and the New Haven had been under 
the control of unscrupulous and dishonest management 
and would have been in the receiver's hand$ even with 
hif$her rat ee. These· two sy$t ems should have been well 
payin~ ones had not their management used the properties 
ae the basis for such financial operations. This pl aced 
a heavy debt upon the stockholders fDom the effects of 
which it will take many.) years to recover. 
Everythin~ done in the railroad business is a means 
to secure revenue with which tc expand and if railways 
do not earn enou~h to do thi·s they will have to borrow. 
If a railroad borrows too much, its debt becomes out of 
proportion to its stock and its credit will decline. 
That is what happened to our railroad$. 
Before the war started the railroads could have 
secured capital had they the credit, but after the war 
etarted they would have been unable to secure it unless 
they had paid very high ratee and this they were unable 
to do. After the war started, we were makinss large 
. . 
loans to the Allies, and this with the demand for capital 
from the industrial eetablishmenta which were bidding.hi.gh. r • 
for capital, took all of our surplus capital. Also at 
thia time two-thirds of our foreign held securitie8 were 
returned and $2,000,000,000 of these were railroad 
s e cur it i ea • 
In 1907 J"arnes J. Hill es·timated that ei6Sht and one-
fourth billion dollars would be required in the next five 
years to properly move the nations commerce, but durin&S 
that period only about one-third of that amount was 
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added. He also said that an addition of about five percent 
should be made annually to mileage but during that 
same period only one and one-eight percent was added 
annually. 11. 
METHODS OF FINANCE 
During the period of insufficient earnings the 
railroads had to uee an increasing amount of bonds and 
shert term notee with which to finance themeelves. Their 
credit was so poor·:that people would advance them credit 
o~y upon the best of security. Thie method of financing 
increased fixed charges and causedlar~e expenditures 
which should have gone for development purposes. 
Capital for new construction:- 12. (thousands) 
Bonds 
Stock 
Total new money 
















The above table show$ two conditions. The first is 
that bonds are greatly in excess of stock, and the· second 
is that the amount of money bein~ put into new conetnuction 
and betterments was rapidly ~owin~ less each year. The 
ll. Hill, Jamee J.--Railroad Situation--Worlds Work,Oct. 
1917--p. 593. 
12. New Railway Capi tal--Hailway AJ?:e--February 23, 1916--
P. 300. 
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credit of most the lines wae so poor that they experienced 
increasing difficulty in their efforts to sell stock. 
Investors wanted the best of security when they advanced 
money to the carriere. 
THE EQ,UIPJIJfENT SHORTAGE 
In 1914 and 1915, the railroads did not have the 
money nor the credit with which to purcha~e equipment, 
1915 bein~ an especially bad year. In 1916, an especially 
profitable year, they had money with which to buy equip-
ment but they could not secure it ae fast as it was needed. 
When the railroads were unable to buy equipment, manu-
facturers reduced its production with the result that 
when ·a heavy demand was placed upon them they were unable 
to meet it. The same condition probably would have 
exiated not to such a great extent thou~h, if the railways 
had been able to buy equipment in 1914 and 1915. Business 
was slack durin.g those years and many idle cars were 
standing on the tracks deteriorating; so there is little 
possibility that the nailroads would have bought extra 
care even had they foreseen the heavy future demand, 
and have allowed them to stand idle on the tracks.· 
Manufacturers of equipment would have been in the same 
condition in either case. 
In 1915, there was congestion in eastern terminal.s 
and sporadic and local car shortages but the situation 
did not beco~e serious. This condition nearly always 
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·occurs in the fall and winter months when crops are being 
moved, due to tha fact that cars can.not be unloaded at 
terminals. Again in the autumn of 1916, the situation 
became worse than ever and rapidly grew worse until tn 
the winter and spring of 1917 we had the worst car shortage 
in the history of the country. 
There are many reasons for the congestion. in eastern 
terminals and the resultin~ car shortage in the west, · 
probably the most important one being the lack of 8hipping 
space for export traffic. Ocean travel at thi ~ part icula.r 
time was very uncertain because of the effectiveness of 
German submarine warfare. When there was no ship awaiting 
exports all that could be done was to leave the goods 
in the car or unload them upon the ground. While the 
latter .practice was employed to· some extent, the former 
was employed most because prices were so high that owners 
of the productF> could afford to pay demurra15e charfSeS. 
Another very important re as on also was the $ho rt age 
of motive povv~r and the use of antiquated machinery in 
sh<hps, which caused a loss in the time of making repairs • 
.B1rank McMana.my s,aid, "Ten million dollar!? spent on. shop 
machinery and equipment before the war started would 
have made the Government control unnecessary. "15. 
The railroads were at this time especially short on 
8Witchin~ and 8hort haul power. 
A third reason for the congestion was bad traffic 
rules. Cars were us.ed as stor:e house13; there was no 
13. Shop and Engine House Equipment and Faclli tie$, --
Railway Age, January 3, 1920--p. 405 
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priority in shipment; movement was slow, for four to eight 
days being the average from points in Iowa to Chicago, 
and there were delays in switchinl$ ,to·:points of unloading 
and through terminals. The reconsi~nment of cars by 
shippers was also responsible for rnuch trouble. There 
was also a lack of rules for the interchange of cars. 
Western lines lost all their cars to their eastern con-
nections. On October 9, 1916, other line8 owed the Union 
Pacific a balance of 24% of its equipment. 14. 
·A fourth reason. was the attempt of shippers to sell 
all of their products at ance. Prices were good and people 
were anxious to get the goods off of their handA as 
quiclHy as possible, conBequently in most caees they 
were shipped far in advance of the ti me when they would 
be needed. In 1914, the whaat crop was also a heavy one 
and the farmers tried to moire it all at once because of 
the high quality and the hi~h price of the grain. There 
was a lack of elevator capacity, so cars were used for 
that purpose. 
Other reasons were the lack of terminal facilities, 
the lack of labor, many of the laborers having gone .into 
the war industries where wa~ee were higher, bad weather 
which delayed the movement of trains, and the use of 
coastwise and inland waterway ships for ocean tran6-
portation, thus placing the work formerly done by them 
14. Interstate Commerce Commission InspectorB Investi~ate 
Car Shortage in Nebraska, Railway Age, Oct.27, 1916--P. 743. 
upon the railroads. 
In summarizing this section, it can be said that the 
bad traffic situation ~as an emergency g;rowing out of the 
war. The unseen and unequalled demand for f'acili ties to 
\ 
mo1re the traffic'. placed a ·burden upon the railroad$ 
which they could not carry. Attempts were made by the 
railroads in the form of increased demurrage rate$ and 
embargoe8 to remedy the situation and while these aided 
a great deal yeu the situation gradually grew worse 
and worse until in February 1917 a collapse of the 
whole transportation wa$ evident. 
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Ch apt er II. 
OperationR of the Railroadi::; from the Entry of the United 
Stat ePl into the World War, April 6, 191 ?1 until the Assump-
tion of ~the Railroad Control and Operation by the Govern-
ment, December 28, 191?. 
· Aft er the Unit eel Stat es dedlar ed war on Germany, it be-
ca.me a matt er of prime importana:e that the operatione of the 
railr cads should be unified more than had ever been the case 
previously, because a heayier burden than ever would now 1'>e 
thrown upon them. In addition to the work that they had 
been doin€ they would now be required to tranaport materials 
for the construction of army eamp8, ships and aeroplanes, to 
transport !:? oldi ers to those camps and to ports of embarkation., 
and to transport foodatuffG and equipment to the camp!? and to 
the seaports for ~hipment acro8s the ocean to the soldiers who 
would "be Rent abroad. This waf3 an immense taek to £:6ive them 
considerint? the condition of their traffic affairs at the time 
and considerinGI; the bad wi11ter throuigh which they had ju1=>t !!,One. 
Our entry into the war came at a very inopportune time for the 
railroads because their traffic was almos~ complet~ly disor€an-
ized. Operatin.g ;under diff icul ti e8 .a8 they were, the fact was 
obvious that they ·would have to exert themselYes to the limit if 
the railroads were to perform their function in the manner that 
was to be expected of them. The railroad executives r eco~­
ni zed the Reriousness of the situation and acted quickly 
in an effort to me et the ener~ency . 
In the Army Appropriation Act:~. of Aussust 29, 1916, 
was a provision for the eetablishment of a Council of 
Nation.al Defense, designed to be a body of peace time 
effort "for the coordination of industries and resources 
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for the nation.al security and welfar e"l before war should 
come upon the land. The framers of this provision 
framed it to meet the lmexican. trouble, there being no .. 
thou.£$ht in their minds at the time that we would enter 
the World War. Thia Council was composed of s·ix Cabinet 
officers and an Advisory Committee of seven memberB who 
were persons with a. knowledge of some-· <Special industry. 
The members of this Committee were to perform duties 
assiJllned by the Cammi ttee in general. The first duty 
assi~ned to the Committee ·was the location of railroads 
with reference to the frontier of the United States so 
as to render quick transportation of troops and supplies 
to pointF3 of def enee; their coordination. for mili ta.ry, 
industrial, and commercial· purposes in the location of 
ext en53ion.s and branch lines; and the utilization of 
waterways. The President of the United States appointed 
Dan.iel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road Company as the persrnn on the Committee to have char~e 
of transportation problems. 
When wa:t" waB declared on April 6, 1917, the Council 
of national Defenf3e called upon the railroad officials 
1. Dixon & Parmalee--War Administration of the Railways 
in the United States and Great Britian--p. 17. 
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to so or~anize their business as to lead to the greatest 
expedition. in the moving of freight. A meetinq; of 
railroad off i'cials was called immediately an.d on April 11, 
seven hun.dr ed railroad executives met in WaShington, 
D. C. to decide what was to be done.· At this meeting 
the Railroads' War Board, consist in~ of five members, 
was formed under a resolution signed by the chief execu-
tive of practically every railroad in the country. The 
members of thiG Board were: 2. 
Fairfax Harrison., Chairman-President of the Southern Railroad. 
Samuel Rea-----------------President of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad. 
Howard Elliot--------------Chairman of the Committee of in-
tercorporate Relations of 
the 11-r'ew : Haven. 
J. Kruttachni tt---- --------Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the Southern Pacific. 
Hale Holden----------------President of the Chicago, Bur-
lington, & ~uincy Railroad. 
Daniel Willard of the Advisory Committee of the 
Council of National Defense and E. E. Clark of the Int er-. 
$t a.t e Commerce Commission were members ex-officio. 
The activities of the Railroad War Board was co or-
dinated with those of the Council of Nation.al Defense 
and those of the Interstate Commerce Commi1?sion by a 
member of each o'f thef.ie bein,rs a member ex-officio of the 
Railroad We:r Board. These two ex-officio members par-
ticipated in. the deliberations of the Railroads' War 
Board and in the ehapint?-: of its policies. Thar9 was 
2. Dixon & Parmalee--War Admiaiatration of Railways ir:i 
The United States and Great Britian--p. 21. 
also cooperation between the Railroads' Wa:r Board and 
the army and navy, and the J?ood and Fuel Administrations, 
and points of contact were established with nearly all 
other gover:runental p~en.cies. 3. 
The execut i ires who inaugurated the Railroad's War 
Board pledged thell!!lselrves to operate their systems in a 
conti.nental system during tl\-e war "mer~ing during such 
p.eriod all the merely individual and competitive ac-
tivities in the effort to produce a maximum of national 
transportation. efficiency" .4. Al though thi~, the patriotic 
motive was the main reason for the efforts put forth by 
the executi Yes, it was:.> not the only one. Another object 
expressed by more than one railroad executive, to be 
attained was that they "Proposed to demonstrate to the 
country that a co-operative or~anization of private rail-
Way corporations could so euccessfully meet the situation 
"that ·crc>"'Vernment interference with operation would be 
unnecessary". 5. The officials of the railroads reco'6-
nized the fact that they were on trial and that failure 
on their part meant Government operation. of the railroads, 
and that shoi.tld~~suchiopera?6.lhon become a necessity, a 
chanJ?;e to ~e-war statu$ might not be likely nor possi r;le. 
The operations of the railroads were to be directed 
by the Executive Cammi t t e of the Railroads' War Board 
actinq, through ret?;ion.al committees who in turn acted 
t.hrou~h the chief executive of each individual railroad. 
3. Cunni ngha.m, W. J • --The Railroads under Government Oper-
ation, Quarterly Jr. of Econornics--Feb. 1921--p. 295. 
4. Dixon, F. H .--The Operatiol'Js of the Railways duri:nJ?; the 
War, Journal of Political Economy--Aug. 1919--p. 577. 
5. Dixon, F. H.--The Operation .of the Railways during the 
War; Journal of Political Econorny--Aug. 1919--p. 578. 
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The chairman of the ret?;ional committees th.gether with 
the Executive of the Railroads' War Board and the member$ 
ex-officio made up the complete board. The$e re.gional 
cofhmittee15 exercised oon.trol in territories corresponding 
th the five army departm enta, namely the Northea8t er n, 
the Eastern, the Southeast er n, the Central, and the We stern. 
The Railroads' Wax Board did not have authority to 
compel the tailroads to comply with its orders. The extent 
of its powers was to give su~gestions and make rules 
which would aid the railroads. It derived none of its 
powers fr om the Gover riment. It wa8 formed by the railroad 
officials themselves and exercised powers which were 
entrusted to it by them. Althou~h the Board could not 
compel the railroads to comply with its orders, yet the 
railroads did this in most cases r:ecause they reco~nized 
the difficulties with which they were confronted. The 
,work of thie Board was to 80 coordinate and unify the 
operations of the railroads of the country that they 
could meet the requirements ffor the movement of troops and 
Government material and at the same time maintain the 
C7l!'dinary commer~ial life of the nation. 'fhe whole_ problem 
Wa$ to $ecure better operating efficiency. 
At the aame meetin€ when the Ra{J.roafu!' War Board 
was formed, the Special Committe of the Council of 
National Defense was enlar,ged to thirty three menbers 
and divided into $iX departments to correspond to the 
six War Departments, and seven subcommittees under the 
supervision of the Railroads' War Board and reportin'S to 
it, were formed. The :name of these different ·committees 
shows in a general way the work for which they were rea-
ponf3i ble. These Committees were: 6. 
A Committee on Car Service. , 
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A Committee on Military Transportation and Accounting. 
A Committee on. Military Equipment an.d Standards. 
A Committee on Materials and Supplies. 
A Commititee on Military Passen.ger Tariffs. 
A Committee on Military Frei&_!;ht Tarif'fs. 
A Committee on F.i.fCpress Transportation. 
METHODS USED IN SECURING OPERATING EFFICIENCY 
As has l;een said, the whole problem confrontinl? the 
railroads was to eecure operatin~ efficiency and the methods 
which were employed in endeavoring to secure that will now 
be described. ? • 
1. The pooling of 6oal shiEments. 
All Coa.l that was destined for Lake Erie ports was 
pooled in shipment regardless of ownership. This 
saved it days for each coal car. All Jlake ore 
shipments were pooled on the return trip. These 
two movements saved 5200 cars durin.g the· season of 
navit?;ation. 
Bituminous coal to tidewater ports was also pooled. 
This plan reduced the grades of coal from 1156 to 41. 
There was no lon~er the holdin~ of coal until a car~o 
of a certain ~ade was accumulated. This plan saved 
133,000 care. There was an ~ncrease of 20.9% ih 
the number 6f care moved from May until September· 
a$ compared with the same period for 1916. 
2. E111bar go es. 
'Fnnbargo,es+.wer;ff·:ute·d wfien con~estion threatened, 
when F.Jhippers ordered more cal!S than they could load, 
6. Dixon & Parmalee--War Administration of the Railwaye in 
the United Stat es and Great Brit ian--n. 21. 
? • Dixon & Parmalee--War Administration of the Railways in 
the United States and Great Britian--p. 25. 
or when. conaign.eea ordered shipments without -· · 
contracting in advance for vessel space. 
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3. Mole intense car, Loading. 
.. 
Here was the center of the drive for operating effici-
ency. Order in~ in full carloads and co-operation. 
among buyers by clubbing together in buying for a 
sin~le destination was encouraged. Shipments for a 
single destination were doncentrated. dhole train-
loadB of flour and of corn and oats were shipped from 
Minneapolis, Minnesota to New England. Double and 
triple minimum loads were put in cars. 
Increase in loadin~ Uni ta. 8. 
Cotton from 50 to ?5 bales. 
Su~ar " 24000 lbs. to 60 000 1 bs. 
Potatoes " 125 bbls. to 200 bble. 
Cement " 70000 lbs. to 7?000 lbs. 
Flour " 46000 lbs. to 62~60 lbs. 
Coal an increase of 111% • 
4. Committees on car service. 
The Committee on Car Service stationed subcommittees 
throughout the country to anticipate trouble an.d to 
localize complaints. Weekly reports on. the grain 
situation includinl$ the amount in. elevators and the 
amount shipped were made. The car inspection ser-
vice reduced the number· of ca.rs required in face of 
an abnormal export of 76,000,000 bushels of grain 
from May until July. 
5. The pooling of frei~;p.t cars. 
Freiq;ht cars~ were pooled and used where they were 
needed worst. Cammi ttees were appointed with full 
power to draft locomotives and cars from western 
and southern zmads to be U$ed on eastern lines. 
6. The elimination of unnecessary pa$senger service. 
Special and excursion trains were reduced in number 
aa were luxury cars and luxuriou8 bills of fare. 
The number· of trains on branch lines was reduced; 
throu~h pass:,enger service :was consolidated, 8ome trains 
being eliminated; no double header paB8en~r trains 
were run if it were possible to ~et along without 
8. Dixon & Parmalee--War Administration of the Railways in 
the United States and Great Britian--p. 34. 
them; mixed thain service was substituted; and 
through trains were required- to do local service. 
these ret?;Ulations conserved fuel, man, and motive 
power for more essential service. 
This reduction in passenger service was mainly east 
of Chicago. There was too much competition between 
trans-continental lines for much reduction of 
service there .. 
7. Other methods. 
Other methods employed were the pooling of terminal 
facilities, the·keeping of a careful watch over 
cars needing repairs, the speeding up of movement 
all alon.g the line, and requiring that int er line 
shipments should be accompanied by the revenue way-
bill in order to avoid delay at interchan~e point e 
and at destination by bein!$ required to wait until 
the way-bill came·. through the mails. 
Congress waB not content to leave the railroads en-
tirely to themselves in making regulations and rules 
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because of the seriousnes.A off' the situation. Accordingly, 
upon the recommendation of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Esch Car Service Act was passed on May 29. 
By this Act, every carrier was required to establish, 
observe, tand enforce just and reasonable regulations and 
practices with re$pect ctocar service. 
A s econ.d Act of Congresi=; was the Priority Act of . 
Au1?;Ust 10, 191?, Thia Act authorized the President to 
direct that carri ere both rail and water, ~hould l?;i ve 
preference to such traffic as wa$ in hie jud~ent essential 
to the national defense. R. S. Lovett, Chairman of the 
Execu ti Ye Commi tt e o:f the Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
was appointed Priority Director. Two orders were given. 
under the pr(D)visione o_f thi e Act before the Gover nrnent 
assumed control of the railroads. t.l:he first one, .given 
on. Au@st 20, was to avert a. threatened coal famine in 
the Northwest. Under the order, railroads were to .give 
prefere~ce to coal for Lake Erie ports because an in-
sufficient amount was E?;Oin.g there to supply communities 
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served by those ports during the winter. The second order 
was in re.gard to the use of open top ca.rs. By~it, shippers 
were forbidden to uae such cars for purpose other than 
. the shipment of coal, Government shipments, and other 
essential products. Some $hippers had ~een uain.g the 
care for shipping non essential products as was the 
case in Ohio where 6000 cars were bein.g used weekly in 
haulin~. road building material. 
THE SUCCESS OF THE RAILROADS' WAR BOARD. 
The operation of the railroads under the Railroads' 
War Board was not an unqualified success nor was it a 
complete f.ailure. Durin.g the year congestion. was reduced 
while the amount of traffi cc was steadily increasing. On 
May 1, the country experienced the greatest car shortage 
it had ev:er known but by June 1 it had been reduced 30%. 
The campaign for the heavier loading of cars caused an 
increase a:f 8.9% over 1916. 9. 25,000,000, 000 more ton 
miles of freight were handled during. the first six mon.thF.J 
tha.n. durin15 the aarrie period in 1916. In niue months 
this Board succeeded in rnovinq; .18~b more coal and 14% more 
9. American Railway Efficiency During the War--Railway 
A~e, Jan. 4, 1918--p. 18. 
of all frei~ht than was moved in 1916. In addition the 
extra freight they also moved 2,000,000 soldiers and their 
equipment, and moved 34,000 carloads of freight to can-
tonments, 'Vl{hich c~ntonments required a tot.al of 2500 
cars daily in provisioning the soldi era and laborerf3 
within them. 
The success attained by the Railroads' War Boa.rd is 
shown by the foll1'Wint?; table:- 10. 
FREIGHT OPERATIONS. 
Seven Months ending October 31. (Roads with annual 
oper~tin~.~evenues above $1,000,000) 
Item Per cent of Increase of 
1917 over 1916. 
Frei~ht train miles 
Freil$ht locomotive ~ilea 




Revenue ton miles 
Non-revenue ton miles 









Average no. of freight locomotives in service 1.3 
Average numbe!' i>Jfi_shop or awaiting.shop d 8.0 
Per cent in shop or awaitin~ shop d 9.2 
Average number of f~eight cars in service 
AveraJ?,e number in shop or awaiting shop 
Per cent in shop or awaitlin.g shop 
1' o ns per train 
Tons per car 
Tons per loaded car 
Avera~e miles per loc,omoti ve per day 
Average miles per car per day 
Avera€e miles operated. single track 










ThiB table reveals a Btrikin~ picture of operating 
10. Dixon &: Parmalee--War Administration of the Railways 
in the United States and Great Britian.--p. 37. 
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efficiency. It will be noticed that the inCJf'ease of 
equipment was very small; so reaultB were accomplished with 
the exisiin€ equipment. Efficiency wae secured, first by 
the heavier loading of cars, and secondly in the greater 
mileage made by cars. Equipment held for repairs de-
creased. ~his fact may be due to one of two causes or 
to both. Repairs were made more quickly or else equipment 
was not sent to the shops but was kept in operation as 
long as it could be used. Greater speed was attained by 
the locomotives while at the same time they were hauling 
heavier loads. In 191?, they pulled a twelfth more in 
each train and covered more miles per day than in 1916. 
However in November 191?, railroad officials $OW that 
they were facing defeat unless more traffic could be moved. 
The operating effieiency was increasing over that of 1916 
but the rate of increase was declinincg while the amount 
of traffic to be moved was .growin€ larger. The Railroads' 
War Board did everything possible to avert disaster, but 
conditions steadily gr6'f{ worse. Freight congestion was 
increasing rapidly on the lines serving ports on the· 
Atlantic seaboard. There are four imp:orta.nt reasons. for 
this congeJStion as s;een by Mr. Cunningham of Harvard Uni-
versity. 11. 
The first of these is the inadequacy of facilities 
to handle the ineeased amount of traffic. The principal 
11. Cunnirnsha.rn, Wm. J .--The Railroads Under Government 
Operation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 1921--J;. 297• 
difficulties were in the:, t:erminals at Pittsbur.g~ Balti-
more, Philadelphia, and New York. 1'he ~reater share of 
the war traffic of the remainder of the ::;country had to 
' 
~o through theae terminals and the railroad$ had to supply 
raw materials and take finished products from the man-
ufacturing plants whi:ch were concentrated in the stat es 
near to those pain.ts. The sho rta£$e of terminal facilities 
in this region delayed the unloadinJ?; and moirement of cars. 
A second cause was the failure to regulate the flow 
of export traffic. Export frei~ht was accepted without 
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re1gard to the availaliil.e ship capacity. Some. of the Allied 
orders were under contracts that provided for the pay-
ment of a lar~e percenta.ge of the invoice as eoon as the 
materials were loaded on the cars. This was true eRpecially 
of the contracts with Russia and when that country 1:roke 
down, large amounts of materials were left on cars at 
both Atlantic and Pacific seaports. The profits to the 
manufacturers on ~hese contracts were large and the traffic 
departments of the railroads were anxious to secure the 
inc:t'eased tonnage so there was every inducement to :.load 
the materials as ,early as po;.ssi ble. The trouble started 
at the eastern seaports and gradually.backed up to inter-
med~ate yerds, then to the producing centers east of ~itts­
burR;, and finally to Chicago and Mississippi river points. 
A car shortage in the vvest was the result of this eastern 
co nges:-t ion. 
A third cause w~s the lack of an effective agency 
for d:eterminin.g the de~ree of priority for products and 
for coordinatin~ the demands for Government shipments, which 
shipments had, under the Interstate Commerce Act, priority 
over all other5 in time of war. Each Government Depart-
ment wanted priority for its frei~ht and as this class 
of frei.ght made up a larrse amount of the shipments of 
eastern lines, great demoralization of traffic resulted. 
A fourth cause of the congestion was the failure o~ 
the part of the railroads to curb competitive influences. 
This wa$ ~ only natural though because the railroads 
had been brought up under the policy of competition an.d 
there was difficulty. in departin . .g from such a policy 
expecially in so short a time. 
When conditions became so bad there was much a~itation 
for a different method for operatin~ the railroads. Many 
plans were advanced a ome favoring one kind of operation 
and some another but all were of two .general types, that 
the Go.verrunent sh_ould either assume control of the rail-
roads durin.g the war, or else existing laws should be so 
modified as to permit the rai J.roads under the exisiing 
method of operation, to meet the need. Early in December 
a special report of the Iriterstate Commerce Commission was 
published and this document had more influence than 
anythin'S else :en influencin~ the plan of operation adopted. 
In this report, the Commission ssave the fundamental causes 
for the failure of the railroads to meet the transportation 
needs of the country and the plan which it believed should· 
be adopted. The opinion of some of the Commissioners 
will be ~iven below. 
Mr. Hall was of the opinion that the policy of 
govennmental regulation was largely re$ponsible for 
the. failure of the railroads under the management of the 
owners. He said that the competitive pri rciple had been 
fostered and £$Uarded, this causing the railroads to 
seize and retain every point of vantaise for the~r parti-
cti.lar roads. Pooling~, mer~ers, rebates, and the con-
solidation into large systems grew out of rate wars. which 
the Commission tried to :prevent. Regulative acts were 
framed in time of peace and were for peace conditions. 
Those acts looked toward the protection of the nation 
and ite commerce in. time of wartt After the United States 
entered the war, i.t became clear that unification in 
operation was indispensible to the fullest utilization 
of ·the railraads. 12. 
"The Interl3tate Commerce Act was not enacted to meet 
such a situation. Carriers have the right to demand just 
and rea$ona 'ble rates to yietd.) a fair return after of'her 
expenses are met. 'lbe railways must n.ot be permitted 
to become less efficient at such ~ time. Increased 
rates cannot brin.g cppi ital in sufficient amounts." 13. 
"The carriers Should be _permitted to unify in a 
lawful manner. Anti-truet laws should be suspended during 
the w.ar with the exception of the section on anti-pooling 
and one with respect to con8olidation or merger!3 of 
parallel and competing lines as applies to rail and 
water carriers". 14. 
12. Hall, H. C.--Report of Interstate Com. Com.--1918-p. 5. 
13. Hall, H. C.--Report of ~nteretate Com. Com.--1918-p. 6. 
14. Hall, H. e.--Report of ~nter$tate Com. Com.--1918-p. 7. 
Commissioner McChord believed that voluntary co-
operation could not be effee'tive. Voluntary committee$ 
could n.ot accomplish wllra.t the situation demanded, because 
the element of self-intere!?t, the traffic influence, 
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waa a persi~tent factor in postponin~ and reqisting 
measures that seek to disre€ard individual ri~hts in the 
efforts to secure transportation results as a whole. 
Individual and competitive activitie$ have their effect 
in spite of voluntary_ agreements. There also runs in the 
acti~ities of c·ommittees an inclination to do whateve:r 
is needed to prevent £?;OVernraent authority from actinJ?;• 
"We need the strong arm of governmental authority. 
We must have action that ia strong and vi€orous. "15. 
As to the position of the railroads durinJ?; the _period 
of voluntary co-operation, Mr. Sakolski says, 
"In nine_, months before the ~overmnent took over the 
railways, they floundered in a sea of· irresponsible cen-
tra.lized direction while under private and responsible 
financial management. '11he companies surrendered their 
i ndi vi du al initiative and independence without my · 
adequate relief to assure their financial or corporate 
inte~ri ty. Under this system, the op er at inP:; difficulties 
multiplied Ao that go,rernment operation was both a mil-
itary and financial nece~aity. There can be but little 
doubt but that the owner$ and managers benefi tted throu.gh 
lSOvermnent operation." 16. 
The immediate cause of the breakdown was the heavy 
increasrn in.traffic coupled with a too ~en erous use of the 
preference taLS an.d the bad weather. Wa:r industries were 
speeded up, some bein~ placed upon a 24 hour basis. This 
ere at ed an abnormal dem.and for facilities to transport 
fuel and finished roducts. The use of the reference 
15. WcChord, C. c.-Repor of n er.state Com. Com.-1918-~.7. 
16. SaR.olski, A"gl M.-Present Situation-Com. & Fin. Chronicle, 
March 20, 1920--p. 12. · 
39 
tag in Government shppments de~eated its own purpose. 
There ?hould have been $Ome central authority to determine 
the degree of priority of shipments but none was provided. 
The entire winter of 191 ?-1918 was the mo st severe one 
known and the railroad$ suffered much on account of this. 
J3e.sideB the delay occasioned by bad weather, marine 
terminal8 were blocked with ice and there was almost no 
co-operation al all between ~il arid water transportation. 
The railroads, durin~ the period of voluntary co-oper-
ation, $UCceeded in speeding up their machinery and moved 
more traffic than had ever been moved before in the same 
len~th of time, but they came to a place where, under 
exisiin~ conditions and. laws, they could go no farther 
unlesR some of the restrictions upon them were removed. 
It would, in the estimation of the Inter8tate Commerce 
Commission, have taken longer to modify the existing laws 
in r~gard to railway operations, than for making plal18 for 
Government operation of the lines; so the Government, 
on December 28, 191?., assuma:l operation of the railroads 
of the :nation. 
In assuming control 6f the railroads, President. Wilson, 
r:,aid of the Railroads,. War Board, 
"The group of railway executives who ware charged witlh 
the task of actual coordination and general direction, 
performed their difficult duties with patriotic zeal and 
marked ability, as wa8 to have been expected and di9,,I 
believe, everything that it was possible for them to do 
under the circumstance$. If I have taken ib.he task out 
of their handB, it has not been:: becau$ e d>:fl derelict ion 
or failure on their part, but only becaus,e there were some 
thin.ga the Government can<' do and private management 
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cannot do." 17. 
Thus the period of volunttary co-operation on the part 
of the railroad officials themselves, durin.g which there 
were many radical chan~e~ from former railroad policies, 
end8 and the railroads enter into a new period far diifferent 
to any that they had ever experienced before. The Pres-
ident's Proclamation of December 26, 1917, in which he 
$Uat ed the policy to be followed in re.gard to the rail-
roads for at 1 east during the duration of the war, re-
moved all uncertainties' concernin~ the railroad pQ.licy. 
Railroad officials were relieved of much an.xi ety when 
the President assumed control of the railroads and every 
interet:>t iin'.:.cbe country was .glad that he took the action 
that he did. There was not a dissentinig voice when the 
railroad$ passed under Government contrGll and operation. 
17. D..lnn, Samuel 0.--Re.gulation.: oID' Railways--p. 12. 
Chapter III. 
The Actual Period of Government Operation:-(December 
28 2 1917 to March 1, 1920.) 
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On December 26, 1917, President Wilson u tilizj~d the 
power given him in the Army Appropriation Act of Auigus:;t 
29, 1916, and in a proclamation i$eued on the former date, 
stated that the railroads of the United State8 would-
pa.s8 from private to Government operation at noon on 
December 28, 1917, ~ivinlS aa his reason for the action 
that, 
"It had become unmistakably phain that only under 
Government administration can the entire equipment of the 
several syetems of transportation bj fully and unreservedly 
thrown into a common eervice without injurious discrim-
ination against particular properties. 0 rily under 
Government administration can an absolutely unrestricted· 
and unembarrased common use be made of all tracks, ter-
minale, terminal :ff·acili ti ee, and equipment of every kind. 
Only under that authority can new terminals be constructed 
and developed without regard to the requirements or limita-
tions of particular roads." l. 
The greater part of the President's proclamation will 
be ~iven here because it 8tatea in a clear manner the mebhod 
of operating the railroads, the administration and its 
or~anixation, and also the mtthods t6 be followed in 
makin~ contracts with the individual carriers. The eec-
tions.of the proclamation that refer specifically to 
the rai~roads read as follwwa:-
1. Report of the Interstate Comnrer~e Commission--1918--p.10. 
"Now therefore I, Woodrow Wilson, Pre$ident of the 
United States, under and by vittue of the power vested 
in me by the foregoing resolutions and!. statute and by 
virtue of all other powere there to me, enabling do 
42 
hereby, through Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, take 
possession and assume control at 12 o~clock noon on the 
twenty-eiJ$ht day of December 191?, of each end every i::>y$tem 
of transportation and the appurtenances thereof located 
who~ly or in part within the boundarieB of ~he continentail 
United States, and consi.sting of railroads, and owned or 
controlled systems of coastwise and inland transportation, 
whether operated by steam or by electric power, including 
also terminals, terminal companies and terminal associa-
tione, i::;leeping and parlor cars, private cars and private 
car lines, elevators, warehouses, telephone and teleJ?;raph 
linea and all other equipment and appurtenances commonly 
used upon or operated as a part of such rail or combined 
rail and water systems of transportation to the end 
that such aystems of transportation be utilized for the 
tr an.sf er and transportation of troops, war material and 
equipment to the exclusion so far as may be necessary of 
all other traffic thereon and that so far as such exclusive 
use be not necessary or desirable, such systems of trans-
portation be operated and utilized in the performance of 
such other eervices as the national intere$t may require 
and of the usual and ordinary businees and duties of 
common carri era. 
"It i!3 hereby directed that the possession, control, 
operation and utilization of such transportation systems 
hereby by me undertaken shall be exercised by and through 
Wm •. G. McAdoo, who is hereby appointed and desLgnat ed 
Director General of lR.ailroads. Such Director may perform 
the duties imposed upon him, so long and to such extent 
as he shall determine, throu~h the boards of directorB, 
receivers, officers and employees of said systems of 
transportation. Unuil and except so far as said Director 
shall from time to time by general or special orders other-
wise provide, the boarda,of directors:>, receivers, officers, 
and employees of the various transportation systems shall 
continue the operation thereof in the usual and ordinary 
cour8e of the busineS3s of common carriers, in the names 
of their respective companies. 
"Until and except $0 far as said Director shall from 
time to time otherwise by lSeneral or special orders 
determine, such systems of transportation shall remain 
$Ubj ect to all existin~ st a tu teB and sirders of the Inter-
~tat e Comrrerce Commission, and to all statutes and orders 
of reigulating commi.ssions of the-: various states in which 
said systemB or any part thereof may be a ituated. But 
any orders, gen:eral or special, lfLereaft er made by eaid 
Director $hall have paramount authority and be obeyed 
as such. 
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"The Direct or shall, a.s soon as may be after havintS 
assumed such possession and control, enter upon negotia-
tions with the several companies looking to agreements for 
just and reasonable compensation £or the possession, use, 
and control ~~ their respective properties on the basi$ 
of an annual guaranteed compensation, above accruin~ 
depreciation and the maintenance of their properties, 
equivalent, as nearly as may be, to the average of the 
net operating income thereof for the three-year period 
ending June 30, 1917, the results of such negotiations 
to be reported to me for such action as may be appropriate 
and lawful. 
"But nothing herein contained, expressed or implied, 
or hereafter done or suffered hereunder, shall be 
deemed in any way to impair the rights of the stock-
holders, bondholders, creditore, and other persons having 
interests in said 8ystems of transportation or in the 
profit~ thereof to receive just and. adequate compensation 
for the u8e and control and operation of their property 
hereby assumed. 
" "Regular di vi dends:J hitherto dee lar ed, and maturing · 
interest upon bonds, debentures andoother obligations, 
may be paid in due course; and such reguaar dividend~ 
and interest may dontinue to be paid until and ulesi:; the 
8aid director 6hall, from time to time, otherwise by 
general or special orders determine; and, subject to 
the approval of the direct or, the various carriers may 
agree upon and arrange for the renewal and extension of 
maturin~ obligations • 
. "---------But for the purpoBe of accountin€ s:>aid 
pessession and control shall date from twelve o'clock 
midni15ht ~on Deeember 31, 1917 ." 2. 
Immediately upon his appointment, Director General 
McAdoo went to work to Qll.".ganize his workinss staff, or 
the Railroad Administration a~ the body was called. 
He selected his assi8tant.s from amon.g men who were ex-
perienced in the railroad field and most of the accom-
plishments of the Railroad Administration were due to the 
whole-hearted an.d loyal efforts of these men. The 
Director General had only one purpo:se in view, to op er ate 
2. Dixon & Parmailee--Wa.r Administration of the Railways in 
the United States and Great Britian--p. 198. 
Supplement No. 1 to the Railway Age of December 20. 
Supplement No. 2 Is a list of the officers 
of the Railroads under Federal control . 
The ·organj1 zation of the United States Railroad Administration Railwqy Age 
,\ 
Exports Control Committee 
605 Southern Ry. Illdg. 
OEORGE D. OODEN, Chairman 
Major-General G. W. Goethals 
Rear-Admiral C. J, Pcoplu 
P. A. S. Franklin 
D. W. Cooke 
R. L. McKellar-, Secretary 
I 
Board of Wages 
and Working Conditions 
812 So. Ry Dldg. 
G. H. SINES, Chairman 
F. F. Caines, Vice.Chairman 
~. i:. ~i~~~~Y ~ · o~· ,Jth0::1~n 
I 
I 
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS 
W. G. McADOO* 
'913:1, C. C. Bldg., Washington 
M. Brice Claggett, Private Secretary to Director General 
OSCAR A. PRICE, Assistant to Director Cicneral 
"'Resignation effective Jan. 1 
I 
I 
I WALK.ER D. HIN ES, Assistant Director General.-.,"# 909 I. C. C. Bldg, li. A. Taylor and G. H. Parker. Assistants 
I 
I I 
Division of Law 
621 I. c. c. Dldg. Division of Finance and Purchases 
6l9 I. C. C. Building 
JOHN SKELTON WILLIAMS 
Director 
Division of Capital Expenditures 
603 ], c. c. Bid •• 
ROBERT S. LOVETT*, Director 
E, E. Adams, Engineering Ant, 
Division of Traffic 
1023 I. C. C. Dldg. 
. I Central I 
'-~~~~-..~~~~---' 
JOHN BARTON PAYNE, General Counsel 
Charles B. Eddy, Asst. Oen, Counsel 
EDWARD CHAMBERS, Directot" 
R. C, Wright, Freight R. Walton Moore, Asst. Gen. Counsel 
Nathan Matthews, Special Assistant 
Frank W. Gwathmey, AHt, to Gen. Counsd 
W. G. Wheeler, Special Assistant 
D. C. Porteous, Assistant F. W. Scrcom~e, Accounting Ant. "Resignation clfectivc Jan. I. 
Gerrit Fort, Passenger 
r:. L. Bevington W. S, Basinger c B. Buxton C. A, Fox A, P, Humburg, Special Aasistant 
Frank C, Abbott, Asst. to Gen. Counsel 
F. P, Smith, Asst. to Gen. Counsel 
Carl A. Mapes, Asst. to Gen. Counsel 
James W. Carmalt, Asst. to Oen, Counsel 
PauJ Dulaney, Asst. to Gen. Counsel 
Purchasing Section 
Advisory Committee ' Charles A. Lutz 
704 Southern Ry, Bldg, 




Claims and Property 
Protection Section 
Southern Ry. Illdg. 
UOHN H. HOWARD, Manager 
· W. J. Flynn 
Chief of Secret Service -
Geora:e 0. Yeomans 
WUliam W, Morris, Secretary 
Procurement Section 
H. C. Pearce 
John E. Mahaney 
District Managers 
{v, 0A. 5~~:~~in~~iS~~~io1Jf;, Mo. 
Finance Section 
Advisory Committee 
614 I, C. C. Duilding 
FRANKLIN Q, DROWN, Chairman 
Festus J. Wade 
Frederick W. Scott 
James N. Wallace 
W. C. DELANOY, Manager 
I 
Phillip J, Doherty, Counsel 
Property Protection 
Charles F. Patterson 
Counsel [ot' Claims 01car- V, Daniels, Pitt1burgh W. F. Jones, Wnt Albany, N. Y. 
r-1 Marine Insurance Section 
'-~~~-6_1_s_1_._c_.c_.~11-"~'·~·~~---' 
Forest Products Section 
701 ·so. Ry. Duilding 
-
Stores Section 
601 G St. 
E. J, ROTH, Manager 
U. K. Hall, Assoc:, MEr. 
-
Fire Loss and 
Protection Section 
718 18th St. 
CHARLES N. RAMBO, Manager 
I 
Advisory Committee 
M. E. TOWNER, Manager 
John Foley, Assoc, Mgr. c. O. Deabier, Asst. Mgr. 
], H. Lauderdale, Special 
Representative, New Orleans, 1.a. 
Rep::;e~~t~~og~a~tf:.ci~uh. Y Fuel Distributor 601 G St, D. P. PHILLIPPE ...____ __, Theodore H. Price•, Chairman R. M, Bissell D, R. McLennan CharJcs E. Mather ·A. M. Schoen •Rr"ignation r!Tt'ctivf' Tan, 1 
Eastern Region 
A· H. SMITH, Regional Director · 
Grand Central Terminal, New York 
Martin J. Alger, Exec. Asst. 
H. W1 Burnham. Exec. Ch, Clerk 
A. T, Hardin, Asst. Reg. Dir. • 
H, L. Jngersoll, Mechanical Assistant 
W, G. Curran, Sp. Agt. Trans. 
Francis La Bau, Traffic Assistant 
~: ~; kne~~I~~. 16ees~. TS~!·t.~T!i~g~~~~':nd Telephone 
Regional 
Purchasing Committee 
S. B. WIGHT, Chairman i-- ..,_ 
A. W. Munster 
. W; G. Phelps 
Q, C. WOODRUFF, Chairman 
Salling Day Plan 
Committee 
,,,Budget Committee 
.. <~~ew York City 
Tl", 1.1 STUAR'r/' Chairmart f-
A, T. Hardin 
~.·~.~:;ed 
IW, B. POLLOCK, Marine Director·~ New York Harbor . Gr;tnc.J Cent. '!"erm., New York 
E. J. Henry. Supienisor 
I 
New England District 
RaiJ and Like Traffic 
Eutern and Allegheny Reilons 
Buffalo. N. Y. 
I 
Central District 
Traffic ReprHentatives in Government Departments 
H. M. Ada.ms. Manaicr Inland Traffic, War Dept, 
11. P. Anewalt, M•nagcr Jnland Trame, Navy Dept. 
~-a~f~ el~~ .. n~a~!~~~c,I~l~irft~a~~~riood Administr~tlon • 
F. M. Whittaker, Manager Inland Traffic, Fuel Adrninlstrauon J, A. Middleton, Manager lnland Traffic, Peuo1eum 
Section, Fuel AdminiHution 
T. C. Powtll, Manager Inland Traffic, War Industries Board 
I 
Allegheny Region 
C. JI. MARKHAM, RegionaJ Director 
Broad StrNt Sta., P11iladrlpl1ia, Pa. 
M. :P, Blauvelt, Asst. Reg. Dir. 
~: ~· c~~~ds7iT,ra~erx;~i~ta~~sistant 
J. B. Fisher, Tnnsportation Asslstan1 
Mechanical Assistant 
E. B, Templt, Engineering Assistant 
L. D. Shearer, Supervisor Tel. & TeJ, 
N~tth Atlantic Ports 
Freight Tr:tffic Committee 
I.ti Broadway, Xcw York 
ROBERT L, nUSSELL, Chairman 
Richard Van Ummerson 
Archibald Frlrs 




Y J, R. KkARN&V, Ch"irman Sailing Day_ Plan '--~~~~c-o_m_m_•_"_•·~~~~--' 
Re:giona\ 
Purchasing Committee 
E. U. BANKARD, Chairman 
J, D. Landis 
J. H, HUSTJS, District Director 
p: South Station, Hoston. MM1. 
• Jt J.odd, Aufstant te> District' 
A. T. HARDIN. District Director 
Granc.1 Cent. Term., N. Y. 
JI, A. WOnCESTER, District Director 
721 Union Cchtral ll11lg., Cincinnati, O. 
Uuah McVeagh, Extcu\lvt Anlstant · · nec:tor, Bancor, Me. 
p P. Hastings J, D. Watson 
~ .B~·c!ff:;olph ~: ~·B~~~ler 
Committee on 
Mail Ttanaportatio 
608 .Southern Ry, DI g. 
GUY ADAMS, Chairr~an 
Rudolph Brauer 
H Express and Mail Section 718 18th St. F •. S. HOLBROOK, Manag_cr ..____ _ ____, Engineering and Maintenantc Departmcrtt 629 So, Ry. Dklg. 
H, L. Fairfield 
{t CT. M~;::~n, Jr 
G, P. Conard 
Aa:rlcultural Sectiori 
718 18th St. 
J, L. EDWARDS, Mar ager 
Interregional Dining 
Car Committee 
J, R. SMART, Chairman' 
Eastern Freight Traffic Cor tmittee 
R. CAMPBELL, Chair ~an 
C. C, McCain, Secretar 
-
-
143 LiLerty Stred, New · 'ork 
Southern Frtight Traffic Co nmittee 
- C. McD. DAVIS, Chain ian· ,__,__ 
J •• E. Chaloner, Secreta. y' 
Walton Building, Atlanta, Ga. 
We11ern Freight Traffic Cot 1mittec 
A. C. JOHNSON, Chair"inan· ·: 
E. D. Boyd, Secretary · 
" Ttans11ortation Bldg., Chi ,ago · ~ 
I 
Pocahon{ as Region 
N. D. MA=!~~lk~.~t:~al Director 
T. S. Davan1, Tr'.1ffic Assistant. 
D E. SpangJer {rans. Asst. 
G: w. Jett, suP'r_visor Tel. &. ~d. 
~~~-~~-'·~~~~-
! Reglon>J,1 . ~ E. T. BURNET'(• Chairman I. - "•"'"''"~ <"·\ mm;tt<e B. T. Jel~-"-0" ___ _. 
I 
I J. A. TALBOT1j1 '~ 1 Chairman Saning Da ' Plan Commit1 'ec 
Agrjcultural Co'mmittce 
North and West 
L. SEAGRAVES, Chairman 
Chicago 
,F. W. Welsh W. L. EngJish 
J, B. Lamson F. S. McCabe 
L. J. Bricker Douglas White. 
Agricultural Committee 
Southeast, Texas, Okla. 
W. W. CROXTON, Chairman 
Atlanta 
G. A. Park 
H. J, Schweitert 
J, c. Welty 
B. L. Hammet 
J, c. WiUiams 
T. L. Peeler 
Eastern Passenger Traffic 
Committee 
C, M. BURT• Chairman 
c. L. Huntir, Secretary 
143 Liberty St., New York City 
Southern Passenger Traffic 
Committee 
W. J. CRAIG, Chairman 
W. H. Howard, Secretary 
4Jl Rhodes Bldg., Atlanta, Ga. 
Western Passenger Traffic 
Committee 
P. S. EUSTIS, Chairman 
T. Thompson, SeC'('!tary . 
· Transportation Dl<lg./'Chicago 
Regional 
Southern Region 
In charge of 
cffARLES A. MORSE, Assistant 
Director, Div, of Operation 
I 
Maintenance Committee 
F. L. Stuart W. R. Rodenbau1:h, 
E. B, Temple J. C. Hough J. E. 'Crawford H. R. Safford 
E. A. Hadley 
Fuel Conservation Section 
629 Southern Ry. B1dg .• Washington 
Uni.on Electric Bldg., St. Louis 
EUGENE McAULIFFE, Manager 
Major E. C. Schmidt 
Assistant to Manager 
Robert Collett, Asst. Mgr. 
Eastern Region 
H. C. Woodbridge, Supervisor 
Allegheny Region 
Harry CJcwcr, Supervisor 
Pocahontas Region 
Bernard J, Feeney, Supervisor 
Southern Region 
Frank P. Roesch, Supervisor 
Northwestern Region 
Leslie R. Pyle, Supervisor 
Central Western Region 
J, W. Hardy, Supervisor 
Southwestern kegion 
Exemption and Dt:ierrcd 
Classification Bureau 
17th St. and Penn, Ave. 
GEORGE M. BUSBY, Manager 
B. L. WINCHELL. Regional Director 
Healy lluilding, Atlanta~ Ga. 
J, T. King, Acting Operating Assistant 
A. R. Smith, Traffic Assistant 
Staff Officers 
t W. Small, Mechanical · T. King, Transportation , N. Rodenbaugh, Engineering 
E. H. Dulaney, Traffic 
Q, W. Lamb, Accounting . 
W, L. Stanley, Claims and Cldm Prevention J. A. Jones, TekgTaph and Telephone . 
Regi.onal 
Purchasing: Committee 
F. lt. FECHTIG, Chairman 
Albert C. Mann 
' ' --
I 
W. L. STANLEY, Chairman. \ 
Samng Day Plan 
Committee 




612 l. C. C: Bid •. 
I 
I 
Division of Operation 
1028 I. C. C. Didi. 
CARL R. GRAY, Director 
W, T. Tyler, Senior Asst. Dir. 
J, H. Keefe, Asst, Dir,, Office 
FraD~re':t~~·u~~'. ~~s;:~ant 
F. C. Writ;ht, Assistant Director 
Manne Department 
Charles A. Morse, Asst •. Director 
Eng. and Maint. Department 
I 
Mcehariical Deputmcnt 
710 ); c. c. Bldg, 
Irl charge of 
FRAN!C McMANAMY 
THEODO~E H. PRICE•, Actuary 
10 I 0 I. c. c. ll!Jg. 
Ballard i,1unn. Assistant AttUltJ' 
Bureau ofT~J~'!~:':;n:n~nd Complaints 
T ,T. Mn•r ii 1fi. 1l~~~ 
Fr lnk F. Gt'orr;c 
•Ruign:ation c~cctive Jan. 1 
I 
I Division of Inland and 
Coastwise Vlaterways 
601 Gj St. 
0. A, TOMLJN,iON, Dtrector 
Ne!!· f~r~0~!j t~t~rjle:::;a~!~all 
M. J, Sanders, Fe'dcral Manacer 
JdlniHlppl and Warrior Waterwa71 
I 
Car Servin S~ection 
718 18th'~''· 
Assiltant Director 
Division of Operation 
F. P. 1Plahler, Chief 
Mcct,1nical Engineer 
J, J. Tatum, Oeneul 
- W. C. KENDALll• Manager• E. H. DeGr.004( Jr, A. Q, Outhelm 
Supervhior of Car Repair1 





L1 ~~ • E~~~':1aint. East 
Supuvisor 
1
ot &qulpmt:nt, W~~. 
I I 
Com1ttee on St&nduda 
FRANK !lcMANAMY, Chairman 
Henry Bartlett H. T. Bentley 
J, F. Carroll C. E. Fuller 
}', F. Gaines A, W. Citbbs 
H. L. Ingersoll J, E. O'Brien 
John Purcell ll', P. Pfahler 
J. W. Small J, J, Tatum 
W. H. WiJ1on 
E. A. Woodworth, Secretary 
Inspection and Tut Section 
~O Southern Ry. Dldg. 
- C. B. Phelps 0. F ~ Richardac, n {y A, Som ervill'i w'. t. ~~~~~:~jChica10 _____ .... 
Open.tin&: Statl1th.i,, Sectlon 
603 Southern R~'·. ·Didi[. 
W. J. CUNNINQU~M, Man11er 
V. P. Turnbutke, A~sl:;1tant Manaier 
j• J, Ekin H. w· • M1cken:rie • O. Drew W •. C~ Wit.hut 
, R, Martin I 
Safety Sect1ion 
712 Southern R\Y· Ill<lg. 
A. F. Duffy, Attin,I .'Manar;tt 
Re1ionaJ Supe'rv11on 
R. S. larnlgan, £~1stcrn Roads 
~ar}l ~de~!~~ 1fot1:1~!~n ~~!~! Chui;. W. Cir~n. Wa1hin1ton 
I 
C. B. YOUNG, Man11er 
Chief Materials Inspector 
H. E. Smith 
H Troop Movement ~ection 429 Homer Built ling OEOROE HODGEs,fManaeer 
._ L-----!---' 
Chief Construction Jn1pecton 
C. T. Markel, Locomotives 
J, A. 17lckabaugh, Cars 
I 
Northwestern Region 
R. H, AISHTON, Regional Director 
226 \Vest Jackson HJvd., Chie:aga r· J: .J}~~:!ith~s.j.i:~~nc' fa's~!~:~! Director 
~·. 1>. HB~i~%·.!,"'K£!~~i;:r,, A(l:~:andoal and 
Telegraph Sc11 don 
Sou. Ry. DI Jg. 
l\IARTIN 11; CLAP1P, Manaitr 
I 
Central jW est cm Region 
HALE HOLDl~N, Regional Director 
547 Jackson poulevard, Chicago 
B. B. Greer, A1.sistant Re~ional ~ireetor 
F. E. Clarity, ':t'tansportat10~ Au11tant 
H. A. Scandrett, T~affic. Au1sta,nt 
~· ~: ~ .. ~:~t;eJ~i;.f!~~!~~~l A~~~i~~~~t 
Richard H Thornton. Jnspector, Tel&: TeJ, - Grain Traffic, Duluth, Minn, ]. B. Cook, Supervl1or Coal Traffic, Buttr, Mont. 
Roy W. Mqrrls, Supervisor, Tel, a: Tel. 
B. J. Ro...;e,· Suhervisor Coal Traffic, Chica~o 
H. K. Mack. si1pervi1?r Coal Traffic. Herran, IIL 
J.e'.fi. ~!l~!.~:t,_~;i:P~~;;~~i9~~·b~:i~7a~~nver 
T, J.f, 'PRl>CTOR, Cl.•irrn•n 




L. S. CARROLL, Chairman· 
F. A. Bushne:U 
S.aJt Lak~~ C1t7, Utah 
OEOROE J{rolfTON. Ch•lrm•n 





Purch. 'Sing Committee 
L. N. H(1>PK1NS, Chairman 
M, J. Collins 






Health and Medical Relief 
17th St. and Pa. A-.e. 
DR. D. Z. DUNOTT. Chairman 
g~: ~ic:; 1;,le,1/:tnr 
Dr. T. R. Crowder 
Dr. H. M. Bracken 
I 
Division of Public Service 
· and Accounting 
1114 1.c. c. nuilding 
CHARLES A. PROUTY, Dlrectot" 
Geora:e T. Atkins, Trame Auis11nt 
C. B. Heinemann, Tcaffic Assistant 
Accounting Committee 
A. H. PLANT, Chairman 
~ 1!\. s"'hrte ~~a~k ~:~onald 
J, G. Drc:w L. O. Scott 
W. E. Balley 
Auditlnc ~Section 
71B 18th St. 
J, W. Robert•, Auditor 
Fred Pculjohn, Chief Accountant . 
Short Line Section 
I. C. C. lluilding 
EDWARD C. NILES, Manager 
Robert Rtntaul, Asst~ ~er. 
I 
Division of Labor 
606-607 I. C. C. Dui!dln• 
W. S. CARTER, Di.rc.ctor 
J, A. Fra11kl1n, A.slatant 
G. w. W. :-tanzn, Auiatant 
Rep:-uentatlves 
Willia:n Blackman 
John A, Moffitt: 
Anthony M. Danks 
H, H. Re ed. Special A11t. 
Board o( Adjustment No. 1 
'33 So. Ry. Duildinii 
CHARLES P. NEtLL. Chatrman 
L. E. Shtppard, Vice.Chairman 
F. A, Bur&ets 
WUUam A. Clark 
W. N. Doak 
~1b~i ~l:iM!~· 
John G. Walber 
E.T. Whiter 
Board of Adjustment No. 2 
702 So. Ry, Duilding 
E. F. POTTER, Chlnnan 
Oeora:e W, l'rlng, Vicc:·Chalnn1n 
A. C. Adamt W. S. Murrl1a. 
G. M. Bur1nluet W. II. Penrith 
H. J, Carr E. A. Sweeley 
Otto E. Hoard Robt. J, Turnbull 
'F'. H. Knlght. C. C, V1nt>ornn 
Board ot Adjustment No. 3 
H. A. Kl~N'NEDY, Chlirman 
T. H. Otrrey, Vlce·Ch1lnn1n 
~·. ~~t'l;~:~;,~n &e.orJ.~ fi'tu~lpp 
E. A. Gould Richard P. Dee 
Women•1 Service Section 
17th St. and Pa. /\ve. 
MISS PAULINE GOLDMARK, Manactr 
Field Atent1 
Miu Florence E. Clark 
Mi11 Edith R. Ha\\ 
Miu Heltn Rats 
Miss Rose Yates 
Southwestern.Region 
B. ~,1", BUSH, Rc1ional Director 
Rr. )~xchange Illdg .• St. Louis, Mo. 
W. Q, Vollrne: ... A1sistant Regional Director 
~,' ?i. ~fddJf[.• T~:~~eA~i~~ta~~slstant 
0. W. Bricce, Supervisor of Transportation 
C. H. Wood, Supervisor of Car Service 
W. Rogers, 1'el. and Tel. Eng. 
ll. E. Ma.ck, Gen. Supervisor M:til Traffic 
H. A. Weaver, Supervisor C'."-~-. "1'1 •ffic, Kansas City 
~:. ~ ~~;:ri~;~~:v~~;e~1:!?~iT~r~ffi~r.lnic~~; .. City 




C. A. HOW. Chainn1n 
J. L Cowan 
F. M. LUCORE, Chairman 
SaiUng Day Plan 
Committee 
. \ .. ~ •• ~.~ "•t'Ort ComrnlU<O \ C.\\Jt..lU .. ES. 'T. Al.R\t~, Cb1.\tm.t.n. 
Atlanta., Ga. 
J. W. Daley, Galveston. 




Pu1ct Sound District 
L. C. GILMAN, District Direttot 
209 O. W. rassenger Station. Seattle 
W, C, Wilkes, Asst. to Dist. Dir, 
\ 
WILLIAM SPROULE, District Director 
San Franciscot Cal. 
Texas :pistrict j 
F, 0. PETTIIIONI:. District Dlro:tor 




the railroads efficiently ae an arm of the Government 
in wax, and he took no chances with political appointees. 
The or~anization of the Railroad Administration was as 
follows:- 3. 
W. G. McAdoo-----------Director General. 
Henry Walt er,s----------Operatin~ Advisor. 
J. Skelton Williams----Advisor on Financial Matters. 
Hale Holden------------Supervisor of Railroad War 
Board Organization. 
Edw. Chambere----------Ad\.viaor on Traffic Uatters. 
W. D. Hines------------Advisor on Le~al Matters. 
A. H. Smith----------~-Assistant to Director General. 
R. s. Lovett-----------Priority Director. 
W. S. Cart er-----------Labor Advisor. 
Other appointments were made but these are sufficient 
to show the general character of the organization and the 
type of men choBen to fill the positions. ·The complete 
organization of the Railroad Administration, both 
national and regional, is Shown in the accompanying 
cha.rt. 
For operatin.g purposes the country was divided into 
first three and later into seven re.gional districtF.> 
with re.gional directors who were experienced railroad 
-
men, in charge of each, as$iated in some eases by a 
district director. The Re.gional Directors had ;seneral 
supervision over the lines in their re~pective districts 
and their duty was to see that the orders an.d re~lationB 
of the Railroad Admini8tration were complied with and 
to keep that body informed as to conditions in their 
3. Dixon & Parmalee--War Administration of the Railways 
in the United States and ~reat Britian--p. 131. 
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districts. They were supreme in command in their res-
pective district.s and were directly responsible to 
the Direct or General. Fo.llowin6$ are the different 
regiona and their directors:- 4 • 
Eastern Region------------------~------A. H. Smith 
Alle~heny Region-----------------------C. H. Markham 
Pocahontas Re.gion----------------------Wf. B. I1faher 
Southern Region------------------------B. L. Winchell 
Nolithvvestern Re.gion--------------------R. H. Aiahton 
Central Western Re.gion-----------------Hale Holden 
Central Southwe.st Region---------------B .F. Bush._ 
Map showing the di vision of the country into districta. 5 
l<EY 
I. EA.r T f= IOI flt· G. I O,v 
2.ALl-~C.H/:.NY !(E/J..IGIV 
3fOCAHO#'TliS ~fi'C.101'1 
Jf. fO vrH£fi'/{ Jr( F ()../ON 
$ NOlffH WliJ"UIC If l{J:.0. ION 
b.CEJITRllt- WFS1E f(N tf'J: O..[ OH 
7Jo&17'HU'c.J"TERN' l(eA.10# 
The first o~der of the Director General directed that 
all who were in··~he em1Jlpy of".,b.he railroads $hould· con-
4. Thompson,S.-Railway Statistics of the U. S.•1918-~. 41 •. 
5. Thompson,S.-Railway Statistics of the U. S.-1918-p. 41. 
tinue their duties in the same manner and report to the 
same officers as before Government operation. Under 
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this order the president of a railroad company acted as 
the agent of the Director General and at the 8ame time 
continued as chief executive of the corporation, thi$ form 
of or~anization being used until after the passage of the 
Federal Control Act on March 21, 1918. After the passage 
of this Act there was an attempt to draw a line between 
the federal and the corporate activities of the railroads 
but such an undertaking was not as succesl=>ful as wished 
for with·the result that on May 21, a change was.made in 
the organization. 
The Director General now ordered that there should 
be a di~tinct cleavage between federal and corporate 
activities. With thhi end in view he placed the in ..dividual 
rai.lr oads in charge of federal and general managers, . 
the federal managers being in charge of the more important 
single lineB or .groups of less important lines,., and 
the general manat?;ers beint?; in charge .of smaller di visions. 
The federal managers were required to sever all connections 
with the respecti~e companies and become the exclusive 
agents of the .Government because the Director General 
felt that they could not co-operate with him ~o the best 
advantage if they at the same time maintained their 
affiliations with the private companies and lecau$e he 
thou~ht that he did not receive the amount of support 
which he thought necessary, in a few cases. The : 
federal manaf6ers were cho$en fr om the et a.ff of the road 
of which they were to ha"re charge, in many cases the 
president being chosen but in a great many cases ~ome 
subordinate official being chosen because he was in 
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closer touch with operations. From this time there were 
I 
two sets of officers for each· road, the federal and the 
corporate. The latter officers were left free to repre-
sent the corporation in its responsibility to the stock-
holders and the directors. The duty of the federal 
manager was to rnake reports to the Regional Director 
of his respective district and to avail himself to the 
fullest extent of any advantage to be secured in the oper-
ation of his road or in the preservation of its identity. 
The placin.g of competent railroad rnen in charge of all 
the important positionB created by the Railroad Adminis-
tration ~ave greater assurance in re~ard to the proper 
functioning the railroads. 6. 
The pO.licy to be pUl3eued by the Railroad Adrninistra-
t ion is given -in the followin.g and is known ae Mr. 
Mc.Adoo's "Declaration of Policy" of June 17, 1918. 7. 
(Things to be accompli$hed in order of importance.) 
1. "The winning of the wa:r which includes the prompt 
~q)vement of men and the material that the Government 
requires. To thi$ everythin~ else must be 
.subordinated. 
6. Cutini11~ha.m, Wm. J. -The Railroads Under Govt. Operation, 
vtuart erly Journal of Economics--Feb. 1921-.-p. 302. 
7. Dixon & Parmalee--Wa.r Administration of the Railway$ 
in the United States and Great Bri tian--p. 137. 
2. "The s'er vice of the public which iB the purpose 
for which the railways were built and ~iven the 
privileges accorded them. This impliee the main-
tenance and improvement of the railroad properties 
eo that adequate transportation facilities will 
be provided at the lowest cost, the object of the 
Government being to :fiurnif?h service; t.ather than 
to make money. 
48 
3. ".The promotion of a $pirit of sympathy and a better 
understanding as between the administration of the 
railway$ and their 2,000,000 employees as well as 
their 1O0, 000, 000 patrons, which 1 at t er class in-
cludes every individual in the nation, since trans-
portation ha$ become a prime and universal necessity 
of civ?i.lized existence. 
4. "Tlj.e application of sound economieq including: a. The elimination of superflous expenditures. 
b. 'rhe payment of a fair and l.iving wage for 
services rendered and a just and prompt compensation 
for injuries received. 
c. The purchase of material and equipment at the 
lowest prices con.siBtent with a reasonable but not 
an excessive profit to the producers. 
d •. The adoption of standardized equipment and the 
'introduction of improved devices that will save 
life and labor. 
e. The routin~ of freight and passenger traffic 
with due r essard to the fact that a straight line is 
the Bhortest distance· between two points. 
f. The_intense employment a.I. all equipment and a 
careful record and a scientific study of the results 
obtained with ·a view of determinin~ the comparative 
efficiency secured." 
In the above statements, it can be seen that the 
Railroad Administration assi~ned itself to an immense 
task. 'l'he fundamental principles of this policy are 
unification, consolidation, and !3tandardization. These 
were the methods to be employed in bringing about a 
realization of the goal eet. 
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The Contract Between the Dovernment an.d tihe Indi viduar' 
Railroads. 
In the Preeident's Proclamation, the Director ueneral 
was authorized to enter into negotiations with the different 
railways in oneer to determine a just and reasonable 
compensation on the basis of an annual ~aranteed rental 
above accruing depreciation an d the maintenance of 
their property. equivalent to the net operatin~ income for 
the three-year period endin~ June 30, 1917. All of the 
fundamental principles upon which the contract was to 
be based were stated in the proclamation. In an Act of 
Congree of March 21, 1918, comm only known as the Railro Bd 
Control Act, the general principles that were to form the 
basi8 of the agreements with the different railroads were 
stated. A contract had to be drawn up between the 
Government and every individual railroad that was taken 
oYer, and not until October-" 22 was the ·form of the con-
tract finally agreed upon ty all the partie6 concerned. 
The delay was caused by the many issue$ involved and by 
the conditions that were peculiar to each line of railroad 
which demanded separate consideration. As it was consid-
erable difficulty was experienced in reachin~ an a~ree-
ment with many of the compani ee with the result that by 
January l, 1919, contracts had been executed by but 23 
out of the 160 or more Class I railroads. At the ter-
mination of federal control 14? contract$ had been 
executed and 83 were y:et under consideration. Of theee 83, 
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49 had agreed as to compensation while 15 had declined 
to accept the compensation offered and had filed appli-
cation with referee boards to f'ix the amount of R:nmPensa-
tion. Six roads had declined to make contract$ and seven 
had never made appltcation for one. 8. The iSi st of the 
main sections of the Railroad Control Act which was 
approved by the President in May 1918 is ~iven .below: 9. 
Section 2. If no agreement waa made with the carrier8, 90% of the estimated amount of just income was to be paid. Ji.ny amount over that found 
due was to be paid with 6% interest. Carriers 
were to pay inter est on overpayments. 
Section 3. Claim$ for just compensation, not adjusted 
were to be sulxnitted to boards on application. These boards were given power to summon 
witnesses and require records and testimony. They were to report to the ~resident the 
just compensation and the President could 
make an agreement upon that as a basiB. 
Section 4. CompenBation for additions, etc. were to be increased by a certain per cent npon cost. 
Section 5. No dividends in exceBs of those of the 
three yea:r test period averaq;e were to be 
paid. RailroadB that paid no dividends 
durin~ that period had to secure the approval of the President before any could be paid. 
Section 6. There was to be a revolivin~ fund of $500,000,000 out of the United States Treasury, to pay the 
exp ens ES of federal control and to pro"lide 
facili t:.ees. The President could order the 
carriers to increase their facilities and 
advance them the amoumt needed, the carriere payinq; int ere.st on the amount adYanceQ.. The loss claimed by additions etc. was to be ascer-
tained by an agreement between the :President 
and the c ar:ti er. 
8. Cunnin.gham, Wm. J .--The lfailroads Under Government 
Operationr~uarterly mr. of Economics, Feb. 1921--p. 306. 9. United States Statutes at Large-1917-18--The ~ran.'3por-. tati on. Act of March 21, 1918--p. 451. 
·: 
Section 7. With the approval of the Pres:;ident, any 
carrier could issue securities to provide 
neces$ary funds. The President mi~ht pur-
chase the securities out of the fevolving 
fund and sell them whenever desirable 
at a price not less than cost. 
Section 8. The Pref3ident could appoint aisents for 
executin&.; the powers and could call upon 
any part of the Government for services. 
Section lm. Carrier$ while under Eederal control, were 
subject to exii::;tint?; laws not inconmiatent 
with thi~ act~~ There was to be no defense 
as a 150 ver:runent agency. No pro c ea a was to 
be levien a€ainst the property while under 
Federal control. The President had power 
to ini ti ate fares, rat es, classification$ 
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and re~ulatione by filin&.; them with the Inter-
.state Commerce Commission, which should not 
be suspended pendin~ final determination. 
They were to be reasonable and just. Com-
plaitit~ could be made again.st them. The 
ce::btificat e 6f the President was necessary 
t.o increase operatin.g revenue. 
Section 11. The pu~ishment for the violation of the 
provisions of thi8 act or for int erf er in~ 
with the use of railroad property wag a . 
fine of $5000 or two years imprisonment or 
both. 
Section 12. The money derEYed from operations wa~ United 
at ates :property and i.vaa to remairi in the 
cu~tddy of railroad officers. ~he mtthod 
of accountinl$ exist in~ before federal control 
wa~ -to be used. Disbursments ·were to be 
made in the same manner as before federal 
control and were to be made for snecific 
purposes desi~nat ed by the President. If 
the roads were restored to the owners during 
any tax period, only the amount f allin~ under 
f ed~ral control was to be paid out of' money 
'received then. The books were to be clo(:)ed 
whenever the President &ro wished and the 
exces.s or deficit to be cr:edited or aebited 
to the r evol vin~ fund. 
Section 13. All cases then in court were to proceed. 
Section 14. There was to be federal control for twenty-
one months after the wa:r ended. The Pre.si-
dent could,.; prior to July 1, 1918, reli:mquish 
such carrier!? a.s he desired to relinquish. 
There was no ri1?:ht to compensation after 
relinquishment. 
Section 15. Nothinl$ in this law affected stat.e laws· 
except when they intefered with Government 
op er at ion.. 
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Section 16. "This act ie expresF3ly declared to be emer-
J?;ency le~iE:lation erected to meet conditions 
l$rowin.g out of the war, and nothin.l$ herein 
is to be construed as expressin~ or pre-
judicrin.g the future policy of the Federal 
Government concernincs the ownership, control, 
or regulation of carrere or the method or 
the basi~ of the capitalization thereof." 10. 
The provisions of the contract can be briefly summar-
ized. In takint?; Oirer the property,. it had to be enumer-
ated in detail, for accountin~ adjustments and regulations 
and for final settlement. Improvemerits and new equipment 
were to be charged to the railroads affected and were to 
carry int er est payable by the Director General a$ rental 
from the date of completion or delivery, but strictly 
war improvements were to be a charE?;e a£Sainst the Govern-
ment. The Direct or General was to meet· operatin~ expenses 
and no·:!."Inal ta:xes, ·to maintain the property up to the 
stardard existinl$ when taken over. to maintain contri bu-
tion$ to pemdon and other funds, to pay the lfiontinuin£S 
cost of valuat io.n work, and to carry out all contracts 
and a~reements for the buyint?; of supplies. ·'.l'he railroads 
.themsel 'res were to bear the expense of maintain.€ their 
10. United States Statutes at Lar.ge-1917-1918, The Trans-
portation Act of March. 21, 1918--p. 458. 
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corporate organization, of war taxes, and to meet all 
cha.rt?;e$ such as interest and di 1ridends. The op er at in~ 
income was determined· by deducting all operat in~ expenses, 
normal taxes, and certain operatin.£?; r;entali:; from operatin!S 
revenues. The !1Uaranteed rental wa8 to be paid to the 
carrier whether it wa.r-:; earned or not. If adjustment of 
claims could not be accomplished by a conf ere nee, the 
InterE?tate Commerce Commission was to appoint a board of 
referees, and if a,n a£S!'eernent could not 'be reached with it, 
the carrier was allowed to pet it ion the Court of Claims. 
Carriers were denied the right of litigation at the end 
of federal control on the question of whether they had 
suffered from the diversion of traffic, it bein~ held by 
the Director Gent=ral that Conl$re1::1B intended that the 
authorized compensation should cover this element. The 
annual average income was to "be ascertain ed. by the 
InterF>tate Commerce Commission and certified by it to 
the President. In makin~ accounting and adjustraent·s in 
regard to maintenance and reserve8, considerati·on wa$ to 
be given to the amounts sp.ent for such durinR,; the t eet 
period, and to the condition of the property when taken 
over. Excesi:J opera tin~: income wa~ to remain the property 
of the United StateB. In case of lines that were in the 
receiirer's hands, or in the ca8e of tbose where due to ab-
normal or undeveloped conditions, expenditures for 
additions and betterments; were not fully refl~cted, 
as wa8 the case with southern. linea, the President was 
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authorized to make any agreement which he considered just .11. 
Conditions When tt:he Government Assumed Control 
The Government assumed control of the railroads when 
their traffic affairs were in the very worst condition. 
Con~estion at that time extended far into the west and 
added to this trouble wae the unueually severe weather 
which not only interfered with the movement of traine 
but blocked marine termirials aB well, so that the terminals 
were crowded to the point of paralysis. About the middle 
of January, occured a storm that completely paralyzed 
traffic, and all durin€ the winter one s term fallowed 
closely upon another. A great deal of time i~ lost on 
railroads because of the effecte of cold weather and 
snow storms. Ash pans freeze, water and ice freezes on 
the engines, coal freezes in the Car$ causin~ difficulty 
in s ecurin'S a good fire, lubricatin~ oil igets cold and 
will not flow, the solidly frozen roadbed increases 
wear and tear on the equipment, switches freeze and are 
difficult to operate, and there is dlh.fficulty in gettinig 
up steam in the enE?;ines. All t tee e conditions serve to 
retard and delay the movement of trains • 
Another fact or was the bad condition of.motive power. 
It had been kept in eer1rice when it should have been in 
the repair shops and when seNere weather came, much of it 
went out of use altb.~ether. Durint6 the bad. weather many 
11. Dixon, F. H .--Federal Operation of Rai Jroad$ during the 
War, Q,uar. Jr. of Econo~ics, August 1919--p. 582. -
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shoprnen were utilized in clearin~ the tracks of snow, thus 
causing delay in repairin~ the equipment, and some engine 
houF3eB were unable to accomroodat e tihe larger engines. 
This condition caueed a great deal of dehay in terminals 
and a great deal of lost ~tme in taking engines where 
they could be repaired. 
A $hort history of the conditions existing on the 
Pennsylvania Railroad during the win.t er of 1918 will be 
gi,,ven in order to give a picture of the condi tion>s that 
confronted the railroads. Conditions were the worst on 
thi8 system of any syst1em but conditions were very bad 
on all lines, so a hl4tory of those existing on the 
Pennsylvania will not be far from typical of those on 
all lines and especially of those on eastern lines. 12. 
On January 23, 1918, 23 trains on the track were 
ready to rnove but there were no locomotiYes available. 
In one. yard there were ISO cars of Goirernment automoblies 
and 50 of these were in open top cars. At ijlenrock~ 
Pennsylvania, there were 120 cars all of which· had been 
held over 20 days. There were 1156 cars for the American. 
Shipbuilding Company at Hog !$land, 667 bein~ in the 
Philadelphia terminal and 427 at Hog Island not being 
unloaded. The vongeation was east of Pi ttsbur'$ and was 
partly due to cold weather and sick trainmen. 
12. This hi'st orical material concerning the Penn_i:;;yl vania 
Railroad is taken from: Lee, E.- ... Experience of the Penrv:ayl-
vania with Winter--Railway Age, March 1, 1918--p. 447. 
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After the heavy snow storms of January, shopmen. were 
utilized in shoveling snow and claarin~ switches. This 
' 
made lesa labor in the shops at a time when it was needed 
mo.et. In the Altoona shops, from December 20, 191? 
until January 21, 1918, the men spent 9225 ten-hour days 
in shoveling snow. This time repreBent ed a lses of the 
repairin~ of 19 engines, of the buildin~ of 39 steel 
freifjht cars,· of the strengtheninr:s of 33 cars, of the 
heavy repairin~ of 25 cars, of the light repairin~ of 
45 passenJ$er cars, and of the manufacture of 350 car 
wheels. The disruption of the forces in this manner also 
\ 
slowed up labor as well as causing the loss of time. On 
'Y'I 
the Bellwood Di vision, 11000 hours were $pent in shoveling 
snow. As a reeult of this 540 cars accumulated. At 
Pittsburg 2357 cars accumulated. 
~ 
DurinE?; the cold weather, · en~ine failure$ increased 
45% in the Pittsbur!S district. On January 28 there were 
70 engine failures in six hours. There was also much 
trouble with boil era due to the poor qua1ity of water used. 
In the Philadelphia yards, the normal movement of 
cars was 2925 daily but from January 14-25, it averaged 
leeB than. 2000. From 54 to 61 cars daily were left over 
without loconJoti ves. The averaise daily western movement 
of cars of this division wa~ from 140Qito 2200 but the 
number sent Wa$ from 110 to 586. 
On the M'iddle Di vision, 11000 care. were left over 
every day, and only 50 .% or 60% of the normal business was 
done. 
~ ... 
On the Pittsbur~ Division, 10000 cars were left over • 
daily and there were 100 trains daily without engines. 
The Pitcairn coal district needed 324 cars daily but re-
ceived only 24. 
Reduction in tannage: 
Maryland Division.-----------36% 
Philadelphia Di vision.-------25 
Middle Division-------------17 
Pittsburg Division.----------38 
There was also at this time a great deal of trouble 
in ho ldin.~ labor due to causes which have a.lr eady been 
mentioned. On the Cresson Di vi8ion of the Pennsylvania, 
171 new men were hired within 4 months in order to main-
tain a force of 149 men. 
When railroads a.re confronted with such conditions 
57 
as have been described, it is utterly impossible for them 
·~~ 
to do an averag:e day's work, or to come anywhere near that 
goal. Snow drifts retard the movement of train.a; the 
utilization. of shop labor for track labor slows down t 
repair work; bad_ weather increases sickness among empl"ees; 
and much effi ci en.t labor is lost to other industries., 
leavinl$ les;;s efficient labor to do work which requires ~l:Le 
!(~· 




A. Freight Service. 
As soon. as the Railroad Administration was ort?;anized, 
its main efforte were toward the securin€ of operating 
efficiency. At this time, thou~h no one in the ~ountry ex-
cept a few Government and railroad officials knew it, 
the Allied nations had sent us word that unless the United 
States could get foodstuffs to them, Germany would win 
the war. Every effort was now bent toward gettin~ the 
necessaxy pr ovisiona to the Allied nations. Every thing 
elee was subordinated to this need for a time and the 
problem was solved. 'l'he demands of the Eur91pean countries 
were made in February and by March 15 their vessel capacity 
had been satisfied and there were available at North 
Atlantic ports an excess on wheels of 6,318 cars of 
foodstuffs exclusive of ~ain in cars and in elevators. 
After that. time there wa$ never any dan~er but that 
we could meet the demands of the Allies for foodstuffs. 
In rnakin~ the driV\:e for o])eratint?; efficiency, economy 
and the eavinLS of money were considered althou66h those 
factors were not the chief aim, that aim beintS to meet 
war necessities~ lJrany of the methods employed by the 
Railroads' Viar Board were retained and enlariq;ed upon and 
many new methods that were either impraciiicable or im-
:poseible under voluntary co-operation were used. The most 
important of these methods were the unification of terminals 
and stations, the reduction of passenger service, reduction$ 
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in o~ganizatio~a, and other miscellaneous economies. These 
methods wi 11 be described in detail below. 
1. Solid Train Movements. 
Foodstuffs traveling from west to east, fruits from 
California, lumber from the northwest to be used in the 
construction of aeroplanes, ships, and army ccamps, 
packin~ hou8e products, and flour, corn, and oats from 
l1Unnesota were shipped in solid trainloads. Although 
such a practi~e is not the most economical because the 
most economical weight of a train varies with the rate 
of ~rades and with the power of locomoti1~s, which differ 
widely on di:ff erent railroads, yet the practi ve did much 
tto quicken the movement of frei~ht because the continuous 
movement of traffic was secured through advance informa-
ti on to conrectinig lines, thu~ eliminating switching 
throu~h terminals. 13. Fast schedules were unnecessary 
b ecau.s e of continual movement and minimum terminal delays. 
Certain products were desit?;nated to certain lines on 
certain days, thus ineu~·im~ maximum tonnage to all lines, 
and each train had a specific routin~~ The plan acceler-
ated oil movements 100%. 
All export traffic was, as far as possible, totbe 
concentrated at Chica~o, St. Loui8, and Pittsburg and 
eolid trainloads were to made up at the8e point$ for the 
different ports. The strain caused by the great amount of 
13. Cunn.in~ham, Wm. J. The Railroads under Govt. Operation, 
Quar. Jr. of Economics,-: lrebruary 1921--p. 314. 
export traffic was lessened to some extent by the work 
of the Exports Control Committee which was created on 
June 11, .1918 and which "consisted of a representative 
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of the United State8 Railroad Administration, a major 
general representing the army, a rear admiral representing 
the navy, a st earns hip representative representing the 
Shipping Control Committee, and a traffic expert re-
~r ea'entinrs the Allies ."14. The committee was to have 
. ·charge of all questions relating to export traffic. and 
:t'b was'. 'to determine the probable amount of such traffic. 
and_ to work .. out a plan for its distribution through the 
dliffer.ent ports in order to relieve the con~estion. at 
·t " •. 
New York which had until thiB time received the greater 
share of the export traffic. After February 14, 1918, 
an export license.was required of all export frei~ht. 
2. 'l'he Unificatio'n of Temminals. 
·The best example of the unification of freight 
terminals was in Chicago. In that city there a.re tbree 
belt lines, the Inner Belt Line or the Belt Railway of 
Chicago, the liTiddle Belt Line or the indiana Harbolf 
Railroad, an.d the Out er Belt Line or the El~in, Joliet, 
and Eastern Railroad. 1'he Outer Belt Line was used for 
an interchange line for traffic movinl$ beyon.d Chicaf$o, 
with the excepti,on of perishable$, those products being 
routed· over the Middle Belt Line. The Inner Belt Line 
was used for the deli very of cars within Chicab50· . Inter-
ch~~e switchin~ in all terminals was largely eliminated. 
14. CunninC6ham, Wm. J .--The Railroads under Govt. Operation. 
Q,uar. Jr • of Ee onomi cs, February 1921--p . 315. 
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In Chica~o, as the result of co-operation with producers, 
66% of the coal arriving there durin~ Au.gust Wa$ consiESned 
directly to consumers from the mines, and cros8 hauling 
between terminal lines was larfSely reduced throu.gh the 
same co-op er at ion. 
Terminal mana~ers were appointed in all the lar~er 
cities and they had jurisdiction aver the fad:ilities of 
all lines. 136 off line and uptown stations were closed • 
.. 
In. the Southwestern RefSion switching was consolidated eo 
that 54 lines did what was formerly done by 109 lineF3. 
In New York harbor 117 coal barges and 18 tu~s belongin~ 
to different railroad$ enterinfl the city, were pooled 
a.s Yr ere also the pi er s, each railroad bein'6 assigfted to 
a certain pier. 
3. Embargoes. 
Rules of February 28, 1918. 15. 
a. Gonsi.q;nees who <Md not unload promptly were sub.;. 
ject to the approval of the Director General. 
13. Expeptions when a complete embargo was not essentnal, 
were live stock, coke, charcoalr, acidSJ, alcohol, 
ammonia, light oil, petroleum products in tank cars, 
and tan.M cars; 
c. D ame!Stic food :products when not expected for home 
consumption, and food products for a.nimalB except 
hay and straw; 
15. Embar.go Rules, Railway Age, l!1ebruary 28, 1918--p'." 4105. 
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d. Materiale assi.gned to the United States Government 
or it s a.gents ; 
e. Railroad material and supplies other than coal and 
coke when consigned to an officer destined to a 
point on his line; 
f. Printing paper, printing inkt and scrap and waste 
paper when consigned directly to paper mills or 
manufacturers; agricultural improvements for pre-
parin~ the soil; 
.g. Demurrage char.ges were to be assessed if cars 
were loaded in violation of the demurrage rules. 
During the w1nter of 191 ?-1918, an embarE?;o was 
placed upon everythin..g except food, fuel, and certain war 
mun.i tions and supplies on the Pennsylvania east of Pitts-
burt$, on the :Baltimore and Ohio Railroad eaet of the Ohio 
river, and on the Philadelphi~ and Reading Railroad for 
the purpose of enabling those lines to special! ze in coal 
for supplyin~ the acute conditions in New England and 
New York harbor, and in sup-plying empties for mines and 
coke ovens. 
4. illie Routin~ of Frei~ht. 
The ow~ers of freight had absolutely no .power in 
the routin~ of their frei~ht. It was routed by officials 
regardles~ of origin and ownership. This practive did 
away with circuitous routes which ha~ been one of the 
most wasteful practices in. railroad operation in the past. 
General Order Number 1 o'f the Director General directed 
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that everythin~ possible be done to alter this condition. 
Studies were underttt.ken for the purpose of developing 
new route6 which would not only be shorter but also more 
economical and eff i ci en.t and as a result , car , en~ine and 
train miles have been saved and ehippers have had the 
services of many more car·s than they otherwise would have 
had. Durin€ the ore s~ipping season a total of 64,770 
loaded and empty cars were r e:Cout ed with a saving of 
3,577,464 car miles from the Misaabe Iron Ran€e alone. 
In the Eastern al1rd l\forthwest e.rn Re~ions alone 
there was saved a total of 16,863,633 car miles. 
Cases of shortened routes. 16. 
Between and Long route. Miles Short route Mile!3 
Duluth-Chicago C.B.&Q-H.P. 606 Soo line 464 
Chicago-Kans .City C .Gt .West596 A .T .&S .F. 458 
Minneapolie-
Dea Moines C .B .& .Q,. 614 C.R.L.&Pac. 270 






This plan was thought by.:: the Railroad Administration 
to be one of :tts most important reforms but 1'lr. Cunningham 
however, does not believe this to be the case. 17. He 
thinks that the importance of the factor has been over-
estimated. He finde that in practice freight suffered 
the least delay when moved over the normal rout es. A 
shif11.i n.g of the load to the short er route oft en found it 
unprepared to move the load and congestion resulted. Even 
if there were savin£6S they were but a fraction of a per 
16. Statements of Hon.W .G .McAdoo before the lnter8tate Com. 
Commission, January 3 and 4, 1919--p. 13. 
17. Cunningham, Wm. J .--The Railroads under Govt. Operation., 
Q,uar. Jr. of Ee on.omi cs, -: February 1921--]l. 314. 
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cent of the total car miles. Savin~s made by using shorter 
routes were in many cases overbalanced by the higher cost 
of movin.is cars over the shorter and more con.geeted routes. 
5. The Permit System. 
The use of permits in the shipment of goods was a 
~reat aid in claaring;up con~estion. Before ~oods could 
be shipped to a consi~ee he must have contracted in ad-
vance, for the required vessel space, and he must also 
be able to accept and unload the 'SOOds without delay. 
This was a method of controllint?; the traffic at the 
source and there. is a: possibility that the transportation 
demand would not· have been met without the mmplo.yment of 
this system. 
6. The Poolin.g of Eguipment. 
The Car Service Section had complete control over 
equipment and with the exception of coal cars, it was 
distributed to where it was needed without re&Sard to 
owners hip. Durin.g the ~reat er part of federal control 
the payment of che.rges for car hire between different roads 
was waived and each road was inf;tructed to t?;ive the same 
running repairs to forei~n cars that it E?;ave to its own. 
Motive power was also transferred from one road to another 
where a shorta~e existed. 
?. Demurrage Rates. 
These charges were cumulative and were increased 
.. 
almost to the prohibitive point, the char~e bein~ $3.00 
for the first day, $4.00 for the second day, and $10.00 
for the eight day and thereafter. 
8. Heavier Car and Train Loading. 18. 
1919 1918 1917 
Avera~e train load in tone revenue 
and non-revenue frei~t. 688 681 653 
Average car load in tons, revenue and 
non-revenue frei~ht. 27.8 29.2 27 
Percent of loaded to total car miles 68.7 67 .8 70.2 
The increase in coal carried wae 22, 000, 000 tons 
during the first six months of federal control. 
Figures of the 1 nterstate Commerce Commission on 
car and train loading. 19. 
1919 1918 1917 
Ton.$ per loaded frei€ht car 25 .48 26 .99 24 .?7 
Tons per freight train 631 628 597 
65 
Tons of frei~ht ori~inatingll90,172,967. 1382,004,577 
1,376,844,812. 
Ton miles per mile of road 1, 559, 442 1,738,305 1,698,825 
This ~as one of the best fields for improvement in 
the matter of moving traffic. Formerly cars had been 
moved when only partly loaded and scarcely any caris were 
ever loaded to capacity. The i?;igures given show tbat 
the train load and the car load were both greater in 1918 
than in 1917, but the same efficiency was not maintained 
durin£$ 1919 because, of conditions due to the termination 
of the war. In 1918 frei.ght train movement was not as 
large as in 1917 but if larger trainloads could be moved 
18. Hines,¥{. D.--Report tio the President for Fourteen Months 
ending March 1, 1920--p. 8. 
19. Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 1929, 
Table VII, p. 101; Table III, p. 99. 
with steady movement in a litt·le :banger time, a great 
saving would result. The units for loading cars were 
increased and shippers were required to move ~ain and 
foodstuffs in maximum lots. 
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The "sailing day plan" was employed in the movement 
of freight in less than carload lots. . It was designed 
to brin~ about a better utilization of frei€ht cars by 
securi:1€ a heavier average load per car. Schedules were 
made for the main less than car ~oad shippin€ points 
and such freLght was held for through cars which :fan 
to certain points on specified days. The plan was not 
altogether approved of by shippers because it gove some 
distributing centers an· advantage over its competitors 
to common market~ when the traffic from the firBt was 
heaYi est and justified more frequent service.' In New 
York and Philadelphia, s~ore door deliveries were made. 
The interchange of labor was also practiced in order to 
avoid the accumulation of less than carload freight. 
9. The Coal Zoning Plan •. 
This plan was continued from operation under the 
Railroads' War Board. It was predicted that the railroads 
could not meet the nations need for coal but· they met it 
in i:>pi t e of the bad wwather in the win.t er of 1918 and also 
succeeded in transporting.37,083,300 more tons during 
the first ten months of the year than was transported 
duirinis the same time in 1917. At the beiginni:ng of fad er al 
control a eerious f3ituation existed with reR;ard to bi-
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tuminous coal. There was a shorta~e of cars at the 
mineGt a lack of eff'icient distribution, and a dislocation 
of the New En~land supply because of the use of coast· 
wise ships in ocean transportation. A critical condition 
also exiBted in the northwest. In meeting this situation 
each producing district was given a certain fixed area 
in which to market its production. Shipments to other 
places were not allowed without a permit by the Fuel 
Administration. J.his eliminated a great many lon.g hauls 
and a great deal of short hauling and also offered an 
incentive £or using the coal in the plain statea which 
at any other time would not have been. mined in competition 
with better P:;rades of other districts. 
Anthracite coal and empty cars were moved throu@'l. 
the Pennsylvania tubes, and bituminous coal at New York 
llarbor was diverted to the piers where it could be dumped 
most expedi tiou c::;ly to relieve the need of bunker coal 
for ships. Ihis ~as a move which could not have been 
taken under private control. 
10. The Pooling of R~pair Shopa. 
Equipment needinl? repairs was taken to the :nearest 
repair shop in which it could be accommodated, re~ardless 
of ownership. Many shops were not adapted to the repair 
of e o:me of the lar P:;e en[$i n ES and they had to be hauled 
some distance at times before they could be taken to one 
that could accommodate them. Some times it was found to 
be more ad visa.bl e to close some enl?;.:bl!e houses and con-
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centrate the work in a less number. This plan was used 
J 
at Galveston. ·.i.he separate car inspection forces main-
tained by individual line!? was consolidated .into one 
force at many of the large interchange points. 
JJ. The Standardization of Equipment. 
Director General McAdoo claimed that there were about 
2000 styles of freight cars and mearly as many of loco-
motives; so be thought that standardized equipment would 
be a good thing for the railroads. Under such a plan, 
the producer$ of equipment and the management of repair 
shops could employ more uniform methods and thus $ave a 
~reat deal of time and money. He had a committee work 
out plains for the standardization of equipment and it 
finally made plans for 12 standard types of fr eight ca.rs 
and for 6 types of locomotives of two weights. Under the 
terms of the contract between the Director General and 
the railroads, the Director General was required to secure 
the approval of the corporation before he could perman-
ently assign any of the equipment to it. Most railroad 
men did not favor the plan. because of the varying con-
ditions that existed on different lines. None of the 
twelve standard types mi~ht meet the condition$3 on 
particular line$. J.he railroad officials did not so much 
oppose standardization a$. they did the de~ree of stan-
dardization. Two or three times the number of standard 
types of locomotives mi~ht meet the situation on all roads. 
The caae for etandardization of frei~ht cars was 
J 
·much stronger and it is poss~ble that such was a ~ood 
reform. Cars do not stay on the home road and if all 
car8 conform to ce:t:ta.in type~ they can be repaired in 
any shop. Railroad repair ehops would not have to carry 
as many repair parts and there would be a E?;r eai-t deal 
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of time saved in repairin~ becau$e each ~epair shop would 
have the~part needed and would not have to wait until 
a special design wa~ made before ·beginnin~ work. 
1:A.:._Unif orm Freight Classification. 
There had b.een three classifications applying to 
interstate commerce and in addition to this many states 
had clae~ificatione. The8e various classifications con-
tained about 15, 000 different items and they differed in 
many details. ~reat con.fusion resulted in ratin~ and 
cla'3Bifying frei '?;ht. To remedy thiF3, a consolidiated 
cla$sification was:> prepared and submitted to the Int er-
state Commerce Commission for its approval, Mr. Hines 
not caring to initiate it himself without the approval 
of that body. The principal obstacle to.?· plan of uniform 
classification was that such a plan would cau$e losses 
to some roads in the lowest classification. in any terri-
tory were adopted and on the other hand if meant hi£Sher 
rates to shippers if the hi~hest classification were 
adopted.20. The Interstate Commerce Commission held 
20. Cunni n'?;ham, Wm .J • --The Railroads Under Govt • Con.tr ol, 
Q,uar • Jr. of Ee onomi cs·' February 1921--p . 319 • 
hearint?;s upon the proposed plan and the shippers showed 
such opposition at these that the Commission declined to 
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approve the plan of re-classification becauee it appeared 
to have the effect of increasing rates unduly. The 
Comission did however, ~ive its approval to the unifica-
tion of cla~sification rules. If such a plan had been 
approved it would have beer;i ·easier for officials to 
compel closer compliance to arar ].oading standardss, thus 
preventin.g underloading. 
13. The Simplification of Accounting. 21. 
The chan.ge. from pri vat ed to :dederal control with the 
separation of corporate and federal accounts placed a 
heavier burden upon the accountin~ departmentB of the 
railroads. At first the railroads were imitructed to 
keep two setB of accounts but lat er the federal and the 
corporate forces were divided and one was:- amicel'lneu 
with the Government accounts and the other with corpor-
ate account!?. The Director General required many special 
accountc:; and statistice as did also the Division of 
Accounti~ and the Division of Capital Expenditures. 
And later, in July the standardization of operating 
statistics placed still he.a1ri er burdens upon· the account-
in~ department.s of the railroad6. 
To counterbal!3-nce tht:?se h.eavy burden$.) many simpbi-
ficat ions in accounting relating to interroad transactions, 
21. Cunningham, Wm. J .--The Railroads Under Go-v-t. Operation, 
Q,uar. Jr. of Eco riomics, -:February 1919--~. 31~. 
were ordered. The Governn1ent Wa$ interested only in the 
combined results of the roads as a national $ystem and 
not in ab~olute accuracy of accounts; eo many shortcutc; 
in accounting rnet hods were order ed. 
The first step Wa$ the adoption of the Uni ver$al 
int er line ·waybill which provided for the billing of all 
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·through frei ~ht moving OiTer mor.e than one road from point 
of origin to point of de$tination. This elEminated 
much re-billing at junctions and thua reduced the delay 
of freight. 
Next, came the discontinuance of the technical and 
arithmeti.cal checking of bills between roads under 
federal control. ~he billin~ road was required to use 
care in making out the bill and the debtor road war;; 
required to a$sume the accuracy of the bill. This applied 
to freight clairn8, car repair.s, equipment rents, ,joint 
facilities, arid $tatements concerning the 8ettlement 
of joint reverues arising through interline traffic. 
The next $t ep waa the use of the "road to road per-
cents" met hod of apportioning interline freight revenue 
instead of the old method of each road figuring from 
waybi11 records the amount which it owed to other roads 
. and which other roads owed to it. The new plan provided 
ffor the division of joint frei.ght revenues as between 
carriers in the same proportion that auch revenues were 
divided durin.g the yea:r precedin.g federal control . A 
method like this w.as al~o used in dealin~ with pa$se~er 
revenues. 
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Another 6hort cut method used was the discontinuance 
of freit$ht car hire charges between roads under federal 
control. 
14 ·· Advance Movement of Materials. 
The advance movement of raw materials durin&S the 
sum mer months when traffic was:; slack wae encouraged. 
People were alee encourat$ed to secure their winter supply 
of coal during the sunnner when the railroads were able 
to get it to them. 
15. Centralization of Government Shipping. 
Government shippin!$ was centralized by the appoint-
ment of 1v'faj or General George W. GoethalB, tha!ll"I acting 
Q,uartermaater General, as Director of War Department 
Tran'3portation. Thie method would provide a central 
management to handle Government traffic which would make 
for the orderly movement of supplies, and would make 
next to impos~ible the recurrence of the situation that 
came about through the exeesBive U!Sed of the preference 
tage under the Railroade '. War 13oard, when there was no 
central or~anization to take charge of such matters. 
16. The Elimination of Duplicate Lines. 
When there were two closely situated, parallel line8 
or where a parallel line had been built for the expre$S 
purpose of competing. with an ollder line, their aciLi~ities 
were correlated so that there would be ai::; little waBte 
of energy a$ po~Bible. Examples of such railroads are 
the West Shore, the Nickel Plate, and the Des Chuyler 
Railway and the Oregan Trunk Line, the~rn latter two 
going down a.pposite sides of a canyon into a territ.ory 
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who~e traffic did not justify on·e line. Unified control 
stopped the waste aue to such competition . 
.!1..:_The Consolidation of the Express CompanieB. 
The four expresa companies were consolidated into one 
camp any to be known as the Am er i can Expr er; s Company, 
which was to conduct the businesr; on all federal lines. 
50i% of the earnings were to go to the United States 
Government for payment for haulin~ the express, and the 
I 
balance after paying expenses and an5% dividendi was to 
be divided between the Express company, the Railroad 
Administration, and a guaranty fund. 
B. Passenger Service. 
1. The Elimination of Unnec§ssary Service. 
Elimination to December 31, 191S. 22. 
Eastern Region 16,253,914. paasenger train 
Alle~heny Region 4,a?opooo rni les 
Southern Region 1,? 02, 480 " " " Northwest Er-n Region 23, 280, 000 n II " Central Western Region 16,772,524 " " 11 
Southwe~t ern Region 4,411,244 11 " It 
Service between St. Louie and Chica~o wa~ reduced 40%. 
' Between many of the larger cities there was a sur-
pluaage of trains arrivint.S and departing at the same time, 
some of them bein~ but partly filled. There were two 
tw:en.ty-four trains between Hew York and Chicago, both 
22. Thelen, Max--Public ·:servioe Under Govt. Operation. 
Annale of American Adademy, November 1919--p .24. 
leaving and arrivin~ at the same hour. Between Chicago 
and St. Paul, Chicago and St. Louis, and Chicago and 
Kan~as City there were in each case from three to five 
trains leavin.g at> about the·:earne hour in the ereenin.g and 
arriving at about the same time the next morning. In 
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other cases there was a triplication or quadruplication of 
service. Many of these unneeessary trains were dis-
continued,., and' the t·ompeting ~raine on parallel :tinee 
were discontinued and the remaining i:> er vice was arranged 
.'' . ~ . : 
/!' 
eo that the time of the arrival and the departure of the 
I 
/ trains wa8 more ··frequent than under the old sy~tem. 
The schedules of many trai m were lengthened. this being 
the ca~e with limited trains and they were required to 
handle local traffic. The Baving was greatest in the 
west and the northwe~t where accornmodati ons were most 
liberal, and in the east where traffic was heavieet. 
On January 6. 1918, 400 tfains were discontinued on 
eastern lines. The hauling of special trains and of 
needle$S private cars was discouraged and schedules 
were revised ao that connections would be closer and so 
that trains would lea1re at successive hours instead of 
the same hour. Tickets of one railroad were honored 
by any other railroad and a universal mileage book was 
adopted and sold at $30.00 per thou6and miles plus 8% 
war tax. This wa~ de$igned to lessen the pressure at 
ticket office8 and to diminish congeBtion which had been 
complained of at ticket .offices. 
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2. The Consolidation of Ticket Offices. 
Up town and off line offices with the exception of 
a few in the larE?;er cities, were eoneolidated and the 
employees were as8i gned to work in other department s 
of the railroad $ervice. This was done because there waa 
no lon/$er any competition for traffic of any kind. This 
affected a aavin~ of over $23,000,000. 
3 • The Unification of T er mi nal s . 
Plans were made out providinf$ for the common use of 
some terminals which had previously been used by an in-
di vi dual railroad. The best example of this is the U$ e of 
the terminal ~f the Pennsylvania Railroad in New York 
City by the Baltimore and Ohio and the Lehigh Valley 
railroads. Such. a plan resulted in better service to 
the public. Another example is the u Be of the pi er of 
the Southern Pacific railroad at Oakland, California by 
the S.anta Fe and the Western Pacific rai lroadB. 
4. The Change in the Dining Service. 
Tab 1 e 1 d' hot e s er vi c e was put i n'b o us e on 0 ct ob er 
1, 1918 in order to conserve in the use of food and 
dining cars. Meals were s:erved at the Uniform priae 
of$leach. A la earte service was restored on March 1, 
1919 to meet the requirements of travelers. 
The movement of passeM,'.ers. 
Troop movements--May 1, 1917 urtil June 30, 1919. 23. 
23. Thelen., Max--Public -:Service Under Govt. Operation, 
Annal$ of AmeTican Academy, November 1919.--p. 24. 
The tota3:, troop movements durin.g this period was 
13, 890, 691 individual movements divided as follows: 
7' 988,? 07 
3,614,058 
2,287,926 
movement8 in special troop trains. 
" t1 regular n " 
" of iDrafted men to carnps. 
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The movement of troops received the ~reatest attention 
of any of the Government demandB and the railroads met 
the situation every time that they were called upon to 
mo11e tropps. "The troop moYement required a great number 
ot sleepin.g and tourist care as well as chair cars. The 
short er movement.s were made in chair cars but all the 
longer movement$'-\ from camps to .portG of embarkation 
were made in tourist and sleeping cars. This moirement 
furnished no return load. The cars had to be taken bafk 
to the camp~ and a lar~e amount of motive power was 
• 
utilized in doing this. 







The Railroad Administration tried to di$cour age 
pac::;sen~er travel at this time but the n~unberB carried 
broke all previous records. The railroads carried thi~ 
large number of passengers with practically no increase 
in equipment and with a ~reatly reduced number of trains. 
The train~ were £Senerally crow<ied and delayed trains were d.. 
common occurrence. But the convenience of the public had 
24. Report of Interstate Commerce Commission-1920-Table 
III--p. 99. 
to be subordinated to war needs. Af~er the war ended 
much of the discontinued service was reestablished 
because of the demands of the traveling public. 
SUCCESS OF THE DRIVE FOR OPERATING EFFICIENCY. 
There are many different opiniona as to the $Uccess 
of the railroads under Government operation a~ regards 
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the amount of ~raffic moved. Many railroad officials 
claim from fi~res given by them comparing the operations 
of the railroads during the years 1918 and 1919 with 
the operation durirus the years 1916 and 1917, that not as 
much traffic was moved a8 would have been moved under 
i 
private management, while the Railroad Administration 
claims and also gives fi@lree to prove its claims, that 
the railroads were much more efficient under Go1rernment 
management. We are sure of ore thin~ and th~t is that 
the railroads under Government operation sudceeded in 
accomplishin.g the tac:;k that was intended for them. They 
moved the frei~ht and the people necessary for the winning 
of the war. There is a claim, but figures from different 
sources show it to be untrue, that the railroads rroved 
more freight durln~ 1917 than during 1918, ~ut even if 
that. were true, in 1918 they mo1red more that was necessary 
for our military operations. The question was not al-
together the amount moved but al8o the kind of freight 
that was moved. The Government had absolute power and 
could give priority to a.ny clas$ of frei$t that it needed 
worst, while un.de.r private operation there was always 
present the incentive to take freitSht merely. for the sake 
of the revenue that it afforded. The worst freight con-
gestion in history was cleared up within five months 
aft er the Government as~umed control. 
Table showing freight traffic for 1917, 1918, and 
1919, 25. (Net ton miles per mile of road per day.) 
1919 1918 
January I 4275 3878 
February 4002 4591 
March 4059 5273 
April 4124 5471 
May 4524 5226 
June 4615 5423 
July 4878 5487 
August 5075 5691 
September, 5625 5731 
October 5651 5584 
No\re:mber 4711 5155 
December 4688 5184 
Average for 12 months 4689 5206 






















1 These figures te1i their own story •. The railroads 
mowed much more freitSht during 1918 than during 1917 
but the record was not maintained during 1919. 
A word should be said regardin~ the slump in efficiency 
durin.g 1919. This was not due to negligence· or mis:man-
al$ement on the part of the Railroad Adrni ni8tration but 
was caused by c oDJdi ti ons connected with the:_ termination 
of the war. When the United Stat es entered the war, 
25. Hines,W .D.--Report "bo the Pres;ident for Fourteen Mnnths 
endirus March 1, 1920--p .• 8. 
26. Report of the Interstate Com. Com.-1920-Table III--p. 99. 
.. 
changes were made without he.si tation. The comfort and 
convenience of the traveling public was necessarily sub-
ordinated to the nation's first and primary need. Wax 
conditions made operations more difficult than in peace 
times. But after the armistice was signed complaints 
were made about the class of service that was being fur-
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nished. During the war people were stirred by the patriotic 
motive and they 1Sladly accepted limited service but after 
the war was over the patriotic motive wa~ lacking. The 
war had been won and people wanted a return to the pre-
war service. There was also a slump in traffic at this 
time. War could not be stopped one day and normal rail-
raad operations be resumed the next. Time was required 
for adjustment to the new condition$. 
The operatinl$ resulte during the fii"'st ten months 
of federal control are summarized by Director General 
McAdoo as follows: 27. 
"The railroads, duri11£$ the first 10 months of Federal 
control:, :pr educed 1. 9 p,er cent more ton miles with a 
decrease of 2.1 per cent in train miles and a decrease 
of 5.8 per cent in loaded car miles. The avera~e train 
load increased from 655 tons to 682 tons, a gain of 4.~ 
per cent; and the average carload increased from 26 .8 
tons to 29 tons; a gain of 8.2 per cent. I may say that 
that does not reflect the situation a$ favorably ~s the 
result$ justify, or as the Railroad Administration is 
entitled to, because, in order to ~et food and supplieB 
promptly to the sea8hore for transehipment over the ocean, 
we hauled empty cars regardless of any other traffic 
into the ret?;ions where the originatin~ traffic was, and 
carried the supplies back to the seaboard with all poesible 
27. Statements of Hon. W_. G. McAdoo before the Interstate 
0ommerce Committee of the Senate, January 3 and 4, 1919--
Bett er Operation--p. 14. 
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rapidity, in ord-er to meet the demands in Europe of the 
armies and the -civilian population there. That refers to 
the instance described in the previou8 part of my report. 
Ordin.ar ily, as you know, the railr oadFJ make it a point 
never to haul empty loads if they can avoid,it, which, 
of courBe, ia sound economic practiue. The exL~encies 
however, were so £Sr eat we had to haul those empty cars 
a very lon~ distance in order to ~et them quickly where 
the vital traffic wa6, and we £?;et n,9 credit for that in 
the statistics I have ju8t ~iven. lhat would be more 
favorable if we tbok thoi=Je matterl3 into account. 
"The inc1feas e in traffic in 1918 wa$ accomplished 
by the use of approximateJ.y 3.4 per cent more frei~t 
care. and approximately 1.4 per cent more frei?it loco-
motives than in 1917. ~ompared with 1916, the 1918 
increase in freight car$ was 6.9 per cent and the 
increase in frei~ht locomotive$ was 2.4 per cent. 
"It should be explained that the total ton-miles 
handled are much less than they would have been in the 
past for a corresponding volume of traffic by reason of 
cutting out circui taus hauls. The general statement 
may be made that the actual transportation production 
is great er than is indicated by ton-mile sta ti sties. 
In whatever degree the actual performance crl' moving tons 
from one place to another as required is accomplished 
by moving the tonna~e over shorter routes, to that 
degree the ton-mile statistics understate the real per-
formance when they are compared with a period when the 
shorter routes were not U6ed. That i$ somewhat technical, 
but all railroad men, I hope, wi 11 understand it." 
WAGES. 
Early- in the year of 1918 the Division of Labor was 
created as a division coordinate with the other divisions 
of the Railroad Administration, and W. S. Carter, ~resi­
dent of the ~rotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and l::ingineers 
was appointed as dire.ctor. BEpartisan boards of adjust-
ment were also created to deal with the grievance8 of 
employees that could not be settled locally. The work 
of these boards wae ve,ry -satisfactory, an agreement being 
,reached in practically every case that came before them. 
The boards were __ created by ~reement between the labor 
or~anizationa and the Regional Direm'tors. The principle 
of collective bar.gaining waa recognized in all labor 
questions. 
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Immediately after its ortt;anization the Railroad 
Administration created a Railway Wage Commission consisting 
of Pranklin K. Lane, C. C . Mc Chord, J. H. Covington, and 
w. R. Wilcox. ~he duty of the Commission was to make 
an. investigation of railroad wages a$ compared with wages 
in other tndoostiies, of railroad conditions in different 
parts of the country, of the special emergency wages 
caused by the war, and the relations between different 
classes of laborers on the railroads. This Commission 
was to make a report to the Director General coverintS the 
whole field of railroad wage8. General Order Number 27 
of the Direct or Gener al, which increased the wa~es of the 
railroads' e:rrployees, was l:ased upon this report. 
The above Commission was unable to deal with all labor 
problems so a Board of Railroad Wages and Working Condi-
tions, compo$ed of three representatives of railroad 
labor and three representative$ of railroad manafSement 
was created. This Board took up the special. claims of 
employees and made r ecomme ndat ions upon the bas ea of 
which supplements to General Order Num"ber 2? ware made, 
these supplements providin66 for variouB chant?;es in waJ?;eS 
and workin~ conditiona. 
The labor 8ituation: on the railroads vms a very 
82 
serious on.e durint?; the entii·e period of federal control, 
thou€h it was much more serious before the war ended 
than afterward because of the difficulty in securin~ 
and retaining efficient labor. Wages were much higher 
in wax industries, consequently many labor ere left the 
railroads and entered those industries. Much of the 
labor secured by the railroads durin.g this period was 
inefficient and1 could not accomplish as much as efficient 
labor. The Pennsylvania System bad the equivalent of a.n 
annual turnover of 100% from May 2?, 1918, until June 5, 
1918, 4477 enployees having stopped work and 5122 new 
ones havin~ been hired. The ~eatest diffioµlty was in 
securing shop and ttrack labor. 
Railroad. employees fared very well under federal 
operation., havin~ received several $Ubstaritial increases 
in wages ~urin~ that period. These increases were necessi-
tated thou~h by the rise in the cost of living and the high 
wages bei n~ paid in other industries, and when all is 
told there is a doubt whether railroad labor recei Yed 
any more or as much as it was entitled to and the fact is 
certain that it wa.s not securing as rrnai.ch ae the labor in 
other industries. The inc:f eases had to be gr.anted to 
keep the laborert? satisfied. 
trouble with their ernployee9 
The railroads were Hnaving 
c :. juJ;;;t 1Te:O'i oua 
to the time when the Government assumed control of 
the railroads a.nd tha.t situation probably exert ed. con-
siderable pre6sure when .the Govern.rnent. decided to a.esume 
83 
control of the ~ailroads . There were no authorized 
etrikee during fiederal control but there probably 
would have been had not the Wa£$es demanc:S been granted. 
As it waG, there was much dissatisfaction and at some 
tirnes there were threatened strikes. The best picture 
of railroad wages in general duri nJ$ Go 'rernment operation 
can be f;£i ven by the following table, part of which has 
been given before in thi8 paper: 28 (rn-thousands) 
Miles represented 250,313 
Employees, numberl,960,569 
Per 100 miles ~f line 783 
Hours worked(ml 5,165,320 
Compen.c:>at i on(m $2, 9 01, 963 



















Per hour (cents) 56 





In studjing the above table one finds an increaee 
of over 15% in the number of .employees while there was 
an increase of about 1% in the number of hours worked in 
1918 over 1917. In 1919 there was a ~reater number of 
employees than in any other year and they worked a 
less number of hours than in any other year except 1916. 
These resultB are due to the Adamson J£ight-Hour Law. It 
vvas cheaper for the Railroad Admi:n-i strati on to increase 
the number of employees than.pay for overtime; so more 
employees were required to do the aame amount of work 
that a less number of men had done before the Adamson 
Law went into effect. 
28.2 
41.09 
28. Thompson, S:Sason.--Railway Statisticrs for the U. S.-1919 
--p. 59. Part of the above table was given in Chap .I, p. 10. 
/ 
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General Order Number 27, the fi~at one dealin~ with 
railroad wages Wt?rl.t into effectoon May 25, 1918. Under 
that order, wages were increa$ed for all those employees 
who were receiving lees than $250 per month on December 
31, 1915. :Back payment was allowed on all time since 
that cB.a:hle and the amount due on such payments on June 1, 
1918, was $125,000,000. The increase was not the same for 
all classes of employees. ':Chose who were rec ei vd.ng a low 
wage secured a higher percentage of increase than those. 
who were receiving a higher wage. The greatest increase 
was 43% for those who .ww~e receivini<S less than $46 per 
month. IiTom that TiLSUre the rate of.increase scaled 
downward until those who had been receiving $250 per 
month, secured no increase at all. If however, the em-
ployees had received an advance in wages since December 
31, 1915, and·most of them had, that advance was to be 
consid~ed in making the new increase. This rulin~ 
resulte4 in much dissatisfaction because in many cases, 
the railroads had already advanced wages ae much or more 
than the Government had. 


















































239-250 Inc~ease large enough 
tdl. increase the wage 
t 0 ~~250. 
The Board of Railway Wages and Working Conditions 
recommended an advance in wages to shopmen and employees 
of the mechanical departments of the railroad$, which took 
effect on. July 1, 1918. ·.lhese employees which included 
machinists, boiler makers, blacksmiths, sheet metal 
workers, electrical workerF.>,, carme n, moulders, thei~ 
apprentices and helpers composed a group of 500,000 
workers. The advance established a minimum basic rate 
of 68 cents per hour for all the classes named except 
carmen, second clas~ electrical workers, and all appren-
ticea and helper$ who had had four years experience and 
who were on January 1, 1918 receiving less than 55 <fi'ents 
per hour. For the other employees_ included in the order, 
a minimum of 58 cents per hour was established. These 
wages averaged about.13 cents an hour higher than those 
previously paid. 
A basic eight-hour day waF.> established an.d a minimum 
29. Congress Recommends Wage Increase of $300,000,000; 
Railway Age--May 10, 1918--P.• 1163. 
advance of 2t c~nts per hour was given to all common 
labor, thew.e two measureB being against the recommenda-
tions of the Wage Commission. 
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General Order Number 28 practically abolished the 
clasa of clerks who received less than $900 yearly. In 
1917 there were 101, 570 employees in this:; clas8- but in 
1919 there remained only 5,603 and the increase in·,their 
pay from 1915 u~til 1919 amounted to 154.5%. In 1919 
the pay of the clerical staff exceeded the total paid 
to road engineers, firemen, and condue:tors. 
In April 1919 the Brotherhoods secured wage advances 
amounting to $65,000,000. 
In August 1919 railroad employeeB again a6ked for 
in.creased wages but at the request of President Wi!iaon, 
they withheld their d enJands until a better opportu:ni ty 
was afforded for det erming the trend of the cost ·of li vin.g. 
The President thou.ght that the lines would go back to 
the owners at the end of the year wt when they did not 
do so the employees again presented their demands but 
at the President 's __ request, again withdrew them until 
better machinery for dealing with wages could be organized. 
On March 1, 1920 the railroads were restored to the 
private owners without any provision being made for 
increaRing wages, leaving the employees to deal with the 
private ovmers as best they could. 
In fixing railroad wages, the wagee paid in the 
temporary was induetries-:were :not considered to any det?;ree. 
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The Railroad Administration wanted to find a just and 
equitable basis which would outlive the war and which would 
give a living Wa&5e to every employee. Efferts were made 
to eliminate inequalities and ·to standardize railroad 
wages a.s much as possible, and while this work has not 
been finished. it has received a good start. 
Avera!!,e yearly cotjlpensation of selected class es, 1915-1919. ZO. 
Road F~ei~ht Road frei~ht Road frei~ht Road freight 






























































































The Railroad Administration did not increase rates 
immediately after the Government assumed control of the 
railroads because there were other questions, one of which 
was the labor question., that demanded first consideration, 
and because the increa~e in rates was a question that 
required careful consideration. The President and the 
Railroad Admini~tration ha.cl power to initiate new rates, 
and rates so initiated could not be lawfully chan~ed by 
the Interstate Cornmerce Commission. except upon compl1aint 
after a hearin~ at which the hailroad Admi11istration. was 
entitled to be heard. In initiatin~ new rateB, the policy 
was to make them high enou~h to cover operatin'S expenses 
and fixed charges because it wa8 felt that the traveling 
and shipping public should not be required to bear the 
expense of conduct in~ a war. 
The first general rate increase was made under General 
Order ~umber 28, although an advance of 15% nad been 
allowed eastern lines on I\Jar ch 15., 1918~. This order 
provided for an 25% increase in frei~ht rates to become 
effective on June 25, and ~or a passenger rate of 3 cent8 
per mi le for the who 1 e country, with t cent e_xtra per 
mile for riding i:n Pullman, sleepint?;, and parlor cars, and 
t cent extra per mile for trairelin.[$ in tourist sleepiniS 
cars. Commutation fares were also advanced 10%. The extra 
char~es for the us:;;e of Pullmans were abolished aft er the 
armietice was si£Sned. Rates on. certain commodities such 
coal, coke, ores, wheat, and packing house products were 
increased by a epecified amount. No charge was to be 
for lese than 50 cents and the minimum car charge was to 
be $15, and no fr eit?;ht rat e8 were to be lower than the 
clas8 rates per hundred-weiE?;ht. Intr.<t."state rat es were 
abolished in cases where there was an interstate rate 
between two points and all state rate8 were leveled up 
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to the same level as interistate rates. 'l1raffic committees 
were appointed in each regional district to deal with 
queBtion8 arisinfS under General Order Number 28, and in 
the organization of these committees, the shippers were 
allowed to have representatives to look a.ft er their int er es ts 
and to present their demand~ and complaints. 
Freight rateB were increa$ed for the purpose of supplyinb£ 
more revenue but passenger rat es were increased for the 
purpose of discouragint?; traYel in order to have the equip-
ment for more essential pcr:pposes, but in both cases the 
desired result was not attained. The increased rates 
did not brinJ.?; in enough revenue to meet the mountinfS 
expen.F?es and passenger traffic was as heavy if not heavier 
than before. The Director General estimaeted that the 
increased rates would yield $900, 000, 000 annually. 
There were rnany .proteatB a£,?;ainBt the increa.<3ed rate9, 
a few as to the amount of the increase, but the ~reater 
part, and· these came to a large extent from State Railroad 
Commissions, were because of the dietmnbance which would 
result from puttinP?; the plan into operation and makinJ?; the 
necessary adjustments afterwards. 
Level of rates. 31. 














The increase under General Order Number 28 was the 
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I only general rate increase made during Government operation. 
The Railroad Administration refused to increase rate:.~ 
after the ending of the war for reasons that will be 
discussed lat er. 
THE SHORT LINES. 
The short railroad lines of the country presented 
a peculiar and in some cases a more or lesf? difficult 
problem, in that they were not necessary to the Government 
scheme of defense, and yet they could not be entirely thrown 
upon their own r eeources because many of them were dependent 
upon larger railroad companies and most of them had a~ree-
ments or contracts with other l'ines which were very essential 
to their successful operation. A Division of Public Service 
and Aco-9unting of a Short Line Railroad Section was appointed 
by the Railroad Admin~stration to deal with the problems 
of short lines. 
In the Federal Control Act, there was a provision 
.giving power to the Preisident to relinquish fDorn federal 
31. Report of the InterBtate Commerce Commission, 1920, 
Table X--p . ,102. 
control, lines that were not needful or desirable. On 
June 28, 1918, the Railroad Administration released 2000 
miles of short lines which were in that dEass. These 
lines releat?ed included some 1400 plant facility lines, 
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or spur lin.es that were for the use of industrial establish-
ments. Some line$ wer released upon their own request. 
After relinquiehment these railroad8 were to receive no 
compensation but were .given protection against conditions 
which might place them in 'an unfavorable position. 'l'hey 
vrer e to remain under the management of the · ow~ers and 
were entitled to all revenues and responsible expenses. 
They received the benefit of several governmental a£Senci es. 
They were to receive equitable allotments of cars, a reclaim 
of 2 days per diem on cars for lines not over 100 mile$ in 
length, and the use of f?;Overnment purchasin.g agen.cieE?, 
but repairs were to be made upon the same basis as before 
Government control. The division of joint rates among these 
linea and the guarantee of the same proportion of competitive 
traffic was to be up on the ba$iS of that of the three 
year teBt period. A co-operative contract which guaranteed 
these lines against discrimination and deprivation of traffic, 
was drawn. up between them and·:: Wle Government .and it was open 
to the si~nature of t.he railroad officials at will. 
There were different reasonB for the release of these 
short lines. Conditions were uncertain. on some of them; 
unreasonable demands were made by some o.£ them; but the 
main reason was that the6e lines were r e~arded as a 
liability rather'" than as an asset by the Railroad Adminis-
tration. It was estimated that their operation during 
1918 would result in a deficit of $20,000,000 e~clusive 
of any compensation; and they were not ne.-eded in the plan 
of national defense; so it waB deemed the wisest policy 
to relinquish control over 'them. 
1 THE OPERATING DEFICIT • 
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The operating deficit incurred by the Railroad Admin-
~\. ' istration has been the source of more ciiti"sm a~ainst 
that body than has anythin~ else that happened concerning 
the railroads during the period of Government operation. 
Some of the criticisms made concerning the Railroad Ad.min-
istration are just and the Administration reco~nized them 
to be so, yeit others, and among them the critici$ro con-
cering the operating deficit, are without much foundation.. 
The deficit was due to an increa~rn in operating expenses 
which was very much f$I'eater than the increeae inooperating 
revenues. If rates had been increased there would have 
been no deficit tut the Administration declined to raif3e 
rates for reaso~s which will be discussed later. 
E8tilnated excess of operating expenses and rentals 
over operatinP;: revenues: 32. · 
Class I railroads-----------------------
Other privately owned pr opert i ES (smaller 
railroads, sleepin~ and refrigerator 
$ 667,513,151.56 
car linE£ and steamship lines----------- 43,011,129.36 
Inland waterways------------------------ 2,449,738.69 
T t 1 --~'i&---72~2~9~7-4----9---0 a - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~P , . , 01 • 61 
Expenses of central reigia11n.al organization 13, 954, 979 .69 
Deficit, Amer. Railway Express Company-- -38, 111, 741.60 
Adjustment of' m~terials and supplie8 in 
settlement with railroad companies on 
account of increased prices-------------
N et Int er est accruals for def erred com-
pensation, open account c;; and 
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85,204,618.26 
additions and betterments--------------- 37,558,162.01 
.Deductions from ~rose income------------ 10,118,034.36 
Miscellaneous profit and loss items----- 4, 894, 056 .38 
--$--91~2~,~8~1~5~,~6~1~1-.~9~1-
L es s non.- op er at i ng inc om e- - - - - - - - - - - - - -_-____ 1_2;..:i • .,..3_3_6_,1 ... 8._5 ....... 5..... ~3..-5_ 
32. Total-----------------------$ 900, 4_78, 756.56 
The latter figure, $900,478,756.56 is the total 
deficit incurred by the Railroad Administration in the op er-
at ion of all prope:Jeties that were controlled and operated 
by the Government yet that fi~re is not the one that we 
have read so much about in the propa&;anda of the opponents 
of the Go1rerrunent owner$hip and in,"·the propai6anda of those 
who have been prone to criticise the Railroad Administration. 
The figure that had been popularized so much i!5 the first 
one or the clef ici t incurred in operatin~ the Class I 
railroads. This amount however is not the whole deficit 
incurred in connection with the Class I lines. This amount 
( $667, 513, 151. 56) is the amount by which operatin65 expenses 
exeeeded operating revenues on Class I lines and does 
not take into account the eJ..i;:>enae of the re£Sional organiza-
ti on, and adjustme rrts that would have to be made. If. all 
of these were considered under Class I lines ·probably 
much the greater share of the deficit would be found to 
be due to the. operation of those lines. 
32.Federal Control of Railroads Result$ in $900,000,000 Defi-
cit; Railway Age, Uay 29, 1920; p. 8?9. From the Report of 
Swagar Sherley, Director Division of Finance· of the Railroad 
Ad.ministration. 
94 
Railroad op_era ting expenses had been mounting gradually 
before 1917. In that yeax the first effects of high prices 
were felt. In 1918 and 1919 increased wages and cost of 
materials raised expense lut there was not sufficient rate 
increases to meet these. 
"Increased expenses were explained in 1916 by the 
increase in traffic; one-half of the increase of 1917 was 
.filue to the increase in traffic and one-eight of the 
increase of 1918 was due to the ean:ie cause but none of the 
increaeed expen~es of 1919 were due to inClfeased traffic. 11 33. 
The increa.13e in operatin1?; expenses outddstanced the ~rowth 
in traffic, but more espe~ially it outdistanced the 
increase in rat es. A deficit om: a railroad is due to in-
adequate revenues. Increased rates were not put into effect 
by the Railroad Administration umtil five months after 
the Government assumed control; so there was five Jfionths 
of heavily increased coste before rate increases became 
effective while increased wa£Ses were made retroactive 
causinE?; the payment of much back pay. Director General 
Hines is of the opinion that if rates had been increased 
on January 1, 1918 there would have been no deficit prior 
to November 1, 1919, and gives the following fi.@lreB to 
prove his statement: 34. 
If. increased rates had been effective January 
1, 1918, the deficit would have been reduced· ~~494,000,000 
If for January and Februaxy, the railways ·:~ 
had been paid a rental proportional to that 
of the three year test period durin~ those 
months, inGtead of two-twelfths of a years 
rental the deficit would have been reduced-- 49,000,000 
33. Parmalee, J. H .--Railway Revenues and Expenses in 1919; 
Railway Age, Jan. 2, 1920--p. 94. . 
341 Hines, W. D.--Report to the President for Fourteen Months 
endin4 March 1, 1920-Financial Situation--p. 28. 
If the coal $trike had not taken place it 
would have been reduced--------------------$ 114,000,000 
A larige amount was due to the slump in 
traffic in the first six months of l~U9. 
The total deficit during thi$ tirne, in-
cluded in the $.?15,000,000 was 292,500,000 
But after November 1918 there mi~ht have been a 
deficit even if rates had been increased earlier because 
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operating costs vvere higher then than in. the earlier part of 
1918, There waf3 also a slump in the amount of traffic 
j 
durinrs the early part of 1919 causin~ all railroads to 
work under abnormal conditions,, and the coal strike came 
durini(the last two months of the year. These factorB, 
some of them unlooked for, decreased r ev.enues by a lar~e 
amount. The Railroad Administration could have increased 
rate8 had it desired to do so but it considered that the 
wisest policy was to let them remain as they were because 
condition.s were too abnormal to permit the drawin&!, of any 
conclusions as to the amount of revenue that would be 
needed and too, in formu].ating a rate policy it wanted 
s omethin~ that would be permanent. From 1914 until 1919, 
frei~ht rates increased 33.8% and passenger rates increased 
27. 9/"G, this in er ease beint;S only one-third as gr eat as the 
increase in railroad expense8. We can thus see why a 
deficit was incurred by the Government while it was operatin~ 
the railroads. 
The Railroad Administration has been accu8ed of makinE!. _, 
the CO$t of operation excessive, or more than it would have 
been under private management, and while it is thue that 
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the central and re~ional organizations were an expense 
that probably would not have been necessary under private 
management yet the expense necessary to the upkeep of these 
organizations was only a Yery small part of the total oper-
ating expeneee. The l:R.ailroad Admin.iatration claimed 
quite substantial saving8. due to coneolidation of offices 
and to the elimination mf some high aalaried officials 
yet these saving? were probably more than eaten up by 
the central and re~ional or~anizations. Both amount8 
were Bo small in comparison with the total amount of 
expensec; that they would make but little differerice in 
the final outcome of the finances. If there was waste 
and excessive costs in other departments it was more 
than likely due to the railroad$' own officials bee ause 
the Government retained all the old employees that it 
could. There haa been Bome criticism of railroad em-
pl oyees r egardin.g thi? matt er. Some have claimed that 
railroad employees made co~ as great as possible in 
order to turn public opinions against Government opera-
tion and while this might be true the~e has never been 
and evidence advanced to prove the claim. 
A compari8on between the expenses of the railroads and 
the United StateB Steel Corporation: 35. 
Expenae6 of the United States Steel Corporation: 
1914 $ 494, 000,000 
1918 1,240,800,000 
A tmtal increase of 151%. 
35. Hines, W. D.--Director Uene.ral Hines Anewers Criticisms 
Railway Age, February 6, 1920--p. 413. 
9? 
Op eratinq; expenses of Class I Railroads: 
1914 $ 2,140, 000,000 
1919 4,324,000,000 
A total increase of 102%. 
In the case of the Steel Corporation the ~ublic 
assume$ that increased expenses were due to enlaxged 
production and to higher costs, but in the case of the 
railroads it assumes the .tncrease to be due to the mistakes 
of the Railroad AdminiBtration. But the railroads under· 
Government contr1ol were subject tJo the same influences 
that increased costs in other industries and it was these 
influenees; workin~ upon operating costs and not mis-
mana~em ent on the part of the Railroad Administration; 
that caused the large increase in operating expenseB. 
Condition~ .growin~ out of the war affected all induetries 
alike and the railroad dollar was ju.st like any other 
dollar when it wa8 spent. It would bu;t af3 much but no 
more than any other dollar. 
From 1914 until 1918, the tonnage of finished steel 
products of the above corporat1on increased 55% and the 
incfease in per ton cost was 61%. '1.'he increa!?ed service 
of the railroads from 1914 until 1919 was 26% and the in-
creased coat per ·unti 1 was 60%. 36. 
36. The year 1918 was taken for the steel industry because 
the figu.re!S for that year were the lat est available at the 
time Mr. Hines w:oote his article and because private in-
dustry was subject to unfavorable conditions during 1919 
that were not present during 1918. 
The Administration has alBo been critici8ed for ex-
trava€ant increases in wages. A compari8on of railroad 
wa~es will be made with those paid in the $teel induBtry: 
United Stat ee Steel Corporation: 
1913 Labor costs per ton . $15.13 
1919(M:arch) Labor costs per ton 34.61 
An increase of 119%. 
The averaP;;e increases in railroad wages Jfior the same 
period was not over 100%. 
There is al~o the claim thatt there was an excessive 
98 
number of railroad employees. It is true that the number 
of employee8· increaded but this was due to conditions 
which were not under the control of the Railroad Admin-
istration. These have been mentioned before and need not 
be referred to here. 37. 
1917-1919--Increase in number of employees------- 9 .?% 
1917-1919--Decreas~ in number of hours worked---- 5.9% 
1917 --Average hours per month of work------- 261.4% 
1919 --Average hours per month of work------- 218.5 
Local railroad officialB controlled the hiring ofi men. 
There were 140, 000 more men at work in J·anuary 1919 than in 
December 1917. This was partly due to the Adamson Law 
but more largely to the fact that because of the open 
winter in January and Ji'ebruary 1919, a great amount of 
mainte riance work was done. Officials took advantage of 
the good weather and a good labor supply to do a large 
amount of delayed maintenance work. 
37. Page 83. 
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Following, is a table comparing the expenses and 
\ 
revenues of the railroads during the three year test 








Op er at i ng Expense$ 
Maintenance1 of way 
and structure 










1212. 1918 Test period 
$ 5,184,230 $ 4,926t594 $ 3,395,231 
3,556,734 3,458,191 2,380,943 
1,178,120 1,032,671 689,410 
57,441 53,563 83,236 
127,664 126,232 59t891 
264,271 255,937 181,751 
4,419,989 4,017,210 2,297,162 
778,105 656, 601 407tlll 
1,232,702 1,110,280 567,665 
47,538 48,741 61,741 
2,193,264 2,056,479 1,158,763 
125,437 112,319 82,538 
42,943 32,791 19,344 
$ 764,241 $ 909,384 $1,098,069 
199,194 186,966 152,427 
________ 9_1~7- ---------6=1-4_ 721 
564,130 721,804 944,921 
Net rentals Dr. 48,337 :ar~. 28,693 Dr. 39,761 
Net operating income 515 t 593 693 t 111 9 05, 160 
Operatint:S Ratio ( %) 82.26 81.54 67.'. 66 
The table above provides a 1$00d mean~ for making a com-
par is on between operation$ during the test period and !!lul!:hng 
1918 and 1919. The table shows a much greater increase in 
operatint:S exp ens es than in operating revenues. The differ-
ence of 27 .60% in the operating ratio between the three 
year test period and 1919 $hows what happened to railway 
finances during Government operation. 
Thus it is 8een that the deficit incurred wae not the 
38. Railway Earnin~s in 1919-Railway Age, Oct. 29, 1920--
p. 756. From Statistics compiled by the Bureau of Railway 
Economics. 
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fault of the Raiiroad Administration, rather it was due 
to the conservatism of that body in ·de:O'errin.g the rate 
inc~ease until it could be sure of the basi$ upon whi~h 
the increase was to be computed. The abnormal conditions 
exisitn~ during 1919 were very unreliable as a basis upon 
which to construct a permanent rate policy. If rates had 
been placed on a par with prices in every other industry 
there pror>ably would ha1re been no deficit. But if rates 
I 
had been increa~ed, Director General Hines dlaim~ that 
there would haire been the loss to the public in either 
case. In. the first place the deficit will have to be 
paid by the taxpayer g of the country and if rat es had 
been increased, the shippers and consum ere of p.r oductB 
would .have paid the price. It certainly makes a great 
difference thou€h who pays the cost, If it is paid by 
taxation, every taxpayer in the country helpf? bear the 
burden whether he ships anythin~ or not, but if shippers 
and consumers pay t1~ cost, the burden falls upon those 
who receive the 1Jenefit of the service and the latter is 
certainly the more just method of paying the costs of 
transportation, althou~h in this particular case the 
Railroad Administration thought that the people who used 
the seriri ces of the railroads should not be required to 
bear the expense of conductin.g a war, the increased ex-
penses of the railroad~ beinss in a large par t due to 
conditions .growimg out of the war. Director Ge reral Hines 
ia of the opinion that private operation would have coat 
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more than Govermnent operation because private operation 
would have e rcountered the same difficulties that Govern-
ment operation encountered and would have been less able 
to take advantage of many of the import ant economies that 
were accomplished through unification. and which helped 
partly to off8 et the increased costs. 
Probably the reason we have heard so imuh cone ern.ing 
the de~icit from the opponents of the1Government oparation 
is because that was the strongest point· of attack in 
turning public opinion rusainst Government operation. The 
deficit was a tangible thing expressed in money, and 
people could understand it easily. The condition vf the 
property w~ich will be discussed later, 39, was certainly 
of much more concern to the railroads than the deficit 
which the Go"rerrrment incurred and wihi;ch the private 
companies would not have to pay. There was nothing about 
the deficit to worry or cau~e anxiety to the private 
owners but the condition of the properyy was a cause of 
anxiety, yet little was said concerning this in the,pro-
paganda spread by opponents of Government operation. 
What. the private owners wanted, was the return of their 
properties and they were pet~rectly justified in wishing 
for this, but in endeavoring to secure the return of 
their properties they should not have criticised the 
• Railroad Administration for s an et bin.g that it could not 
help. 
39. Page. f06 
102 
It can never be told whether the railroads could have · .. 
been operated better and cheaper under pr iwat e management 
durin~ the war because the expenses that would have been 
incurred under private operation will never and ·can never 
be determined. We: do know that the Government assumed 
control of the railroada because private mana~ement under 
the exi8ting laws and re~ulations failed to provide the 
amount of transportation f3ervice that the country needed 
in order to succeasfully wa~e a war. Efficiency in trans~ 
portation involves the expedition with wnich traffic is 
handled and the pr ornptnesa and ref$ular i ty in supply inf$ 
cara and thiG is espec-ially important in time of war, 
as well aa the volume of traffic moved. This is where 
Government operation was perhaps superior to private 
op er at ion. 
103 
THE BENEFICIAL EFJ?ECTS OF GOVERlflvIBNT OPERATIOi'f. 
When everythin.g concernin~ the condition$ surround-
in.g the railroadr; just prior 1Mll'.and durin.g the period of 
federal control is known, probably most people will a.gree 
that the Government operation wa8 the best and only 
procgrarn for the railroads of the country at that time. 
In all probability, every indiiridual intereet in the 
country, what ev1er i tB nature, benefi tt ed thDOUISh Govern-
ment c:Jrperation of the railroads; and the railraad owners 
benefi tt ed most of all yet they are the ones who ha ire 
cri ticis~d Goyernment operation most. Perhaps they 
should not be criticised too much for this attitude. 
They knew there were people in the country who were in 
favor of Goverrunent owner$hip of the railroads and they 
also knew that while the railroads were under Goverrmem.t 
control an apportunity existed for ,the continuance of 
an experiment.in ~overnment ownership and if such an 
experiment were carried to a success, they vrnuld never 
secure control of their property aq;ain. The railroad 
owne:re tried to influence public opinion in their directions 
in order that they mi.ght secure control of their property 
a.gain. This was probably the rea$on for much of the 
criticism that was directed a.gainst the Railroad Adminis-
tration. 
There were three decided advanta~es that accrued to 
the railroads throu~h Government operation. 40. The first 
40. Clark, Hamilton&Moulton-Readinf$~ in Economic$ of the 
War--p. 349. 
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of these was the 'insurance of an income durin~ a period 
of uncertainty, during which time they were caught between 
two forces, fixed rates on the one hand and advancing 
coats on the other. Owners were relieved of the anxiety 
of securin~ a favorable income and could thus give their 
whole time and eff o:tt to other railroad matt ere. 
Secondly, the owners were f:eeed from the danger 
of continually maturing obligations which axdina.rily they 
would have been able to meet but which could not be 
provided for under the exietin~ conditione. 
Thirdly, they were provided with the means of making 
irnprovem ente and betterments which were badly needed, at 
a :.·time when their er edit would not allow them t o make .such 
improvements unaiided and at a time when such provision 
could be practically had through G o\rernment orders 
designed to place such requirements ahead of private 
concerns. 
Government operation also protected the investors 
in railroad securities. There is not much doubt but that 
Go1rernrnent operation saved all but the very stro·ngeat 
lines f!'Om insolvency or a condition approximating it. 
If invest ors had not received their income from railroad 
aecurities, more than likely business over the whole 
country would have been dialocated at a time when every 
cent of money that could be obtained was needed and when 
the 8uccess of a L?;reat many indw:3trieB was of prime impor-
tance in our mili ta.ry op~ations. If the railroads had 
105 
become insolvent,\ investor8 in railroad aecuritie!3 would 
not have received their income from this source, nor would 
the securitie8 have been worth much. TheGe inve$tors 
would have been unable to pay their debts and this con-
dition would have expanded until every class of business 
would have been effected. It would be difficult to imagine 
the ·real condition in which the business of the country 
mib?;ht have been placed if the majority of the railroads 
had beeamne insolvent before any aid was available. 
America would have -oeen practically powerless as a parti-
cipant in the war. 
Then there are the benefiits accruing to the general 
or shipping public in being able to secure cars promptly, 
or at lea~t more promptly than would have been posrdble 
under private control. 
Railroad labor also recei ·17ed many benefite in the 
form of higher wages but these have been disc~ssed and 
will only be mentioned here. 
But the greatest benefit, and this ha~ been discussed 
to some extent before, is that which accrued to the 
nation, and to the world for that matter, in. the winrd.n!S 
of the war by the Allied nations. In time of war, the 
railroads of a country are first in importance after its 
army and navy, and in the lat f! war an army would have 
accomplished but little without the support of an effic-
ient transportation Bystem. 
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THE APP.ARENT DEFECTS AND CRITICISMS OF GOVERlaNT CONTROL 
Of course, af3 was to be expected, some disadvantaE?;es 
resulted from Government operation, but these a:ffected only 
the individual railroads and were connected with the return 
of the railroads to the private owner?. They were pro-
blems of only temporary importance and would be righted 
as soon as normal conditions returned. The moet important 
of these proble~s wa8 with re~ard to tTaffic. During the 
war traffic was diverted from customary channels,and 
routed over the most direct route or over the route best 
able to carry it. This took away traffic from some lines 
and E?;ave extra traffic to other lines. The lines who 
loBt traffic would try their begt to re~ain it after 
they were :teturned to the owners and the lines that had 
~ained traffic would try just as hard to retain it. This 
would result in keen competition and cause some difficulty 
in makin~ the prop er adjustrn<:;mts. 
Another evil was the laxity in executive moral$. 
The official? of the railroad$ would not exert themselve$ 
as they did under prDvate management. They were freed 
from financial responsibilities and there is a probability 
that they were not aB economical as they might have been. 
Another bad effect claimed for Government operation 
but which ia not ·inherent in Goverment operation, and 
which nearly all authoritie$ admit to be true, i$ that the 
Government did not turn the property back to the owners 
in as good condition as it wa!? when taken over. The 
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condi·tion of maintenance is armore or less intan.gi ble 
thin~ and is hard to determine by riding over a railroad 
or makin&S a hurried inspection of the property. One has 
to consider a £Sreat many different factor6 in comparing 
the condition of the property of two periods. One of these 
factors in the price of materials. If the price of 
materials was twice as hi£Sh in one period as in another 
twice as nJljch maney would have to be expended to keep up 
I 
the same maintenance work. The sums of money expended 
in such a case are not as good a ~ide to maintenance costs 
as are the amounts of materials used during the two periods. 
The a'l1ounts of materials can be easily compared but amounts 
of moriey in periods of different priare levels are apt to 
be mir.,leading unless very great caution is ueed in in-
t erpreting them •. In making a comparison between the 
different amounts of material$ U!3ed, one must also con-
· · --~~-amount of new milea~e constnucted 
which did not exi6t in the firat period. These consider-
ations are sufficient to show that the question of deter-
mining the condition of tanlroad property in two different 
periodB is armore difficult problem than many mi~ht 
imagine. 
The Government in its contract with the railroads 
promieed to return the property in as fSOOd condition ais it 
was when. taken over. The owners claim that maintenace 
was not kept up to the standard and that not enou.gh 
equipment was bou~ht. The Goverrunent was restricted 
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in its policy of malo.in€ improvements because of the short-
a.£$e o~ labor and of mat er ials. Durin.g 1918 the policy. 
of the Administration waB to make only such improvements 
a? were absolutely necessary for war purposes. Labor 
and material were needed so badly in other wax activities 
that· only the most urg~t improvements were made on the 
railroads. .In 1919, the Admini8tration planned extensive 
improvements and started work on them but when Conq;res.s 
I 
adjourned on March 4, 1919 without makin&S any appropria-
tion for railroad maintenance work much of thi~ work had 
to be left unfinished and much that v;as planned could not 
be carried out. Con~ress refused to appropriate moiney 
for improvements because of the approach of the termina-
tion of federal control. Con€ress would have sanctioned 
improvements if the railroade had agreed to pay f of them, 
1:ut the railroads would not do this and Con.gress ··~ould 
not make the improvements because it was thout.Sht that 
the benefit would accrue to the private~ owners. 
Some statistics will now be ~iven in order to show 
what the condition of the property was when .given back 
as c ampared with f.t.s condition when the Government 
as~umed control of it. The only.manner in which such a 
compaiison can be made is by .givin~ the amounts s:penti on 
maintenance work durin~ Govern:r.ent operation and for a 
fevv year!? prior it;,o Governnent operation, the amounts of 
mat eriala used in Buch work, and the amount of· nE-W 
equipment bou~ht. 
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Amount spent for maintenance work: 41. ( 000 omitted) 
1919 1918 Test Period. 
Maintenance of way and 
Structure-----------$ 778,105 $ 656,601 
Maintenance of equipment$1, 232, 702 1, 110, 280 
$ 407,111 
567,665 
This table showq that much more waB spent during 
Government operation than durin~ the test period rut it 
does not take into account the di ff er ence in the pTice 
of materials and labor durin'6 the two periods. The price 
of materials UBed in maintenacne work and of labor was 
much hi~her in 1918 and 1919 than during the three year 
test period. Less efficient labor was used in mainten-
ance work durin6?; Government op er at ion than durinP:; the test 
period and improvements were made as quickly a$ possible, 
so there is a poesibility that the maintenance work done 
during ~overnment operation would not be aB lasting as 
that made du~ing a dEfferent period. The following 
table shows better what the Government did re@Snding 
ma int e nan ce work . 








Tiee inserted on 
roads 
94,835,433 
86, 400, 021 
85, 000, 000( estimate) 
These figures would indicate that the Government did 
not keep the maintenace work up to the standard. More rails 
41. Railway8 Earning in 1919-Railway A~e, October 29, 1920 
--p. 756. Stat iBtics from fiP:,Ures of the Bur. of Railway 
Economics. 
42. Maintenance of Way by the Raillroad Administration-
Railway A~e, January 2t 1920--p. 57. 
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were laid in 1919 than durin£S ~he test period but the 
increa$e would not counterbalance the decrease of 1918 
as comp~ed with the test period. The amount of ties 
inserted fell of heavily during both years of Government 





Equipment in use at the close of each year given: 43. 











5 5, 939 
56,611 
56,240 
These figures indicate that more equipm mt was in 
u.se durint?; federal control than at the end o.f the two years 
just precedin~. These figur~s might not mean as muah as 
they f3eem to, hovrever, because they show the con.di tion. 
that existed at one particular time. If another date had 
been taken the years 1918 and 1919 might not have made 
such a fa:vorabl e showing and jrlet they mLght have made 





Number of cars and locomotives built: 44 (includes 
Canadian output) 















Equipment added durin~ federal control: 45. 
43. Report of the InterGtate Com. Com, 1920-Table II--p. 99. 
44. Thompson, Slason, Railway Statistics of the United 
Sta.te8, 1919--p. 47. 
45. Hines, W. D.--Report.'bo the Pres:E!dent :Bor Fourteen 
Nontha endin~ March 1, 1920--p. 32. 
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\Purcha~ed by the Constructed Purchased Total 
















The8e figures make a more favorable showin~ than those 
for maintenance. More equipr.aent was added by the Railroad 
Administration than by the private companie$ durin~ the 
years 1916 and 1917, ex9epting passenger cars, and the 
I . 
Admini8tration. purcha8ed no new paBsenger cars. The 
passenger cars that were returned to the avvners were cer-
tainly in a much worse con.di ti on than they were. when they 
were taken over because they had gom-e throu~h two years 
of the roughest service possible. 
for 
Capital expenditures durinR; federal control{ 46. 
Railwa.y and. track 
Improvements to existin15 equipment 
New equipment purchased by :r·ai lr oads 
New equipment purchased by Railroad 
Admimi.stration 
Ef'.ltimated expenditures for January 






37, ooo. 000 
~1200,000,000 
Investment account of the railroads as of December 31 









The Govermnent made some capital expenditures ae these 
last two tables show. For the 1?;reater arnoun.t of these 
expenditures it would be reimburfled by the railroads 
46. Hines, Vl. D.--Report to the President for Fourteen 
Manthe ending March 1, 1920--p.33. 
1f1,.'. Report of the In.ters:tate Commerce Commission, 1920, 
Table IV--p. 100. 
according to the 'terms of i te contract with the roads. 
Only necessary war improvements were to be paid for by 
the Government. 
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Probably the chief critici$m regarding the equipment 
is tha.t the Government did not !bake the necesBary additlbon.$ 
to equipment and mileage that are generally made in normal 
times. The Administration did not a~ree to do this nor 
did the rai J.r oad$ under p riv.ate management do it in the 
few year~ juBt preceding Government operation. The ~ov-
er.mnent aigreed to return. the property in a.e good condi-
tion as it Wa8 when it was taken over but did not agree 
to make additions and betterments than would last for 
many yeare in the future and which were not a wa:r necessity. 
Opponenns of Government ownership have been inclined 
to hold the Railroad· Administration responsible for the 
claims made r_;y the advocates of Government ownership during 
normal peace times,. but such an attitude is unwarranted. 
The Railroad Administration should not be held responsible . 
for such contentions when it was allowed to do l!llnly what 
Con/¢' es s said it Bhould do • 
. Neither should the GoYernment be held responsible for 
what advocates of Government claim it will accomplish. 
The Goverr~ent did not asBume control of the railroads a$ 
an· experiment in Government operation. If it had it would 
not have been so anxi cul? to return the lines to their 
owners. It would have maintained control over them for a 
period of yearB in order to di8cover what such a plan could 
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accomplish durin~ normal times. During a war is not the 
proper time for testing such planB. There are a few who 
claim that l~lr. McAdoo wanted to show that the best results 
could be abcornplished under Government operation, and 
who critici8e the manner in which the railroads were 
operated!: :during the period of federal control but they are 
probab~y unjuet in their ciiticisrns. Officials did think 
that the beet results could be obtained under Government 
op er at ion else th e Government v1 ou ld not ba ire as 8Umed con-
tr ol of the road8 but Mr. McAdoo had no thought of making 
an experiment in ~overnment opera ti on when he wa!? Director 
General. The idea paramount in his mim.d was to make 
the railroad5i function. ss as to serve U$ best in our 
military operation.e. However, in his attempt to urdfy 
railroad activities, he had to emplpy many plans and 
policies that would· be used in a scheme of Government 
ownerahip. Mr. AcAdoo is an advocate of Goyernment 
ownership o.f the railroads but that is a "qtlestion which is 
entirely 8eparate frOl;ll his manaJ?;ement of' the railroads 
while the war was beint?; waged. 
THE END OF THE W.AB. 
The end of the war in November 1918 chan~ed the con-
di tior:ia f?urroundin€ the railroads and necessita.ted chan~es 
in the traffic policy of the Railroad AdminiBtration, some 
of which have ·been di$CUssed already. President Wilson 
specified in hi~ proclamation that the railroads would be 
restored "bo the owners within twenty-one months after 
the war erided. Aft er the wax ended, the Administration 
went to work forroulatin.g policies that.would aid in 
restorint?; the railroads to their owners. Plans were put 
into o'eration which would place the railroads upon a 
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basis approximatin€ that of normal times before they were 
~iven back to the owners. The Administration recognized 
that it could. not permit affairs to fSO alonl?: in a haphazard 
way and. finally throw the lines back upon their owners 
vii thout rnakincg some provision!? for such a ehant?;e. 
One of the first thin£Ss d crre in trying to restore 
normal operatiD.fS con.di tions was the establislunent of a 
D.irtisiori of Public Service with Mr. Max Thelen as Director. 
The work of this orlSan.ization was to improve relations 
with state commissions and to deal with relations between 
the public, the railroads, and the Railroad Administration. 
Equipment was aleo relocated with regard to ownership •. 
Foretgn cars were staxted toward the home line. Durin~ 
the coal strike iri the latter part of 1919, the Railroad 
Administration was char~ed with the allocation and dis-
tribution of coal and in doin.g this it had to scat~er the 
open top caxs but they were soon relocated after the 
strike ended. The relocc:1tion of equipment gave a better 
chance for railroading at home. Railroad lines were re-
igrouped, expecially in the Southwestern Region, and on 
all linef> shippers were £$iven more control over the routin.ig 
of their frei~ht. Wartime derourrage rates were also re-
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duced to the pre-war basis. Durini.s this time the railroad$ 
made many demandf3 upon the Railroad Admini$tration but 
most of them were refused because it con.eidered that the 
grantin~ of these requests would be favorin~ private oper-
ation at Government expense. 
In May 1919, President Wilson annoanced to Cont:;ress 
that the railroads would be returned to the owner$ at the 
end of the year. This placed upon Congress the respan• 
sibility of pa$sinP:; $·'atisfactory let?;iislation under which 
the lines could be restored. Restorin~ the lines upon 
a basis satisfactory to all concerned was a difficult 
task and required much careful thou~ht and consideration 
upon. the part of 6on~-ress. The vast majority of the 
people with the exception of the railroad employees, were 
disgusted with Government operation and were more than 
willin~ that the lines should !60 back to the private 
owners, but time was required in order to decide upon what 
basis they should tJe returned. In his 8peech to Con£$!' ess, 
President Wilson ~ave no policy for the futl?tre of the 
railroads. He left the whole question in the hands of 
Congress. The Democrate washed their handsoof the 
railroads and the Republicans were reluctant to assume 
the problem themselves; this accountB for the delay en-
countered i.n securin~ adequate railroad leq;islation. 
However, both President Wil~;;on and Director General 
Hines deerned it to be the best policy that the railroads 
should be restored tot.he pri,rate owners. The Interstate 
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Commerce Commission also voiced the same opinion in the 
followintS: 
"Consider! :ng and weighing as best we can all the 
arguments for and against the different plans, we are led 
to the conviction that with the adoption of appropriate 
provisions and safeguards for regulation under private 
ownerf:ihip, it would not be wise nor best at this tinie 
to as8ume Goi!ernment ownership or operation of the 
railroads of the country. 11 48. 
After the President announced that the railroads 
would be returned to the pri 1rat e owners, numer ouB plans 
were advanced f:or sol vin£?; the problem. The framers of 
nearly all of these pro~ram$ had some particular interest 
in view whem framing. their plan~; accordingly, each made 
his plan with a view to benefit those interests. The plans 
advanced were of th~ee general types. The first type 
was represented by the plans of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, of the Railway Executives, and of Mr. David 
Warfi cld, Pres~dent of the Association of Railway Security 
Owners. The fSecond type was represented by the jYlan of 
Director General Hines, and the third type by that of 
M·r. Glenn. E. Plumb, a lawyer of Washint?;t on, D. tll.. 
The plan.B of the first type remained close to the 
underlying principles of the past. The weak points of 
pa8t re£$Ulation were recognized and the framers sou$t 
to eliminate them. Government regulation and a better 
rule of rate makin€ were sou~ht. These plans rested 
upon private ownership; federal incorporation; the fegula-
tio:n. of security is8ues, a Cabinet p oei t ion of Seer etary 
of Transportation which .should have chie£ authority in 
117 
railroad matters, l~aving the Interstate Commerce Commission 
with only quasi-judicial functions; a rule of ratemaking 
to be recognized by statute; and wage boards to be organized, 
when necessary, and wage cost8 to be considered as an ex-
pense in rate making. 
The second general type of plane provided for govern-
ment partnership to the extent of a guaranteed return on 
railroad capital; for corJ;T-olidation into a few stron~ 
systems of railroad~; and for the participation of labor 
and of the Government, in excess returns over a guaranteed 
amount. Director General Hines view on the whole railroad 
problem ia given~in the following quotation: 49. 
"I do not person.ally believe in Government ownerehi:p. 
I believe that there can be a form of radically r econstnuc-
t i ve private owner ship with such close Government euper-
visi on including government repre1Serita.tion on the board$ 
of directors as will give the public and labor all the 
benefits of government owner8hip and at the same time 
will preserve the benefits of private and self-interested 
initiative and will avciid the political difficultiel3 which 
perhaps are inseparable from .government ownership." 
Director General Hines also believed that some of the 
pobicies which were used under Government operation should 
be continued under private mana.gem ent in order to promote 
the great est degree of public convenience and economy. Only 
the maet important of these will be enumerated. They 
have been discussed before and will only be mentioned lblew.50. 
49. Parmalee, J. H .--Proposals for Solution of the Railway 
Problem, American Economic Review, June 1919--p. 394. 
50. Hines, W. ~.--Report to the President for Fourteen 
Monthis endin~ 1~arch 1, 1920--p. 38. 
f', 
1. Unifications of systems and of terminals. 
2. Standardization of equipment, repa±i shape, and 
of waP;;es and wol."king conditions. 
3. Poolin~ of equipment. 
4. The permit system in handlin~ traffic. 
5. Consolidated freight classifications. 
6. Control of export traffic. 
7. Consolidation of ticket offices. 
8. Uniform rules of car distribution. 
9. Bipartisan boards to consider labor problems. 
10. Routin€ of traffic. 
11. Use of common time tables. 
12.·Representation of the shippin~ ~ublic on rate 
makinq; commit tees. 
118 
13. Use of si n.q;le track paralle:t :.:lines as double lines. 
It is obvious that the continuance of the above 
arrangements under private control would be the best thin!?, 
tha.t could be done so ·,far as economy in management and 
conYenience to the shippers are concerned, but there are 
difficulties that interfere with the continuance of some 
of these plan8. Mr. McAdoo, who also believed that these 
plans shot~ld be continued under private operation, points 
out the difficultiei::; to be encountered when he says1' 
"----Competition and self-interest dictate that when 
the roads are· under private control each carrier geiB M 
much business as possible and keeps it regardless of the 
fact that the ag~egate result may be wasteful and unecon-
omical. For instance when two or more competing lines 
operate between two important cities, the convenience of 
the public can best be .eerved if alt ernatint?; trains be 
operated at thort intervals over the different roads. 
Competition however, always results in. each of the roads 
"bunchini;:" its trains at times when the demand for traffic 
is heavie!?t. Competirn~ lines can hardly be expected to 
route frei~ht over the routes of competitors even thou~h 
theBe competing lines may have the shorter routes and be 
able to handle this particular traffic more economically. 
Lines with adirar:itageous terminal faci li ti es cannot be 
expected under private control tto place such facilities 
at the disposition of com:peti tors operating under less 
favorable circumstances. One c ompan.y will not for ego 
loadin~ and haulin~ traffic even though this seriously 
embarasses the general situ at ion because its connections 
cannot conveniently receive and dispoae of the traffic. 
Private carriers may not enforce rules which, although 
desLgned to bring about efficiency and economy, might 
drive bus in es s away fr om their 1 i nes • All the wast e 
resultin~ from theee practices and running into huge 
cost8 is paid for by the public in. the form ai" higher 
rates." 51. 
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The third general type of plans, represented by the 
Plumb plan, provided for Government ownership outright. 
It provided for the purchase of the railroads ry the 
Goverrunent and then for the turning of them over to an 
operating corporation, administered by a board of directors, 
part of whom were to be elected, the others to be appointed 
by the President; for the di vision of revenues between 
the Government and the operating corporation., the latter 
to pay its share to labor as a dividend; for the f ixint?; 
of rate~ by the Interstate Commerce Commission and for 
the settlement of labor problems by boards appointed 
for that purpose. This was the only seriously conBidered 
plan which provided for government ownership. 
All of the plans advanced gave evidence tbat their 
framers saw the £?;ravity of the transportation situation 
and i:lhe need for a ~ood syBtem. Al~o that we needed a 
fuller and more 8trict goverrunental regulation, and better 
provision for adequate revenues. However, n.one of the 
above plans were considered aa the one under which our 
railroad$ should operate after bein~ returned to their 
own.eri;. None of the contained all the provisions that 
Congress considered necessary if the railr·oads were to have 
51. McAdoo, W .G.--Statements before the Interstate Commerce 
Committee of the United State8 Senate, Jan. 3 and 4, 1919 
--p. 16. 
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a satisfactory basis upon which to operate. Of the above 
plans, that of Senator Plumb attracted most attention, not 
because it was the be8t on but because of it radical departure 
f:ocnn past exp er i enc e. 
Two plans riot yet mentioned were the ones which moat 
attracted the attention of Congress. These were the Cummins' 
Bill, in~roduced by Senamor Cummins of Iowa, in the Senate,· 
and the Esch Bill, intDoduced by Repr ee entati 1re Esch of 
Wisconsin, in the House of RepresentatiYes. 'I'here y;ere in 
Con.gress so many difference8 of opinion regardin15 railroad 
legislation that none wa8 passed by the end of the year 1919 
with the result that the lines were not returned to the 
owners as had been planned and they could not safely be re-
turned without proper legislation to protect them. President 
Wilson saw before the end of the year the the proper le£Sis-
lation would not be enacted for Eeturin~ the railroads; 80 
on December 24 he issued a proclamation extendin.g the period 
of federal control to March 1, 1920 and statinlS definitely 
that the roads would be returned to ttiheir owners on that date. 
The above bills were passed by their respective house, the 
Cummins Bill on December 20, 1919, and the Esch Bill on 
November 17, 1919. However neither House would a~ree upon 
the bill of the other. Finally the two bills were submitted 
to a conference committee composed from member!? from both 
houses of Con~ress. This 6onnittee revised the two billA and 
on February 18, 1920, reported to Congress what it had done. 
The bill framed by this .c ommi tt e~, known as the Esch-
Curnmins Bill was acceptable to both 
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hou.ses of Con~ess, the House of Representatives passing it on 
February 21 and the Senate on February 23. On February 25, 
the bill w~se sent to the President for his approval and sig-
nature and on Eebruary 28 he sit?;ned it, thus rnak:b.n.g definite 
what was to be done with the railroads.- The Act a.s siJJJned by 
the President provided amon~ other provisions which will be 
discuse ed in the section immediately followin~, that the 
railroads should be returned to their owners at midni~ht on 
March 1, 1920. 
THE CUllilffINS' BILL, THE ESCH BILL, AND THE ESCH-CUM1'H1'iS BILL. 
The main provisions of the 6ummins bill, the Esch Bill, 
and the Esch-Cummins, or the Conference Committee bill, are 
R;i '\ren in order to show the principles upon which the new 
railroad legislation was based. The different bills will 
be considered collectively in order that the differences and 
changes may be noted. 
I. Ownership. 
Cummins bill: 
Pri '\Tate ownership. All lines were to be con.solidat ed 
into not less than twenty nor more than thirty-five large 
isystems, made lawful by the approval of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. 
Esch bill: 
Pri'7ate ownership and consolidation to the extent 
that the Interstate Commerce Commis.sion approved. 
Conference bill: 
Priirat e owner6hip. The cone olidation iirbo systems 
was to be volun.tary upon the part of the carriers. 
Tlbie Int er state Commerce Commis8i on 
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was to work out a 'Seneral plan of consolidation 
which mi~ht be accepted by the carriers. 
2. Operation. 
Cummins bill:-
Private, under Government reJJUlation; the re~­
lation to be by a Federal Transportation Board 
composed of ~ive memberB to be appointed by 
the President. The In:fferstat e Commerce Commissinn 
was to have a quasi-judicial function. 
Esch bill:-
Private; under Government re£SUlation; regulation 
to be by '<the Interstate Commerce C ornmission. 
Conference biil:-
Same as under the Esch bill. 
3. Securities. 
All three plans provided for Government re.gulation 
of the iesue of securities. 
4. Guaranteed re turn. 
All three bills provided. for .guaranteeing the present 
standa.r d return for a period of six month~. The 
lines which did not ask for increased rates inside 
of Bi)Xy days after the termination of Federal 
control did not receive this privilege, however. 
This provision. wa6 inserted in order that the 
roads mLght not 'be s:>hort of ready money during 





Funding of the carriers debt to the Government 
for ten years at 6%. 
Esch bill:-
Fundin~ of the debt, less rentals owed 1y the 
Government for t'ifteen yearB a.t 6,%. 
Conference bill:-
Funding of the debt for ten years at 6%. The 
carriers were to give such security as the 
President might prescribe. 
6. The revolvin~ fund: 
Cummins bill:-
There was to be an individual reserve for each 
line for its own credit. There was also to be 
a general conting:ent fund created by the strong 
lines for the benefit of all. 
Esch bill:-
There was to be a fund of $250,000,000 created 
by the Government. This could be loaned to 
needy lines for periods of five ·years if they 
made applicatibn for such loans inside of 
twenty-six months. 
Conference bill{-
Sa.me as the Esch bill, except that the amount 
was $300, 000, 000. ?.his appropriation was to 
enable the carFiera to buy equipment and make 
improvements durin€ the period of transition if 
1~4 
they were unable to finance $UCh undertakingn 
themsel ve$. 
7. Valuation: 
Was to be by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
in all three plans. 
8. ·Rates: 
Cummins bill:-
Pre$ent rat es were to be continued until new 
ones w Ere approved by the Interstate Cornmer.ce 
Commission. 'l1he country was to be divided into 
rate districts with special consideration as 
to conditions existing in ea~~ Th.e Interstate 
',!,. 
Commerce Commission was to allow rates that 
would permit a return of 5t% on the valuation 
of the property in each rate ~roup, plus t% 
which might be used ffor improvements. In five 
. d th 5 1 d b . b . year p er l o s, e 1ua . as 1 s could e r ai !3 e d or 
lower ed. 
Esch 'bill:-
Was;. the same a..s the exist in£?; ret?;Ulat io:n except 
that it provided that the Interstate Commerce 
Commiesion should make both maximum and minimum 
rates instead of maximum rates only. 
Conference bill:-
The e~dstin~ rates were to re.main in effect 
until September 1, 1920, unleS?s a che.nge was 
allowed by the Interstate Commertffe Commission. 
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The Int erst ate Commerce Commission was igi ven. 
power to establi $h both maximum and minimum 
rate8 and was to establish rates that would 
allow a return of 5-~-% upon the aggregate 
valuation of all railway property in the rate 
making group, plus !% which mi€ht be used for 
additions, improvements and betterments. All 
of the return in excess of 6% wai=:; to be divided 
equally between the parti~ular carriers reserve 
fund and a contingent fund established by the 
Government from which lo ans ,mi€ht be made to 
weak lines for the purchase of equipment and 
other purpose$. All carriers that wanted to 
receive the benefit of the Government guaranty 
of income were to make appeal for higher rates 
withing sixty days after 1'JTarch 1, 1920. 
9. Labor: 
Cummin.s bill:-
Three Ret?;ional Boards of Adjustment, ha vin.g 
three members each of employers and of employees, 
on each board, were to be created. These boards 
were to decide all la l:or dis:pu tes othe!' t ·rian 
those relating to wages. A committee on Wages 
and Workin~ eonditions waB to decide all ques-
tions relating to Wa.t?;es and working conditions 
and to decide cases when appeals were made to 
it by the Reg.ional Boards. Thii:; Board could 
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appeal in t~rn to the Federal Transportation 
Board whose decision was final. Strikes and 
lockouts were made illegal. 
Esch ·bill:-
Three Boards of Adjustment to decide all 
questiong within the three ciassifi cation of 
ernploye_es, (trainmen, shopmen, and all other 
J.., 
employees) were to be created. These poards 
were to be composed equally of repreqentatives 
of the employees and of the employeri:;. The 
one represent in .q: trainmen was to have eight 
members, that representin~ shopmen to have 
twelve member$, and that representing all other 
employee~ to have eight members. Three Com-
mis$ioners on Labor Di~putes were to be selected 
to .hear all appeal!?. There was no le$Sislation 
against strikes and lockouts. 
Co nf ere nee bill:-
A board to be known as the Itailroad Labor Board 
com~osed of nine members, the enpl qyees, the em-
players and the public being equally represented, 
was to be created. The members of this board 
were to be appointed by the President of the 
United St.ates by and with the conBent of the 
Senate, and the ce:ntral office of the Board 
was to be in Chicago. 
The carriers and their employee$ were ~ermitted 
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to establish Railway Boards of Labor Adjustment. 
The6e were to deal with all -questio~s except 
wages_., the Railroad Labor Board_ havin~ c~arge 
of this question~ and if they could not reach 
an agreement they could appeal to the latter 
board. The Railroad Labor Board could investi-
1'.Sate an.d decide questions upon its own motion, 
at the request of the chief official if a 
carrier, and on t!J.e ~eti ti on of on s-hundred 
unorganized workers. 
There was to ~e compulsory submission of all 
labor di.sputes to the Railroad Labor Board if 
they were not decided 13y the other named boards. 
The decision of the Railroad Labor Board was 
final. How ever, there was no punishment provided 
for violation of its awards. 
The section of the bill deal in.q; with labor 
required more attention than other parts. 
Railway employees were fi qhtin.g aisainc;t the 
carriers ~oing" back to the owners and used all 
their inflµence witn1 President Wilson to keep 
him from Bigninq; the bill. The Conference 
Committee drafted this section of the bill to 
coincide with the views of Director General 





A Federal 'JRransportation Board, and ttlte Inter-
state Commerce Commission. 
Esch bill:-
Both the Esch bill and the Conference bill 
provided f.or one body, the Inter$tate Commerce 
Commies ion. 
The Inters.tate Commerce Act was amended so as to 
~i ve the Inter$tate Commerce Commission the f ollo;vfinb_S 
increased power$: 
1. The establishment of both maximum and minimum 
rat es. 
2. The control of car service in emergencies, and 
the tou tin&:~ of freight. 
3. To compelt the joint use of terminal~, and to 
~ive priority to any class of freight Deedin~ such. 
4. The Commic::sion muat give it.s approval before 
additions, bett e:rment.s, or abandonments can be made. 
5. Compleie~ontrol of the railways in case of wax-
er threatenad war. 
6. Interlockin€ directorates in the case of railways 
wafl prevented without the a1)proval of the Inte=estate 
Commerce Commission. 
7. The membership of the InterBtate Commerce Commission 
was increased fron nine to eleven members and their sal-
aries we~:e increased from $10, 000 to $12, 000. 
Thue the railways o.f the country were restored to 
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their private owners. 'lhis leq;iBlation., while probably not 
the best that could have been enacted, shows a step far in 
advance of anythinc:; that had ever been propo8ed before for 
the f3ol irin~ of the railway problem. Its ori~inators show 
they have a view of the relationship of the transportation 
system to the nation., that has never been shown before. 
They have gotten away from the idea that the railways are 
only a. private undertakintS, and have :eealized the fact that 
the public has as gr eat an intereBt i :n ret?;Ulati on bein£S 
sound and protective to the carriers as well as to the 
public, as have the carriers themselves. 
The outeta.ndin~ feature of the new law is the provision 
for establishintS rate8 that will permit a teturn of 5i-% 
on the valuation of the property,. and the division of the 
earnintSs in excess of 6%. The men who made the law recog-
nized that something must be done to afd and e6tablish the 
credit of the rail ways. That (credit) ie the heart of the 
railway p~ob~em. Give the railways a good basis for credit 
and a little time and they will soon be in a prosperous con-
dition. Under the nevv law the Interstate Comnrerce Commission 
has a 1a8i ~ upon which to make its judgment which it did not 
have under the previous laws. The new law provided for fed-
eral valuation of the railroad propertteB. There was however 
provision for federal valuation before the new le~islati on 
was enacted but such provision had been in effect only a 
8hort time. Federal valuation would make a uniform valuation 
for all of the railroads; and would l?;i ve the Int ersta.t e eommerc e 
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Commission a basis upon which to make its jud@nent when 
dealint_s with rate questions. 
A chan.ged attitude toward the railways came over the 
public durin~ the war. The difficulties under which the 
railways found thern.sel1res durin.g and after the war brouf$ht 
home to the people's mind~ the fact that we had a very ser-
ious railway problem on our hands. Before this time dis-
satisfaction wa~ about petty matters, but durin~ the war 
di~satisfaction was about very fundamental matters. At 
present, people are all more friendly toward the railroads 
than they were five years ~o. '.i~his attitude is bound to 
react to the benefit of both the c arri eri:; and the public. 
At prei:;;ent the publi·c i.s not so much interested in the rates 
that it has to pay as it is in the service which it secure8. 
It is willint$ to pay a rate which will secure the seririce 
trhat it desires. If it will not pay such rat es it will haYe 
to be 8atisfi ed with the kind of service that it is willing 
to pay for. Producers have seen that they are hampered 
in their pr.oductive capacity and that invested capital must 
lie idle if they cannot .get their products to market. If 
they do not E?;et their products to market, they cannot 
meet their obli.gations and bad conditions are created in all 
induBtries. The preple have seen that the mo st costly 
·railway service is i :nadequat e service, and not hit;;h :priced 
service. 
Chapter IV. 
The Trp.n.sp~rtation Situation and the Condi ti on of 
the Railroada upon their Return to Private Management, 
Mar ch 1 , 1 9 2 0 • 
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At midnight, on March 1, 1920, the railroada of the 
United State8 were returned to their private ownere. The 
official8 of the lines had been preparing for this change 
for some tirne with the :eesult that it was accomplished 
smoothly and almost imperceptbly in so far as the public 
wa!? concerned. But the railroads on Jfarch 1, 1920, were 
not the same that they were when they were taken over by 
the Government on December 28, 1917. They could not be 
the same. The Government had. disorganized and rearran~ed 
their aciivities. The identity of ~ndividual properties 
had been mer!.6ed into that of others; the rolling stock 
had been scattered over the country until not more than 
21% of the car? were on home lines; repairs had be en. made 
without uniformity and in. some cases were not adequate; 
the mana£Sement had been deprived of the intimate touch 
with its property; andtthe current revenues had been 
taken by the Government and no final adjut?tmenti had been 
made, leaving their financial condition uncertain. Oper-
ating crusts had risen tremendously during the la.c:;t 'blwo 
yeans; -present revenues were inadequate to meet them, 
and there was a loss to each line of i tB adaptation to 
traffic. Under such cop.di tions, p~-war operation would 
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be impossible. There was a period of adju$tment that the 
railroads would have to .go throu~h. Such conditions were 
bound to cause trouble for the railroad afficials but the 
only thin.g that they could do was to attack the problem 
with all their force and do what they were able to dol 
No more could be expected of them. 
There is sure to be keen competition between the 
railroad8 for the regainin~ of lost traffic and for the 
gaininsi of new traf fie and there will be heavy traffic 
for years to come for the equipment that exist6, due to 
the 'Srowth of industry durinG?; the war and due to the many 
demands that went unfilled ~urin.g the war ?uch as the 
demand for new buildin~ and construction work. These 
conditions will necessitate a vast amount of expenditures 
by the railroads for new lines, additions, betterments, 
and new equipment. The increase in these items had by 
no means kept pace with the increase in business and 
.growth of industry; so provision for them is of the utmost 
importance if the railroads are to .give the service that 
will be required of them, and the shippinG?; public is bound 
to be very insist e rt in the fut-ure in its demands for 
adequate transportation service. 
The f ollowin.g table gives the estimated amounts of 
money th~t will be required by the railroads -vvithin the 
next three years: 1. 
1. Hix Billion Dollars for Capital Expenditures, Railway 
Age, January 2, 1920--p •.. 9 . 
6,000milea new line 
10,850 miles automatic block si~nals 
15,000 miles multiple main track 
30, 000 miles yard and i:>ide track 
13,177 locomotives 
24,500 passenger cars 
712,400 frei~ht cars 
Shop equipment 
Ext ens ions 
Engine houses, shop~ 
Grade revision, elimination of 
curves, etc. 
Statione 
Total amount required 











3 00 t 000 t 00 0 
$ 6,010,000,000 
The amount of indebtedness both of the railroadi:.:J to 
the Government for advances for improvements, and of the 
Government to the railroads for the guaranteed rentalB 
was not known exactly when the railroads were returr:e d 
to the owner$. Some time would be required for the 
adjustment of these matters as each individual railroad 
would have to be dealt with separately in order to deter-
mine the amount due each. In his report to the Prer-;ident 
on February 29, 1920, Director .General .Hine$ gave his 
estimates as to these amounts, and since then the$e have 
proven to be fairly accunate. The estimates of the 
Director Gen er al are given in the ac companyin~ table: 2. 
2. Hines, W. D.--:qeport to the President for I11ourteen 
Months e ndin.g March 1, 1920--p. 47. 
:APPENDIX. 
Statement sh<nmnu estimated ·net disbitrsements made fot' capital efr:penditure8 
and other aclvancos biJ the Govcfoment · a1ut for operafto1is <luring the 26 
1nonths' period (Jan. i, 19.l8-jJf ar. 1, 1920) of Federal coiitroi of Oiass I rail-· 
roads and other ·properties, i1icludfog American· Railway Empress Co., and 
appropriations 1nadc and required. 
l. Total advances by the Government for additions 
and betterments.to roadway and structures ilnd 
equipment (except .auo·cated equipment) ______ $780, 405, 512 
2. Amount that may be deducted therefrom oii ac-
c01rnt of compensation, depreciation, open ac-
count, etc., due companies_~ ___ ;.. .... ____ .________ 461; 480, 839 
3. Net amount of additions and betterments ~ 
toadwa;Y' and structures and equipment , (ex-
cept allocated ~quipmelit) to be ftindeci for 10 
y~ars . (see · nofo 1)-------'-----------...:.-~--~---------...;.----....; 
4. Allocated equipment funded through equipment 
trusts, principally payable in 15 .~nimal in-
. sfollmen ts _______________________ ...:. ... :. _______ ~-------------
5. Other indebtedness due Government to. be evi-
denced by one-year notes· (see note 1 >---------------------
0. Long-term notes payable to Government_ __________________ _ 
7. Stocks, bonds, and receivers' certificates of 
railroad companies owned by Government..: _______________ _ 
8. Total representing indebtedness of railroads and 
other properties, including expres1? companies ____________ _ 
9. Other investments of Railroad Administration: 
Ad(litions and betterments to inland water-
'vays -------------------------~-------~- $10,029,496 










Total of items of i~debtedness and investment_ ___________ 1,031, 899, 451 
Estimated excess of operating expenses and 
rentals over operating revenues: 
Class I railroads------------------------- 715,500,000 
Other privately owned properties (smaller 
railroads, sleeping . and refrigerator car 
• lines, and steamsh.ip lines) -----------r- 29, 170, 000 
Inland waterways------------------------ 2, 570, 000, 
Expense of central and regional organiza-
tions ___ , _____________ ...:---------~------- 14, 080, 000 
American Railway Express Co-------..,.-'--- 37, 000, 000 
Adjustment of materials and supplies in set-
tlement with railroad companies on ac-
count 'of increasing prices ______ .:______ 74, 003, 434 
872,323,434 
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Less net- credits . on account of interest on (a) 
open accounts, (b) compensation, and (c) ex-
penditur~s for additions and _betterments ____ .:,:::_ __ $17, noo, 000 
$854,423,434 
• 11. Grand total..;.. ______ ..;.. __ ..;.. ____ :_ ______ .:_ _______________________ 1, 886, 322, 885 
Original. appropriation, Federal control act- 500, 000, 000 
Def}ciency appropriation-----------:------- 750, 000, 000 
Appropriation carried in pending railroad . 
. bill_.:.._~ ___ _:. ___________ ~.::.-:--: ____ -:;_ _______ 200, 000, 000 
1,450,000,0~0 
Additional appropriation that will be require(] ______ ,:.__________ 436, 322, 885 
NOTE.-=--The net amount of $318,924,673, ~·epresenting cost of additions and betterments 
to roadway and structures to be' fun.ded for 10 years, is reached· by making such· offsets· 
as are permissible under the terms of pending railroad bill, in the first instance, against 
indebtedness growing out of additions and betterments. It is quite likely that in the 
actual settlement 'with many 'roads offsets wlll be used in the first instance to wipe out 
indebtedness represented by demand note.s or by open account instead of against auditions 
and betterments to roadway and structures. - The result of tbls would be to increase the 
net amount of additions and betterments to roauway and· structures to be funded and 
correspondingly to decrease the amount stated in item No. 5, of $194,G80,5u2, as repre-
senting other indebtedness due the Government to be evidenced· by one-year notes. The 
t.otal of indebtedness to the Go1vernment would, of course, not be affected: 
O· 
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In the table just .given it is seen that the total 
amount spent by the Go\rernment a8 investment and indebted-
ness wa$ ~~·l, 031, 899, 451. Add to this, the amount that 
the actual operatin.g expenses of all the propertie8 taken 
over exceeded the operating revenuse and there is a total 
of $1, 886, 322, 885 spent by the Governme.nt upon the rail-
roads and the other properties while _it was operatin~ 
them. Up until March 1, 1920, $1450,000,000 had been 
appropriated by Con.gress to· meet these exp em; es leavin~ 
an amount of ~~436, 322, 885 to be a:ppr opriated before the 
expenses of Government operation had been fully met. 
However· this would not all be a loss to the Governrnent 
because the railroads owed it for all amounts expended 
for i:rrJ];>'rovements that were not made aB war necessities. 
The followines table shows what the Government owed the 
ftailroad8 and what the railroar1s owed the Government: 3. 
Government indebtedness to the railroads 
for rentnls-----------------~--------$ 1,476,928,805.60 
Rai l!'oads indebtedness to the G·overnment 
for improvements and additions 1,667,342,077.00 
Under the terms of the Transportation Act of 1920, 
~~815,379,145 of the amount due fr om the carriers to the 
Government may be U8ed as an offs et aP;;ainst the amount 
owed by the Government to the railroadB leavi·n£?; to be 
paid to the carriers a net a.mount of $661,549,661.89. 
As was shown. in discus~3in~ the op-,eratin.g deficit, 
the tot al lo e s t o the Go ir er nm e n.t d ur i n.g the t went y-s ix 
3. Federal Control of Railroads Results in f-900,000, 000 
Deficit, Railway Review,.:May 29, 1920-'-p. 878. 
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month~ of federal control was $900,478,~S7 and $667,513,152 
of this amount Wa$ chargeable directly to the excess of 
operating expense$ 01rer isros$ revenues on ClaBs I lines. 
The Condition of the Physical Prouerty. 
This was dealt with in the preceding chapter but a 
summary cf the condition will be given here. It is the 
general conqensus of opplh.:b.on among people conver8ent 
wi trrii railroad matt era and from evidence furnished in the 
statistics of the Direct or General that maint enanne 
during tteder al control was nwt quite what it should ha\re 
been although the Director General in his report to the 
President on February 29, 1920 stated that the condition 
o.f the plant and equipment compared favorably with the 
condition at the t.itjle it was taken over by the Government. 
Durin~ the period of federal control the plant and 
equipment were under the greatest pressure of traffic 
1id> which it had ever been su]>j ected, but the maintenance 
was below normal and certainly below what the wanr and 
tear of 1ill:le heavy wa:r traffic called for. It was not 
the fault of the Railroad Administration that the main-
tenance was not kept up to the required standard because 
that body was dependent upon Con.greF.>s for all the money 
it secured with which to make impro1rements, and durin~ 1919 
ConE$re6s refused to make appropriationB with which im-
provements could have been made. 
The Government did a little b'ett er with the equipment 
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althou~h it is claimed that the proper additions were not 
made. Much of the equipment was needed so badly that it 
could not be released for repair·s when they were needed. 
'l'his was true es.:pecially of pass en1?;er equipment . 
Authorized and actural exp endi ture8 of the Railroad 
Adminiatration: 4. 
Authorized Additions and New construe- Equipment. Total 
betterments. ti on. 





$ 57,429,823 . $ 330,42?,456$$1?1,131,168 
Amount actually expended: 
1918 $ 272,232,972 $ 21,346,231 $ 180,058,810 $473,628,013 
1919 . 237,143,941 
1918-19$ 509,376,913 
10,011,832 85,101,952 332,267,?25 
$ 31,358,063. $ 265,160,762 ~805,895,~38 
These fi~res show that the Railroad Administration plan-
ned to spend much more than it did and if Con.gresa had not 
refused to appropriate funds the Administration would have 
$SOne ahead and improved the properties leavin1?; them in as:; 
l?;OOd or probably better condition than when taken over. 
Total Maintenance: 




Per cent of tatal expense. 
$ 974,776,000 42.4 
1,750,305,000 44.1 
2,Qll0,807,000 45 .• 5 
The pe.rcentat?;e total in the precedin£S table would indicate 
that maintenance was kept up to the normal but it does not 
take account of the very hard wear that the p:han.t and 
equipment were subject to durinfS federal operation. This 
4. Authorized and Actual Expenditures, En~ineeri n15-News 
Record, May 27, 1920--p. 10?5. 
5. Parmalee, J. H.--Railway I'lfaintenapce in 1920, En.gineering 
News-Record, J"anuary 6, .1921--p. 34. 
hard wear and tear would neceflsitate the expenditure of 
a proportionately lar~e amount of money in order to keep 
the property in as £SOOd condition as it should be and i:a 
as .good shape as it .was when taken over. 
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The depreciation of plant and wquipment would certainly 
place the railroads under difficulties when they were 
teturned to the owners. Extra burdens would be :placed upon 
the lines in brin~in~ their property back to the proper 
condition. 
The Condition of Railroad Finances and Earnings. 
When the railroads were returned to the owners, the 
opera tins expenses were exceedin~ the revenues by a very 
lar~e amount. Durin~ the last few months of federal control 
the deficit: ·had been .growing lar~er each month. 'l'his 
placed the railroads in a position which made it impossible 
for them to finance thernsel ves unaiidled aft er they were 
returned. If the Government had not iguaranteed the railroa<S 
the Btandard :return for six month$ an.d had not been willinE$ 
to loan them money wi tl!D ".nliich to make improvementc;, the 
carriers would more than likely have had .great difficulty 
in do in .g any improvement work aft er they went back to 
,private control because their credit was 80 poor ithat they 
could have c::;ecured funds only the best of security and at 
the hi~he~t of raaes and it is very possible that they 
would not hhen have secured the amounts that they needed. 
138 
Provisions of the New Regulation. 
It now remains to ~ive the new system of reigulation 
a fair trial. In doin~ this, every individual in the nation 
must do his share toward makin.g the re£?;ulation a succ css. 
New respo:nsirJilities rest upon all "Thut er.,pecially upon the 
carriers and upon the Interstatte Commerce Commission. 
The shippinr; public should not expect too much from 
the railroads at first. lt must be patient while trhe 
railroads are ~oinis throu~h the first few months of t bis 
period of adjustment. It must realize that the railroads 
are faced with very serious difficulties and pr oblernc; 
and that they will be unable to render their be.$t service 
for some time to come. It should also co-operate to the 
very fullest extent with the railroads in their effort!=.> to 
return to a sound basis. 
The carriers must also reco~nize their responsibilities 
durinr;s this period and durin.g the years to come. They rrust 
reco~mize the extent to which other industries are co-
operatin ~with them and must in turn endea"lror to raise their 
standard of service to that level of efficiency whi8h 
is expected of them. They are trusted with the r esponsi-
bili ty of furnishin!S irransportation !?ervice to the public 
and in all their dealin~B they must view ther!i abligationra 
from the standpoint of that of a public servant, and con-
sider the public rights and the public welfare. The 
public ha? a rLght to the service that it expect·s if the 
railroads ha~.;e the power.to deliver the service. Of course, 
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too much must not be expected from the carriers nut if 
we make it poseible for them to operate upon a :profitable 
baei s, we have a right to demand that t'hey furnish ade-
quate tranBportation aeririce f)or moirin£S our product6 
durin~ norli'al times. 
The Int er state Commerce Commission al~rn has a gr eat er 
responBibility for the welfare of the railroads under the 
new legislation because of. the increased powers given to it. 
J?ormerly that body wa8 not responsi"ble for the results of 
tfue exercise of its power but now it is. Previously its 
main duty was in relation to the adjustment of rates, but 
now it has been R::iven broader powers over railroad affairs 
in R;eneral. It now has bDoader powers over rat ea and it 
is also responsible for the proper financial management 
of the carriers through its control of the issueing of 
securi tiel?. Much of. the bu1=3ine:=:;e management of the rail-
roadB has been transferred from the corporations to the 
Commission, thereby makin.g it somethint?; more than a body 
mierely for the purpose of interpretin.g the law and for 
compilin~ statistics. Now, instead of 1newin~ only one 
side of the case, it must see that both sides secure justice. 
The future 8Uccess of the railroads depend8 upon the view 
taken by the «:ammission c oncernin~ railroad matt era; 
whether that view is a broad, far-si~hted one or a narrow, 
di st ort ed one. 'l'he Commis.sion now ha~ the power to either 
make or break the railroadR. Of ·course to a limited de~ree 
each indi1ridual in the nation is responsible f'or the wel-
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fare of the carriers but in the ffirst instance the Inter-
state Commerce Commission is responsible~ because it is 
the body that frames to a lar.ger extent the policies 
governing the railroad$. If the Commission p~rmi b3 the 
railroads to secure sufficient credit to meet the needed 
quantity and quality of transportation service, the le~is­
lation will have been a success, and it will have done its 
part well. The r ai lr oad s, the Int erst ate Gommer ce Commis$ion, 
an:d the new law are all o:n trial and only time will reveal 
the final result. 
We have learned a lesson, and a very costly lesson, in 
railroading, but finally, it mey ~"Je worth all that it has 
cost. It ii:, to be hoped that we: pra·fi t fr9Jm that which 
we have learned. In thi~, a!=> in many other cases, experience 
has been a costly teacher and it i$ to be re~retted that we 
could not have worked out this problem without such a co8t, 
but that not being permitted, we should p2"ofit by our mis-
tatces of the past, and knowing these, go to work to make 
our transportation system, as well as every other institution 
relatins to public welfare, contribute most to our pro£Sress 
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